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Abstract
Donatelle, Benjamin, M.S., December, 2015

Environmental Studies

Abstract
Chair: Len Broberg
Collaborative Conservation is one type of Environmental Conflict Resolution (ECR)
that, since the 1970’s, has proliferated throughout public land and natural resource
management, especially in the Western United States. As the notion of collaboration has
risen in the collective consciousness of public land management professionals, various
efforts to capitalize on its use have been instituted through regulatory reforms and
legislation. For example, the Forest Service’s recent adoption of the 2012 planning rule
emphasizes collaboration and enhanced public involvement in revising forest
management plans. Meanwhile, for twenty years the Resource Advisory Councils have
fulfilled their regulatory responsibilities and exemplify policy mandated collaborative
consensus-building process, yet little research has been conducted to understand what
contributes to their effectiveness.
This study investigates the effect of instituting or requiring collaborative conservation in
the management of public lands by examining the Resource Advisory Councils (RACs)
as they are employed within the Bureau of Land Management. This study seeks to
understand the key benefits and features of the RAC institution that enable its
effectiveness by asking: what can be learned from the Rocky Mountain Region RACs as
an example for how collaborative problem solving can be instituted in public lands
management? And, how can these lessons inform future attempts to institute
collaborative governance within the legal and institutional framework of federal public
lands management?
An analysis of records from past meetings and interviews with RAC and agency staff
members resulted in a comprehensive understanding of the issues over which the RACs
deliberate, their process for formulating recommendations and what benefits are realized
from the program. Responses from the interviews indicated a high level of value
associated with participating in the RAC program such as increased trust between
participants, appreciation of the complexity of controversial issues, and an ability to help
the BLM make difficult decisions. Several recommendations for improvement are also
highlighted.
In an age of ceaseless animosity over the management of federal public lands, this study
contributes to advancing the integration of collaborative problem solving in federal lands
management and gives voice to the positive effects of community-based conflict
resolution.
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1. Introduction
Collaborative Conservation is one form of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) or
Environmental Conflict Resolution (ECR) that, since the late 1970’s, has proliferated
throughout public land and natural resource management, especially in the Western United
States. Whether considered a passing fad or the new way of doing business, collaborative
approaches to natural resource conflict resolution, environmental decision making, and
land-use planning have undeniably left their mark on the history of natural resource
management over the past thirty years. The ability of collaborative conservation to achieve
on the ground results by bringing together diverse, often adversarial interests to solve
natural resource problems has caught the attention of policy makers at both the state and
federal level. This study investigates the institutionalization, or instituting1 of such
collaborative processes of ECR within federal agencies by focusing on the example of the
Resource Advisory Councils (RACs) within the United States Department of Interior’s
Bureau of Land Management (BLM).
This investigation follows two main threads of inquiry. First, what can be learned
from the Rocky Mountain Region RACs, as an example for how collaborative problem
solving can be instituted in public lands management? Second, how can these lessons
inform future attempts to institute collaborative governance within the legal and
institutional framework of federal public lands management? In approaching this
investigation, three research questions were developed to probe both the policy and

Christine Carlson and John Stephens. Governance and institutionalization: How may the institutions
of government make appropriate, sustained use of consensus building processes at the local, state, and
federal levels? Unpublished manuscript. (October 3, 2002). On file with the Author. In their article,
the authors distinguish between institutionalize, which is, “...synonymous with bureaucratize, a
mindless consistency, active suppression of innovation, and frustration of common-sense problemsolving...” and institute, which better describes how “...dispute resolution or collaborative practices
can be employed by government.”
1
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practical aspects of the BLM RACs as an institution: 1) What catalyzed the use of
collaboration in creating the RACs? 2) What has enabled the RACs to achieve their core
purpose? 3) What sustains the RACs over time as a collaborative arrangement instituted by
a policy mandate within a federal land management agency? Together the suite of questions
guides this study through an exploration of the legal arrangement Resource Advisory
Councils have within the BLM, and the effect instituting the RACs within the BLM has had on
public participation and collaborative conservation in BLM land and natural resource
management.
This paper begins by highlighting the legal framework for public participation in
federal public land and natural resource planning and decision making. This framework
both created the conditions for collaborative processes of ECR to evolve and poses
limitations to their use. Next, the paper introduces community-based collaborative
conservation initiatives and discusses the evolution, theory and design principles that guide
successful systems of collaborative dispute resolution. This discussion sets the stage for
outlining the criteria used to analyze and evaluate the RACs in subsequent chapters. Finally,
an introduction of the idea of instituting collaborative processes within federal agency
planning and decision making justifies this investigation while briefly illustrating examples
of where else this is occurring in other federal agencies.
Chapter three briefly outlines the history of the Bureau of Land Management and its
relationship with community-based collaborative governance. This discussion provides a
rationale for looking more deeply into the Resource Advisory Councils as an example of a
collaborative process instituted by a policy mandate within a federal land management
agency. It traces the evolution of the agency’s statutory and regulatory mandates, the
reforms that created the RACs in the 1990’s, and provides justification for the selection of

2

the BLM RACs to answer the above research questions. The end of chapter three addresses
research sub-question #1: What catalyzed the use of collaboration in creating the RACs?
Chapter Four constitutes the original research for this study and explores subquestions two and three: What has enabled the RACs to achieve their core purpose as
outlined in the regulations? And, what sustains the RACs over time as a collaborative
arrangement instituted by a policy mandate within a federal land management agency?
Through in-depth personal interviews of RAC members and BLM agency staff, this study
explores the effectiveness of institutionalizing collaboration (in the form of the RACs) as
evaluated through the lens of the collaborative process design and evaluation theory
outlined in chapter two.
Chapter five concludes this study by reflecting on the findings from the RAC
interviews to answer the two primary research questions mentioned above. This reflection
compares the RACs to the principles of dispute resolution process design and collaborative
governance to draw out lessons that could help improve the RAC program or inform
attempts to further institute and integrate collaborative conservation in other areas of land
use or natural resource management.

Purpose, Need, and Justification
This research examines the use of Resource Advisory Councils (RACs) in the Bureau
of Land Management (BLM) as an example of a twenty-year experiment in implementing a
policy-mandated forum for collaborative conservation in federal public land management.
The RACs were instituted by Secretary Bruce Babbitt under the regulatory reform known as
Rangeland Reform ’94.2 For twenty years, the RACs have formally brought together diverse,

Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management. Rangeland Reform ’94 Final Environmental
Impact Statement. Bureau of Land Management, Washington DC. (1994): 3. [cited hereafter as
Rangeland Reform ‘94 FEIS].
2
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often adversarial interests to collaborate and provide consensus-based advice on
management issues to the BLM throughout the Western United States. This study
investigates the effects of the regulatory mandate on the collaborative process, public
participation in BLM land management decision making, and the principles of democratic
governance.
This process of collaborative problem solving is not a unique phenomenon. Other
forms of ADR are being instituted in other branches of the Federal Government. The US
Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service, the Department of Interior’s National Park
Service and BLM, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), even the Department of
Defense are utilizing ADR practices in land use planning and natural resource decision
making. Examples include the Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration Program
(CFLRP), the Forest Service’s 2012 Planning Rule, and programs for alternative dispute
resolution outlined in the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act and a myriad of state programs.3
In 1993, the US Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution was established under the
Udall Foundation as national support structure for agency professionals facing conflicts
over environmental issues on the lands and resources they manage. That these programs
and policies are being broadly instituted throughout the Department of Agriculture, the
Department of the Interior and other Federal Agencies is a testament to their perceived
effectiveness and warrants looking more deeply into the effects of this institutionalization.
Over time, evaluation of ECR processes has developed into a field of inquiry in itself.
Scholars and dispute resolution professionals have developed an array of methods to
evaluate the effectiveness collaborative processes of consensus building, problem solving

Sara Bates Van De Wetering. A Legal Framework for Cooperative Conservation. Public Policy
Research Institute of the University of Montana. (2006).
3
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and governance.4 These evaluations have primarily taken a case study approach, evaluating
individual processes since the late 1990’s.5 Some scholars have investigated mandated
processes of dispute resolution,6 and others have evaluated the social effects or
management outcomes of policy mandated collaborative processes such as the CFLRP.7 One
University of Montana Thesis project from 2003 took strides in evaluating how the RACs
were meeting their stated goals after ten years of implementation. However, this study
stopped short of assessing the larger implications of mandating collaborative governance
on the decision making and public engagement process. While substantial literature
outlines criteria for evaluating collaborative processes and methods for doing so, to date,
little research has been conducted on the effects of instituting a process for collaborative
governance on planning, decision making and public engagement.8 This study is one
attempt to do so.

Definitions
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is defined by the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1993 as any procedure that is used to resolve issues in controversy,
including, but not limited to, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact-finding, mini trials,
arbitration, and use of ombuds, or any combination thereof.9

Alexander Conley & Margaret A. Moote. “Evaluating Collaborative Natural Resource Management.”
Society & Natural Resources: An International Journal. Vol. 16, No. 5 (2003): 371-386. The authors
give a good overview of existing evaluation methods used by scholars in determining the success of
approaches to environmental conflict Resolution.
5Matthew McKinney and Patrick Field. “Evaluating Community-Based Collaboration on Federal Lands
and Resources.” Society & Natural Resources: An International Journal. Vol. 21 No. 5(2008): 419-429.
6 Sara B. Van de Wetering and Matthew McKinney. “The Role of Mandatory Dispute Resolution in
Federal Environmental Law: Lessons from the Clean Air Act.” Journal of Environmental Law and
Litigation. Vol. 21, No. 1 (2006): 1-45.
7 Courtney Schultz, Theresa Jedd, and Ryan D. Beam. “The Collaborative Forest Landscape
Restoration Program: A History and Overview of the First Projects.” Journal of Forestry. Vol. 110, No.
7 (2012): 381-391.
8 Dukes, E. Franklin. What we know about environmental conflict resolution: An analysis based on
research. Conflict Resolution Quarterly. Vol. 22, No. 1-2 (2004):191-220.
9 Pub. L. 114-38 codified as amended 5 USC § 571(3)
4
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Environmental Conflict Resolution (ECR) is described by the Office of Management
and Budget as third-party assisted conflict resolution in the context of environmental,
public lands, or natural resources issues.10 The Udall Foundation’s U.S. Institute of
Environmental Conflict Resolution goes on to refine the definition by saying, “The term
"ECR" encompasses a range of assisted negotiation processes and applications. These
processes directly engage affected interests and governmental decision makers in conflict
resolution and collaborative problem solving.”11
Public Involvement is defined for the BLM in the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976 as, “...the opportunity for participation by affected
citizens in rule making, decision making, and planning with respect to the public lands,
including public meetings or hearings held at locations near the affected lands, or advisory
mechanisms, or such other procedures as may be necessary to provide public comment in a
particular instance.”12
The term public lands has various definitions. For example, FLPMA defines public
lands as, “any land and interest in land owned by the United States within the several States
and administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the Bureau of Land Management,
without regard to how the United States acquired ownership...”13 The Secure Rural Schools
Act of 2000 defines Public Lands as, “lands within the National Forest System, as defined in
section 11(a) of the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 (16

Office of Management and Budget and the President’s Council on Environmental Quality.
Memorandum on Environmental Collaboration and Conflict Resolution. Available at:
https://www.udall.gov/documents/ Institute/OMB_CEQ_Memorandum_2012.pdf
11 U.S. Institute of Environmental Conflict Resolution. Frequently Asked Questions: What is
Environmental Conflict Resolution? Accessed 11/20/15. Available: https://www.udall.gov/
OurPrograms/Institute/QuestionsAnswers.aspx
12 U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management and Office of the Solicitor (editors).
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act, as amended. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of
Land Management Office of Public Affairs. Washington, D.C. (2001): Pg. 2.
13 Ibid; 2.
10
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U.S.C. 1609(a)) exclusive of the National Grasslands...”14 As the term pertains to this study,
public lands means the portion of the federal public estate managed by the USDA Forest
Service and the DOI Bureau of Land Management, the two multiple-use land management
agencies.
One definition of collaboration that has been widely accepted by scholars
throughout the academic literature since it was first articulated by Barbara Gray in 1985 is;
“The pooling of appreciations and/or tangible resources, e.g., information, money, labor,
etc., by two or more stakeholders to solve a set of problems which neither can solve
individually.”15
Collaboration is also defined by the agencies in various ways:
According to the USDA Forest Service 2012 Planning Rule, collaboration or
collaborative process is collectively defined as, “A structured manner in which a collection
of people with diverse interests share knowledge, ideas, and resources while working
together in an inclusive and cooperative manner toward a common purpose.” 16
Collaboration is defined by the BLM FACA Handbook17 as, “A way of bringing
communities together to address common problems; work through conflicts; and develop
forward-thinking strategies for medium- to long-term multiple use management,
protection, and development.”
According to the Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration Program (CFLRP),
collaboration, “Includes multiple interested persons representing diverse interests; and is
Pub. L. 106-303 § 3(1)(a)
Gray, Barbara. “Conditions Facilitating Interorganizational Collaboration.” Human Relations Vol. 30,
No. 10(1985): 911-936, p. 912
16 36 CFR 219.19 Available at: http://www.ecfr.gov
17 Bureau of Land Management. National Policy for the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Bureau of
Land Management. Washington DC. (2005): 1.
14
15
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transparent and nonexclusive; or meets the requirements for a resource advisory
committee...”
Democratic Governance and Collaborative Governance are defined as, “A governing
arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a
collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and
that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets.”18; or
“...the art of governing communities in participatory, deliberative, and collaborative ways”19
Institutionalization is defined by Stephens and Carlson as, “instituting or integrating
processes of alternative dispute resolution and collaborative practices in government.”
They are careful to distinguish between instituting and institutionalizing which, “to some is
synonymous with bureaucratize, a mindless consistency, active suppression of innovation,
and frustration of common-sense problem-solving.”20 Throughout this study, the term
instituted has been adopted in favor of institutionalize to encompass all the activities of
integrating a collaborative process into planning and decision making.

Research Methods and Assumptions
The primary research in this study investigates the effect of instituting a citizenbased collaborative governance arrangement in federal land management. The effect of
instituting this collaborative process is evaluated based on three criteria: 1) how the RACs
perform compared to their regulatory mandates, 2) the level of satisfaction participants felt
with the collaborative process as it is structured within the BLM RACs, and 3) how the BLM

Matt Leighninger. The Next Form of Democracy: How Expert Rule is Giving Way to Shared
Governance...And Why Politics Will Never Be the Same. Vanderbilt University Press. (2006).
19 Chris Ansell and Alison Gash. "Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice." Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory. Vol. 18, No. 4 (2008):543-571
20 Carlson and Stephens. (2002): 2.
18

8

RAC process compares with principles for successful dispute resolution design articulated
in the literature on the evaluation of collaborative processes of ECR.
Background research began in October of 2014 and consisted of a review of relevant
literature on alternative dispute resolution, environmental conflict resolution, and
collaborative conservation theory and practice. Once the RACs were selected as the example
of policy mandated collaboration to further investigate, the geographic scope of this project
was limited to the Rocky Mountain States in an attempt to define a region of comparable
climatic, geographic, and socio-political characteristics and management issues. A
document analysis was then conducted of the available meeting minutes from the past two
years of all sixteen RACs within the Rocky Mountain States of Montana, Wyoming, Idaho,
Colorado, Utah, New Mexico and Arizona. This analysis resulted in a comprehensive
understanding of the issues over which the Rocky Mountain RACs are currently
deliberating; their agenda setting, discussion and decision making procedures; past advice
provided to the BLM and overlapping topics between districts in the region. This
background research informed the selection of case studies. These case studies facilitated a
deeper investigation into the perception of the RAC program’s effectiveness and successes
through personal interviews of RAC members and agency representatives.
From the document review, a stratified purposive sample of five Rocky Mountain
RACs was selected. The RACs were selected based on two factors: 1) to represent the
geographic diversity from across the seven-state Rocky Mountain region, and 2) to
represent the diverse structural models outlined in 43 CFR § 1784.6-2 within which the
RACs can be organized.21 The initially selected sample included five RACs. Unfortunately,

The RACs can be organized based on one of three models described in 43 CFR §1784.6-2. Most
RACs investigated in this study were organized under Model C which, among other things, allows the
liberal use of sub-RACs.
21
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one of the RACs was unresponsive to repeated requests for interviews, and so ultimately
interviews of RAC members and agency staff from the remaining four RACs were conducted.
A full set of interviews was defined as one BLM Representative who had a direct
connection to the RAC, and one RAC member from each of the three interest categories. A
complete set of interviews was conducted for three of the RACs, while the final RAC was
also extremely slow to respond to requests for interviews, and due to time constraints
resulted in only two interviews: one RAC member and a BLM staff member. A total of 14 indepth, semi-structured interviews were conducted between March and May of 2015.
Although a limited sample population, the interviews provided a comprehensive view of the
RACs benefits, successes and challenges from a significant cross section of RAC members
and agency staff who are intimately involved with the program. The interview questions
explored four main topics: 1)participants motivation for and benefits from being involved
with the RAC, 2)definition of and key factors enabling success, 3)the tangible and intangible
results experienced or observed from working with the RAC, and 4) advice to guide
instituting future collaborative processes of ECR (see interview guide: Appendix I).
Interviews were transcribed by the principle investigator and comments were analyzed for
common themes using a grounded theory approach.22 Themes were based on the
evaluation criteria discussed in chapter two.
The evaluation criteria developed for this study were adapted from literature on the
evaluation of community-based collaborative processes of consensus building and ECR. The
works of Leech23, Innes and Booher24, and McKinney and Field25 were largely informative in

See generally: Hesse-Biber, S. N. & Leavy, P. The Practice of Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage Publications. (2006):348.
23 William D. Leach. “Collaborative Public Management and Democracy: Evidence from Western
Watershed Partnerships.” Public Administration Review; Vol. 66. (2006): 100-110.
24 Judith E. Innes and David E. Booher. “Consensus Building and Complex Adaptive Systems.” Journal
of the American Planning Association. Vol. 65, No. 4 (1999): 412-423.
22
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the development of the evaluation criteria. A discussion of the history, design theory, and
methods for evaluation of collaborative processes of decision making and dispute
resolution in public lands and natural resource management follows in Chapter Two. This
discussion serves two purposes. First, it provides the context for exploring the RACs as an
appropriate model for analyzing the effects of instituting collaborative processes in federal
agency planning and decision making. Second, it establishes the evaluation criteria that will
be used to understand the effectiveness of instituting this collaborative model in federal
agency planning and decision making.
After discussing the interviews in aggregate, the RAC institutional model is
evaluated based on the principles of democratic governance and dispute resolution process
design discussed by Leighninger,26 Selin and Chavez,27 Leach,28 Innes and Booher,29 and
other scholars discussed in chapter two.30 Relying on the work of these scholars, a
framework for successful collaborative process design is constructed, and the participant
interviews are used to evaluate the RAC model in the context of this framework. Key
benefits and a set of recommendations are then distilled from this evaluation in an attempt
to highlight possible improvements to the RAC model, or to guide future endeavors to
institute collaborative conservation in public land and resource management.
This study relies on several critical assumptions. First, the RACs were established in
1995 through a series of regulatory reforms.31 Each individual RAC is authorized through a

Matthew McKinney and Patrick Field. “Evaluating Community-Based Collaboration on Federal
Lands and Resources.” Society & Natural Resources. Vol. 21, No. 5 (2008): 419-429.
26 Leighninger (2006)
27 Steve Selin and Deborah Chavez. “Developing a Collaborative Model for Environmental Planning
and Management.” Environmental Management Vol. 19, No. 2 (1995): 189-195.
28 Leach (2006)
29 Innes and Booher (1999)
30 See infra note 106: Conley and Moote (2001); Ury, Brett and Goldberg (1993); McKinney and Field
(2008).
31 See: Rangeland Reforms ’94 infra note 219.
25

11

charter signed by the Secretary of the Interior which is required to be renewed every two
years.32 The assumption reasons that since the Secretary has continuously renewed the
RAC charters for twenty years, they are, at minimum, fulfilling their regulatory
responsibilities as codified in the regulations. Second, observing the RACs through the lens
of collaborative process design and evaluation principles established by scholars and
professionals in the field of Environmental Conflict Resolution can help to paint a picture of
the effectiveness of the RACs as they have been instituted within the BLM. Third, by
investigating the RACs in this way, lessons can be learned to inform how collaborative
conservation could be instituted in other areas of public land and natural resource
management.
It should also be noted that while the RACs were established to provide advice to the
BLM on land and natural resource management issues from a local perspective, the BLM
and the Secretary of the Interior retain all final decision making authority.33 Consequently,
how the RAC’s advice and recommendations are used is entirely at the discretion of the
local managers and may or may not be incorporated into policies or on-the-ground action.
Therefore, this study focuses on successes, challenges and recommendations identified
through the document review and by the participating RAC members rather than the onthe-ground outcomes of RAC advice. Certainly, on-the-ground improvements in
management or ecological integrity are the ultimate goal of any collaborative conservation
program.34 However, since the BLM has no obligation to implement the recommendations
of the RACs, it is difficult to assess how their advice translates to on the ground
43 CFR § 1784.1-2(b) states: “Any advisory committee mandated by statute shall terminate not
later than 2 years after the date of its establishment unless its duration is otherwise provided by law.
Upon the expiration of each successive two-year period following date of establishment, a new
charter shall be prepared and, after Secretarial approval, filed with the appropriate committees of
the Senate and House of Representatives for any statutory advisory committee being continued.”
33 43 CFR § 1784.5-1
34 See: Conley and Moote (2003) infra note 135 at pg. 380.
32
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management. Further, participant satisfaction has long been used by scholars and conflict
resolution professionals as a method to evaluate collaborative process design.35 The degree
of participant satisfaction for this study was gauged through the in-depth, personal
interviews of members of fourteen Resource Advisory Committee members and agency
staff within the Rocky Mountain States and analyzed through the framework of the
evaluation criteria discussed below.
A more thorough discussion of the interview methods, analysis, sampling
techniques, and evaluation criteria precedes the discussion of the results in chapter four.

2. Public Participation and Collaboration in Public Lands Management
As discussed in the preceding chapter, the term “public lands” has several
definitions. For the purposes of this study, the term was limited to include lands managed
under federal jurisdiction by the USDA Forest Service and the DOI Bureau of Land
Management, the two federal land management agencies charged with a multiple-use
mandate. Although these two agencies have their own origins, agency cultures, and legal
and regulatory obligations, the multiple-use mandate distinguishes them from the other
two Federal Land management agencies: the DOI’s Park Service and Fish and Wildlife
Service. While both the Park Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service manage public lands
(the National Park System and the National Wildlife Refuges, respectively), their
management requirements prioritize protection and preservation rather than the diverse
spectrum of multiple-use management that directs the Forest Service and the Bureau of
Land management. Multiple-use management is defined in the Multiple Use Sustained Yield
act of 1960 as:

McKinney and Field (2008): See Generally for an argument on participant satisfaction as a basis for
evaluation of collaborative models.
35
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The management of all the various renewable surface resources...so that they are
utilized in the combination that will best meet the needs of the American people;
making the most judicious use of the land for some or all of these resources or related
services over areas large enough to provide sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments
in use to conform to changing needs and conditions; that some land will be used for
less than all of the resources; and harmonious and coordinated management of the
various resources, each with the other, without impairment of the productivity of the
land, with consideration being given to the relative values of the various resources,
and not necessarily the combination of uses that will give the greatest dollar return or
the greatest unit output.36
While the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management are indeed unique
agencies, operating under their own legal and regulatory frameworks, management plans,
and under two distinct departments of the Federal government, the fact that they are both
directed to manage the lands under the multiple-use sustained yield philosophy aligns them
more as kin. Comparisons have often been made between the two agencies by both policy
makers and academics. In fact, some have called for restructuring of the Forest Service
within the Department of Interior, arguing such a consolidation would increase efficiencies
and co-management of adjoining lands, decrease inconsistencies, and better address the
increasing ecological effects of climate change and wildfire.37 The similarities between the
two agencies warrant a closer look at the legal mandates that affect public participation and
collaboration within each of their land use planning directives. A final assumption of this
study is that looking more closely into one could help to inform the practices of the other.

The definition of “Multiple Use” as quoted from the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of
1960. Pub. L. 86-517 § 4(a). This act is used as the basis for defining the management
requirements in the Federal Lands Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976 and the
National Forest Management Act (NFMA) of 1976, the two acts that mandate a multiple use
philosophy of management to the BLM and the Forest Service, respectively.
36

See generally: GAO report dated February 2009 titled: Observations on a Possible Move of the Forest
Service into the Department of Interior. In the report’s third appendix, the GAO discusses five
historical proposals for restructuring the Forest Service and the BLM. The five proposals generally
approach reorganization in two ways, which are not mutually exclusive: reorganizing the agencies
themselves or reorganizing the agencies’ lands. Available: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09223
37
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The legal framework for public participation
Federal public land management planning and decision making under the Forest
Service and the Bureau of Land Management is primarily governed by four major federal
laws that require public participation: 1) the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 2) the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 3) Federal Lands Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA), and the 4) National Forest Management Act (NFMA). In addition, where citizenbased groups are operating in an official advisory capacity to an agency, the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (FACA) may apply.
A unique feature of the BLM RACs is the institution’s construction within the
framework of FACA, which outlines procedures for public notice, interest group
representation, and open access to meetings and information. This signifies the embrace of
a law that has created barriers (both psychologically and procedurally) to collaboration
within other agencies.38 The legal framework for public participation in public lands and
resource management has been well chronicled by legal scholars elsewhere.39 However,
several points are worth noting that lay the groundwork for understanding the growth of
collaborative conservation within federal land management, understanding the instituting
of collaborative processes of conflict resolution in agency decision making, and framing the
space within which the BLM RACs operate and make decisions.
First Principles: The APA and NEPA
The Administrative Procedures Act of 1946 40 sets rules for federal agencies to
inform the public of proposed rulemaking and provided the public with opportunities to
participate in the rulemaking process. The National Environmental Policy Act (42 USC §
See generally: Beirle and Long (1999) infra note 68.
See generally: Van De Wetering (2006); Thomas Dietz and Paul C. Stern. Public Participation in
Environmental Decision Making. National Academies Press, Washington D.C. (2008): 36-52.; and
Robert B. Kreiter. “Public Lands and Law Reform: Putting Theory, Policy, and Practice in
Perspective.” Utah Law Review. No. 4 (2005): 1127-1226.
40 Pub. L. 79-404 as codified as amended in 5 USC § 511-599
38
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4321-4347) requires federal agencies to analyze the environmental and cultural effects of
“major actions” affecting the resources they manage. Together the APA and NEPA create a
platform, “...for members of the public to make their informed judgments known to agencies
before decisions were made and thus potentially to have an influence on the decisions...”41
Sara Bates Van De Wetering calls these the first principles for public participation in federal
public land and natural resource management. These requirements are, “meant to ensure
that better decisions are made, with complete information and without hidden influences or
agendas.”42
The Planning Acts: NFMA and FLPMA
The National Forest Management Act (NFMA) and the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (FLPMA), as they pertain to the Forest Service and the BLM respectively,
both have specific requirements for including the public in land use and resource
management planning. NFMA, requires the National Forest Service to engage in long-range
resource planning by directing the Secretary of Agriculture, “...to develop, maintain, and
revise land and resource management plans with substantial public involvement...”43
FLPMA is the BLMs organic act, and it outlines the multiple-use mandate, the requirements
for comprehensive land use planning within the agency, requirements for including the
public in planning and decision making, and establishing advisory committees.44
To fulfill the management plan requirements under NFMA, the Secretary of
Agriculture is directed to, “promulgate regulations...that set out the process for the
development and revision of the land management plans...”45 These regulations are handed
Dietz and Stern (2008): 38.
Van De Wetering (2006): 8.
43 Ibid; pg. 11
44 See generally: U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management and Office of the
Solicitor (editors). The Federal Land Policy and Management Act, as amended. U.S. Department of the
Interior, Bureau of Land Management Office of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C. (2001): 69 pgs.
45 National Forest Management Act of 1976. Pub. L. 94-588 as amended by 16 USC §1600 (note).
41
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down through the National Forest Planning Rule and codified in the regulations governing
Forest Service planning.46 Since 2000, the several attempts to revise the Planning Rule have
been frustrated by legal challenges, and met considerable difficulty in implementing
regulations to guide planning procedures across the agency.47 In 2012, after a substantial
public involvement process to develop new planning regulations, and, in part to focus on,
“...collaboration, science, and sustainability...”48 the Forest Service finally published the 2012
Planning Rule. The new rule states, “The responsible official shall engage the public...early
and throughout the planning process... using collaborative processes where feasible and
appropriate.”49
This emphasis on using collaborative processes is further reinforced in the Forest
Service Land Management Planning Handbook. The Handbook provides specific direction
and procedural guidance to line officers and interdisciplinary team members for
implementing the 2012 planning rule and carrying out the regulations within 36 CFR §
219.50 The Handbook first defines collaboration and collaborative process collectively as:
A structured manner in which a collection of people, with diverse interests share
knowledge, ideas, and resources, while working together in an inclusive and
cooperative manner toward a common purpose. Collaboration, in the context of this
part, falls within the full spectrum of public engagement described in the Council on
Environmental Quality’s publication of October, 2007: Collaboration in NEPA— A
Handbook for NEPA Practitioners.51
The Handbook continues in Chapter 40 by discussing the principles and spectrum of public
participation to inform the development of the plan components. The spectrum identified
36 CFR § 219
See generally: US Forest Service. The History of Forest Planning. Accessed on 9/13/15; available at:
http://www.fs.usda.gov/main/planningrule/history
48 USDA Forest Service. New 2012 Planning Rule: Rethinking Forest Regulations. Missoula, MT; slide
show presentation dated July, 2013: Pg. 9.
49 36 CFR § 219.4(1)
50 USDA Forest Service. FSH 1909.12 – Land Management Planning Handbook. Available at:
http://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/planningrule/home/?cid=stelprd3828310
51 Ibid; Zero Code: pg. 5
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in the handbook ranges at the lowest level from simply informing the public to fully
collaborating with the public at the highest level. Collaboration in this context is taken to
mean directly engaging the public “...to exchange information with each other and work
together on one or more issues during the planning process. Identify where there is
agreement and disagreement.”52 According to the handbook, collaboration can utilize a
range of tools from mediated and facilitated discussions to establishing FACA groups and
partnerships.53 The handbook focuses on how to develop a public participation strategy but
leaves discretion to the responsible official to, “determine the scope and scale of
opportunities for public participation, balancing available resources and schedule
constraints with public engagement needs.”54 It further states, “There is no prescribed
format for a public participation strategy, and the strategy can and is likely to change to
accommodate evolving circumstances.”55
Indeed, the discretion provided to individual forests in meeting the requirements
for public participation outlined in the 2012 Planning Rule is intended to allow the
responsible officials the flexibility to adapt to local needs and interests. However, the
failure to articulate clear guidelines and standards for how and when to meet the
requirements for public participation by the individual forests is already creating some
confusion and tension between forest managers and interest groups in the planning
process. In fact, a federal advisory committee chartered in 2012, and tasked with providing
national level advice to the Forest Service on implementing the 2012 Planning Rule, made
several recommendations to the Forest Service to clarify when and how collaboration and

Ibid; Ch. 40 § 41
Ibid; Ch. 40 § 43.2
54 Ibid; Ch. 40 § 42
55 Ibid
52
53
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public participation should occur in the planning process.56 Consequently, due in part to
this lack of clarity, some early-adopter forests are frontloading their assessment phases
with substantial opportunities for collaboration and then having to rush through the
development of the plan components to meet the established deadlines, while others
struggle with staff capacity to effectively engage the public when and where it’s most
needed.57
In the case of the BLM, FLPMA similarly states, “The Secretary shall, with public
involvement and consistent with the terms and conditions of this Act, develop, maintain,
and, when appropriate, revise land use plans which provide by tracts or areas for the use of
the public lands.”58 The public’s right to involvement in activities that affect lands managed
by the BLM is further emphasized later, “The Secretary shall allow an opportunity for public
involvement and by regulation shall establish procedures, including public hearings where
appropriate, to give Federal, State, and local governments and the public, adequate notice
and opportunity to comment upon and participate in the formulation of plans and programs
relating to the management of the public lands.”59 However, in addition to the general
public involvement requirements, the BLM is also directed to establish advisory councils to
provide advice directly to the Secretary of the Interior on land use and management, “The
Secretary shall establish advisory councils of not less than ten and not more than fifteen
members appointed by him from among persons who are representative of the various

Planning Rule Advisory Committee. Markup of Directives with Committee Recommendations –
FINAL. Dated: November 15, 2013. Accessed on 10/2/14 from:
http://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/planningrule/ committee/?cid=stelprdb5394840
57 Citation: Public Participation: Lessons Learned from Implementing the 2012 Planning Rule.
Unpublished Study Conducted by University of Montana’s Natural Resource Conflict Resolution Class,
Fall 2014. On file with the Author.
58 U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management and Office of the Solicitor (2001): 4.
[Emphasis mine.]
59 Ibid: 6.
56
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major citizens’ interests concerning the problems relating to land use planning or the
management of the public lands...”60
The BLM had a history of citizen advisory boards prior to FLPMA, but they were
called Grazing Advisory Boards and comprised almost exclusively of local grazing
permittees. The Grazing Advisory Boards (GABs) were criticized for having an undue
influence over the agency decisions and a myopic view of range management. They were
accused of elevating their economic interests over the health and ecologic conditions of the
range. Under FLPMA, the Grazing Advisory Boards were severely constrained and a more
evolved version of Citizen Advisory Boards (CABs) were established to “focus on the full
array of ecosystem and multiple-use issues associated with BLM administered public
lands...”61 The RACs, implemented under Bruce Babbitt’s rangeland reforms in the mid1990’s, combined the CABs and the GABs into the model used today which is structured to
coincide with State, BLM District or ecoregion boundaries62 and to consist of balanced and
diverse membership representing three broad categories: 1) grazing permittees and the
resource industries; 2) environmental, cultural and historic interests; and 3) elected
officials, Native American tribes, and academics.63 This period of reform beginning with the
enactment of FLPMA also marked a shift in the BLM’s management focus to, in part,
“Accelerate restoration and improvement of public rangelands to proper functioning
condition.”64
NFMA also authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to “...establish and consult
advisory boards as he deems necessary to secure full information and advice on the

Ibid; pg. 26
Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management. Rangeland Reform ’94: Final Environmental
Impact Statement. Bureau of Land Management. Washington D.C. (1994): 18.
62 43 CFR § 1784.6-2
63 43 CFR § 1784.6-1(c)
64 Rangeland Reform ’94: 4.
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execution of his responsibilities.”65 Interestingly, such discretion was not granted the
Secretary of the Interior and begs the question why? Regardless of the motivation,
requiring the BLM to establish the RACs and leaving discretion to the Forest Service
presents an interesting opportunity to investigate the collaborative processes for planning
and decision making used within each agency.
The Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972
In some circumstances collaborative groups either choose to or are required to file a
formal charter under the Federal Advisory Committee Act. The Federal Advisory
Committee Act (FACA) of 1970 was enacted to ensure that groups who provide advice
directly to federal agencies are fairly balanced, and decisions are made publicly and free of
undue influence of special interests.66 Generally FACA applies when all of three conditions
are met: “(1) the federal agency establishes the group...or exerts some level of management
control over the group, (2) the group includes...individuals who are not federal employees
or elected officials..., and (3) the product of the collaboration is group or collective advice to
the federal agency.” 67 FACA imposes procedural hurdles on a collaborative group to ensure
that the public is given notice of meetings and activities, that meetings are held in an open,
publicly accessible forum, and the goals and expectations of the group are clearly defined.68
It has long been suggested that FACA’s procedural hurdles create a substantial
barrier to collaborative conservation. As William Butler explains, “the lack of clarity of the
procedural requirements of FACA...may deter collaboration as much as ensure high-quality

Pub. L. 94-588 § 14(b)
Van De Wetering (2006): 13.
67 Council On Environmental Quality (CEQ). Collaboration in NEPA: A handbook for NEPA
practitioners. Council of Environmental Quality, Washington, DC. (2007): 91.
68 Ibid: 90.
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processes.”69 This deterrent has resulted from a variety of factors including the lack of
clarity around the procedural requirements of the act, when FACA applies to self-organized
collaborative groups, and agencies feeling discouraged from collaborating or even
consulting with the public based on the threat of a FACA-based lawsuit.70
Regardless of whether a collaborative group is chartered as a FACA committee or
not, Federal agencies walk a fine line between using the advice or recommendations
provided by the group, and abdicating their authority to make the final decisions. In a few
notable cases of “constitutional sub-delegation,” land management agencies have been
challenged for relinquishing their decision making authority to non-government entities.71
The importance of this is that in collaborating with groups of stakeholders on land use or
resource management issues, the federal agency must retain and make the ultimate
decision or they are vulnerable to legal challenge. 72 In terms of evaluating the success of
the BLM RACs in this study, the agency’s obligation to retain their decision making authority
is one of the main reasons for investigating participant satisfaction with the process rather
than on-the-ground actions that result.

The rise of place-based Collaboration
The field of environmental conflict resolution emerged as conservation advocates,
academics, policy makers, and industry proponents became increasingly frustrated with
polarization, conflict and stalemate in natural resource management issues. Stakeholders
William Hale Butler. “Collaboration at Arms Length: Navigating Agency Engagement in
Landscape-Scale Ecological Restoration Collaboratives.” Journal of Forestry. Vol. 111, No. 6 (2013):
395-413.
70 Thomas C. Beirle and Rebecca J. Long. “Chilling Collaboration: The Federal Advisory Committee Act
and Stakeholder Involvement in Environmental Decisionmaking.” Environmental Law Reporter. Vol.
29 (July, 1999): 3.
71See generally: NPCA v. Stanton; as mentioned in Van De Wetering (2006): 17. According to Van De
Wetering, in NPCA v. Stanton, the National Park Service was challenged for giving the Niobrara Scenic
River Advisory Council full decision making authority. The judge ruled the council superseded its
authority granted by Congress, and today, she says, “the council continues in its advisory role, but the
NPS retains final decision making authority.”
72 Ibid: 16.
69

22

often turned to alternative methods of resolving disputes between entrenched and
opposing interests such as mediated negotiations and collaboration. Community or placebased collaboration has its roots in Van De Wetering’s First Principles, the landmark
environmental laws of the 1960’s and 70’s. Community-based collaboration evolved within
the framework of these laws as one tool in the box of alternative decision making models
that has gained considerable traction over the past twenty or thirty years because of its
initial success in resolving conflicts between timber interests and environmentalists in the
mid-1990s. Collaboration has been called many things over the years, but one definition
commonly used in the literature was first articulated by Barbara Gray in 1985, “The pooling
of appreciations and/or tangible resources, e.g., information, money, labor, etc., by two or
more stakeholders to solve a set of problems which neither can solve individually.”73
As early forms collaborative conservation found success in resolving conflicts and
producing working agreements to land management problems, they captured the attention
of agency administrators, policy makers and executives at the local, state and federal level.
Early case studies such as the Quincy Library Group, the Applegate Partnership, and the
Niobrara Scenic River Advisory Council (among many others) received considerable
scholarly attention and further justified the nascent movement.74 Distinct models of
collaborative conservation evolved, have been refined, and scholars have articulated
various typologies to help understand and study the various models. Cestero developed a
simple typology distinguishing between place-based and policy-based groups.75 It

Gray (1985): p. 912
See generally: Cestero (1999); Moote, McClaran, and Chickering (1997); Wondolleck and Yeffe
(2000); McKinney and Harmon (2004) for case studies on early experimental collaborative processes
of natural resource management and governance.
75 Cestero (1999).
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separates place-based groups that focus on a particular geography from policy-based
groups that address problems of regional or national significance.76
Margerum builds upon several typologies, drawing largely on institutional analysis
literature to argue that collaboratives exist on an Action-Organizational-Policy spectrum.77
The key functional differences between points on this spectrum are found in membership
make-up, the management arrangement for implementation, and approaches to
implementing change.78 Operational or action-oriented groups tend to consist of
stakeholders who represent themselves and advocate for their own interests from a more
localized perspective; focus on on-the-ground activities such as monitoring, education, and
restoration; and see the same actors both making and implementing agreements.79
Organizational and Policy- level collaboratives tend to be made up of individuals
representing interest groups or organizations such as industry associations or nongovernmental organizations, agency representatives and elected officials.80 At the
implementation phase, a Policy-level collaborative formulates policies and programs to set
up others to carry out the on-the-ground actions while an Organizational-level collaborative
will vary its implementation process depending on which end of the spectrum it most
closely aligns.81
Pros and Cons of Collaborative Conservation
Advocates of collaborative approaches to natural resource management argue
several major benefits. For example, Wondolleck touts four major benefits of collaboration
that work to: 1) build understanding and shared learning; 2) create a mechanism for
Barb Cestero. Beyond the Hundredth Meeting: A Field Guide to Collaborative Conservation. Sonoran
Institute. (1999): 9.
77 Richard D. Margerum. “A Typology of Collaboration Efforts in Environmental Management.”
Environmental Management. Vol. 41 (2008): 493.
78 Ibid: 493.
79 Ibid: 488-494
80 Ibid: 493-494
81 Ibid: 494
76
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effective decision making; 3) get work done; and 4) develop capacity to deal with future
challenges.82 Scholars like Kenney83, Dietz and Stern84, and McKinney, Field and Bates85
concur, extolling the benefits of experimenting in collaborative processes to formulate more
creative, innovative decision making models. In addition, proponents also advocate that
place-based collaboration can overcome entrenched opposition, better account for localized
knowledge and cultural relationships specific to the landscape, and increase buy-in and
durability of the decisions.86
On the other side, skeptics argue that place-based collaboration turns over an
inordinate amount of control over what are inherently national interests and resources to a
small, localized group of individuals.87 Critics believe the current system of decision making
works as designed, that litigation is an inherent part of the design, and that collaborative
groups are merely attempting to work around the existing statutory and regulatory
frameworks.88 Others insist that the voluntary nature of collaboration has inherent
problems with representation of interests, and argue that leaving decisions about national
lands to an ad hoc group of local citizens puts too much power into small, localized groups
of interests.89 In his book Environmental Communication and the Public Sphere, Robert Cox
succinctly outlines seven common critiques of place-based collaboration from his review of
Julia Wondolleck and Stephen Yeffe. Making Collaboration Work: Lessons from innovation in natural
resource management. Washington, D.C. Island Press (2000): 18-19.
83Douglas J. Kenney. Arguing About Consensus: Examining the Case Against Western Watershed Groups
and Other Collaborative Groups Active in Natural Resources Management. Natural Resources Law
Center,
University of Colorado School of Law. (2000): 7pgs.
84 Dietz and Stern (2008).
85 Matthew McKinney, Patrick Field and Sarah Bates. “Responding to Streams of Land Use Disputes: A
Systems Approach.” Planning & Environmental Law; Vol. 60, No, 4 (2008): 3-10.
86 Kenney (2000)
87 Michael McCloskey. “The Skeptic: Collaboration Has its Limits.” High Country News. May 13, 1996:
2
88 Ibid; 2
89 George C. Coggins. “Of Californicators, Quislings and Crazies: Some Perils of Devolved
Collaboration.” Across the Great Divide: Explorations of Collaborative Conservation and the American
West. Island Press (2001): 163-171.
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the literature: 1) Stakeholders may be unrepresentative of wider public; 2) may encourage
exceptionalism or a compromise of national standards; 3) power inequalities may lead to
co-optation; 4) pressure for consensus may lead to the lowest common denominator; 5)
consensus tends to delegitimize conflict and advocacy; 6) groups may lack authority to
implement their decisions; and 7) irreconcilable values may hinder agreement.90
Despite these criticisms, Wondolleck explains, collaborative processes for
environmental conflict resolution have, “expanded from largely ad hoc application in siteor issue-specific situations to now being embedded in agency programs and procedures.” 91
Land management agencies attempting to incorporate a more adaptive style of
management and collaboratively plan activities at the watershed or ecosystem scale, may
require collaboration and increased public involvement across interest groups, agencies,
and political jurisdictions to accomplish their goals.92 Some scholars argue that planning at
this scale inherently affects and involves many different agencies (federal, state, and local),
private land holders, and various interest groups who all have differing goals, objectives and
methods for achievement. “For collaboration to occur in such situations,” Wondolleck says,
“[environmental conflict resolution] needs to be nudged, or even required. Sometimes
reluctant or skeptical parties must be compelled to give a process a chance.”93

Moving Towards Institutionalizing Collaboration
One of the vital tenets of successful collaboration is that participants come to the
table voluntarily, with full knowledge and clarity about their options for seeing their
interests met. Wondolleck outlines two factors emphasizing the importance of this

Robert Cox. “Managing Conflict: Collaboration and Environmental Disputes.” Environmental
Communication and the Public Sphere. Los Angles: Sage Publications (2013): 111-139
91 Julia M. Wondolleck. “A Crack in the Foundation? Revisiting ECR’s Voluntary Tenet.” Conflict
Resolution Quarterly. Vol. 27, No. 3, (2010): 323
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid: 324
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voluntary tenet in her review of the literature: one involving choice, and the other involving
fairness. Choice, she says, “implies consideration of alternatives and weighing of
consequences; it implies an explicit assessment of the potentials and short-comings of
varying alternatives...A deliberate decision to collaborate suggests that a party understands
the collaborative process as well as their best alternative to a negotiated agreement
(BATNA).”94 Additionally, this choice also implies fairness: “Voluntary engagement bestows
a sense of fairness and consequently legitimacy, instilling a level of respect for the potential
of the process and contributing to a participant’s commitment to the process and good faith
involvement in it.”95 The voluntary nature of ad hoc collaboration becomes a tension
around which mandated forms must navigate in order to be recognized as a legitimate and
valid process for decision making, and worthy of the time commitment required of
participants relative to other opportunities for seeing interests and values met.
Forms of mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) began to emerge in state
and federal laws, partially in response to the success of grassroots attempts at collaboration
in which, as Daniel Kemmis puts it, “...old enemies learn to solve hard problems together.”96
Examples such as the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 97 section 164(e) of the Clean Air
Act, 98 and Montana’s use of water dispute mediators99 all constitute the beginning of a new
era of collaborative governance in natural resource management. Collaborative governance
is defined by Ansell and Gash as a “...governing arrangement where one or more public
agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that
is formal, consensus oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public
Ibid: 327
Ibid: 330
96 Daniel Kemmis. This Sovereign Land: A New Vision for Governing the West. Island Press, Washington
D.C. (2001): 119
97 The Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990. Pub. L. 101-648.
98 e.g.: Van de Wetering and McKinney (2006).
99 See: Montana Code Annotated § 85-5-110.
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policy or manage programs or assets.”100 These laws signify the first attempts by the
Federal government to establish less adversarial approaches to planning and decision
making. However, these early laws have drawn criticism for eliminating the voluntary
tenet101, and collaboration, whether grassroots or institutional, has been accused of
impeding or contravening national laws, and circumventing what legal scholar George
Coggins describes as the, “...legally-ordained processes of decision making.”102
More recent federal laws and regulations such as the Secure Rural Schools and
Community Self Determination Act of 2000,103 the Collaborative Forest Landscape
Restoration Act of 2009,104 and the U.S. Forest Service’s 2012 Planning Rule105 have created
requirements or incentives for disparate interests to come together around public lands
issues to formulate plans or make recommendations on project alternatives prior to formal
decisions by agency administrators. This next generation of collaboration laws operates
within the framework established by the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA),
the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) and
the other environmental and procedural laws that govern natural resource management,
but also allow for citizens to have “enhanced” involvement in and influence over how lands
and resources are managed.
Federal laws, exemplified by those discussed above, authorize policies and
programs to be implemented by agencies requiring some form of collaboration to produce
management plans, make decisions, or establish regulations. These policy-mandates for
Chris Ansell and Alison Gash. "Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice." Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory. Vol. 18, No. 4 (2008):543-571
101 Jonathan Brock. “Mandated Mediation, A Contradiction in Terms: Lessons from Recent Attempts
to Institutionalize Alternative Dispute Resolution Practices.” Villanova Environmental Law Journal.
Vol. 2 (1991): 57.
102George C. Coggins (2001): 164
103 Van de Wetering and McKinney (2006): 44
104 Schultz, Jedd and Beam (2012).
105 See generally: United States Forest Service. Forest Service Handbook 1909.12
100
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collaboration have the potential to create a tension with the long standing premise of
voluntary participation by limiting opportunities for other forms of public involvement, and
circumventing traditional decision making processes. As the Forest Service is currently
promulgating collaboration and enhanced public participation through the 2012 planning
rule, it may prove helpful to look at how other agencies have already integrated
collaborative processes into their planning and decision making and how well those
processes are working.

Dispute Resolution Process Design Theory and Evaluating Success
Collaborative conservation utilizes theories from a variety of disciplines. Scholars
Conley and Moote succinctly summarize the theoretical and practical makeup of this diverse
and growing field in their work Collaborative Conservation in Theory and Practice.106 Chief
among the disciplines drawn from are Social and Political Science, Public Administration
and International Development, and Alternative Dispute Resolution.107 Scholars often
discuss the social and political capital that is created from finding solutions to problems
collaboratively and at the local level.108 Others discuss the democratic implications of
collaborative planning and management,109 while still others work to collect, define and
refine principles and best practices that contribute to developing successful models of
alternative dispute resolution, consensus building, and collaborative governance.110 This
diversity of disciplines, theories, scholarship, and approaches to problem solving, coupled

Alexander Conley and Ann Moote. Collaborative Conservation in Theory and Practice. Udall Center
for Studies in Public Policy, the University of Arizona. Tuscon. (2001)
107: Ibid; 3
108 See Generally: Kemmis (1990); Eric K. Austin. “The Social Bond and Place: A Study of How the
Bureau of Land Management Contributes to Civil Society.” Administrative Theory & Praxis. Vol. 24, No.
2 (2002): 355-362; and Charles F. Wilkinson. “Law and the American West: The Search for an Ethic of
Place.” University of Colorado Law Review. Vol. 59, No. 3 (1988): 401-425.
109 See Generally: Ansell and Gash(2007); Leighninger (2006)
110 See Generally: William L. Ury, Jeanne M. Brett and Stephen B. Goldberg. “Designing an Effective
Dispute Resolution System.” In Getting Disputes Resolved. Cambridge: PON Books. (1993): 41-83.;
Selin and Chavez (1995); and McKinney, Field and Bates, (2008).
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with the unique circumstances that constitute each collaborative process both make it
difficult to apply general theories and entices lively debate among practitioners. However,
several theoretical principles for designing successful processes and methods for evaluating
success have been distilled from the work of those studying practical approaches to
collaborative conservation that are applicable to this study.
Conley and Moote point out that participatory democracy in the international
development arena emphasizes local participation in project development and common
resource management. They stress four basic tenets borrowed from this discipline that can
be applied to collaborative conservation: “1) that everyone who might be affected by or
have an interest in the plan be involved; 2) that all interests be encouraged to discuss their
needs, concerns, and values; 3) that the public be involved continuously through all stages
of planning and decision making; and 4) that decision making authority be shared among all
participants.”111
Ansell and Gash expand upon this idea of democratic governance and stress six
defining principles to guide collaborative process development: “1) the forum is initiated by
public agencies or institutions, 2) participants in the forum include non-state actors, 3)
participants engage directly in decision making and are not merely ‘consulted’ by public
agencies, 4) the forum is formally organized and meets collectively, 5) the forum aims to
make decisions by consensus (even if consensus is not achieved in practice), and 6) the
focus of collaboration is on public policy or public management.”112
Including local perspectives in public resource planning and management is a major
principle underpinning collaborative conservation. In his work Community and the Politics

111
112

Conley and Moote, (2001): 5.
Ansell and Gash (2007): 544-545.

30

of Place, Daniel Kemmis discusses the need for re-vitalizing civic culture and the community
strength that can come from organizing our politics around places of cultural significance;
...what holds people together long enough to discover their power as citizens is their
common inhabiting of a place. No matter how diverse and complex the patterns of
livelihood may be that arise within the...system, no matter how many perspectives
from which people view [it], no matter how diversely they value it, it is, finally , one and
the same...for everyone...if we all want to stay here...then we have to learn, somehow, to
live together.113
Other scholars discuss the merits of bioregionalism and the social capital created from
tackling problems at the local level. The distinguished law professor Charles Wilkinson
offers:
We will always have disputes over land, water, wildlife, minerals, and power. Such
raspings are inevitable and ultimately healthy in a colorful, dynamic, and
individualistic society. Nevertheless, the dissenting parties often leave angry,
determined to undercut the temporary solution bred of combativeness. Perhaps worse,
the process tears at our sense of community; it leaves us more a loose collection of
fractious subgroups than a coherent society with common hopes and dreams. The
overarching concern, therefore, is not to deny that conflict will occur, but rather to
acknowledge an ethic that sets standards and, as importantly, provides a method for
dealing with disputes. Disputants need to recognize that they exist within a community
and that consensus is the preferred method of resolution.114

Designing a Collaborative Process
Designing collaborative processes to build consensus and offer a framework for
successful conflict resolution is an inherently complex endeavor. Conflict resolution
processes must anticipate and be able to respond to the myriad unique and interconnected
social, ecological and institutional factors that simultaneously drive the conflict and frame
the range of possible solutions. The legal principle of “multiple-use, sustained-yield” defines
the range of resource considerations and social interests that must be satisfied through land
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use management within the BLM and Forest Service. However, the agencies are ultimately
responsible for weighing and balancing all the factors and interests and making the final
decisions. Finally, although the decisions that guide the management of local forests or
rangelands most directly impact the social, economic and ecologic conditions of local
communities (broadly defined to include all communities of life), the effect of management
activities on federal public lands are of national significance, and are of equal concern to all
citizens whether they live in a small ranching community in Wyoming or in New York City.
How then, does a dispute resolution system account for and respond to this complexity?
Best practices of dispute resolution and collaborative conflict resolution systems
have been discussed through scholarly literature emerging out of the disciplines of natural
resource management, public administration, and the political and social sciences.
Regardless of the discipline, much of the scholarship agrees on some general principles to
help guide the design process. Perhaps the best recognized are discussed by Ury, Brett and
Goldberg in Getting Disputes Resolved, one of the seminal works on the topic. They offer six
principles to guide designing permanent systems of dispute resolution to help parties avoid
the costs of litigation. The principles are: 1) Put the focus on the interests, 2) Build in "loopbacks" to negotiation, 3)Provide low-cost rights and power backups, 4)Build in consultation
before, feedback after, 5) Arrange procedures in a low-to-high-cost sequence, 6)Provide the
necessary motivation, skills, and resources.115
According to McKinney, Field and Bates, designing systems using the above
framework can lead to improved decision making: “[b]y combining opportunities for public
deliberation, collaborative problem solving and multiparty dispute resolution into the land
use decision-making process, planners, decision makers, and others can create a more
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responsive system of governance, which in turn will likely improve land use decisions.”116
Indeed, as agencies seek to improve their strategies for public participation in planning and
decision making, as exemplified by the Forest Service’s 2012 Planning Rule and the host of
other laws and policies aimed at improving the public-agency relationship, utilizing a
general framework that builds consensus, provides durability over course of time, and is
responsive to local ecological, social and economic conditions seems to provide a good
model from which to proceed.
Selin and Chavez are two scholars who have written on collaborative process design
from an environmental management perspective. They insist that collaborative approaches
to decision making are an increasing trend that views the management agency as but one
member of a set of stakeholders joined together by a common resource problem.117 They
suggest collaboration is a process that results from a variety of antecedent conditions and
proceeds sequentially through several phases: problem-setting, direction-setting,
structuring, and outcomes. Antecedent conditions may include things such as an
environmental crisis, a network of interests sharing a common concern, or a legal
mandate.118 In the problem-setting phase, the issue is given an identity to enable discussion
and ultimately action. They insist that stakeholders will be committed to the process if they
believe the benefits of participation will outweigh the costs.119 In the direction-setting
phase, stakeholders begin to develop a common purpose as they engage in shared learning
to set goals, develop an agenda, and set ground rules. The Structuring phase, “...involves
institutionalizing the shared meaning of the group and devising a regulatory framework to
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guide future collective action...”120 while the outcome phase is where, “...stakeholders
implement the programmatic thrusts of their collective agreements.”121 Finally, Selin and
Chavez identify four types of collaborative design: 1) appreciative planning which is
characterized by exchanging information to develop a shared vision of resource use; 2)
partnerships whereby stakeholders help to advance the vision through direct action; 3)
dialogues to resolve conflict by searching for common ground without the pressure of
developing binding agreements, and 4) negotiated settlements which, “resolve conflicts by
producing a binding agreement ratified by all participating stakeholders.”122 These four
designs will be addressed later in chapter five.
Matthew Leighninger offers a simplified model in his work on democratic
governance in the United States, The Next Form of Democracy: How Expert Rule Is Giving
Way to Shared Governance and Why Politics Will Never Be the Same.123 Leighninger defines
democratic governance as, “the art of governing communities in participatory, deliberative,
and collaborative ways.”124 Within his model, Leighninger suggests two forms of
collaborative governance often emerge: temporary organizing efforts, and permanent
neighborhood structures.125 For the purposes of this study, the RACs closely resemble
permanent neighborhood structures. Here, the notion of the neighborhood is expanded
geographically to encompass a district or region of BLM administered public lands.
Leighninger suggests that the best examples of each form, whether temporary or
permanent, employ four basic principles for success:
First, they recruit people by reaching out through the various groups and
organizations to which they belong, in order to assemble a large and diverse ‘critical
ibid
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mass’ of citizens. Second, they involve those citizens in a combination of small and
large- group meetings: structured, facilitated small groups for informed, deliberative
dialogue, and large forums for amplifying shared conclusions and moving from talk to
action. Third, they give the participants in these meetings the opportunity to compare
values and experiences, and to consider a range of views and policy options. Finally
they effect change in a number of ways: by applying citizen input to policy and
planning decisions, by encouraging change within organizations and institutions, by
creating teams to work on particular action ideas, by inspiring and connecting
individual volunteers or all of the above.126
Leighninger’s framework incorporates Ury, Brett and Goldberg’s principles of focusing on
interests, developing processes for consultation and feedback, encouraging negotiation,
arranging procedures in a low to high cost sequence, and providing motivation, skills and
resources. In Ury, Brett and Goldberg’s model, the principle of “providing low-cost rights
and power back-ups”, refers to processes of professional arbitration that could, “serve as a
backup should interests-based negotiation fail to resolve the dispute.”127 Such procedures
do not apply in the case of the RAC and therefore are of less concern for the purposes of this
study. The discussion of the RAC model in chapter five will, for the purpose of simplicity,
focus largely on Leighninger’s four principles for success.
Evaluating the Collaborative Process
An important thread in the conversation about instituting collaborative
conservation more broadly is how to define and evaluate success. Many scholars have
constructed frameworks for evaluating the effectiveness and success of collaborative
processes in the field (notably: Innes and Booher, Leach, and McKinney and Field).128
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Success cannot be pinpointed to any one particular outcome or criteria because the complex
nature of collaborative processes can lead to success on a variety of different levels.
Innes and Booher, for example, argue the consequences of successful collaboration
emerge in three categorical ways: 1) high-quality agreements that are durable, innovative,
and account for local knowledge; 2) tangible products such as formal agreements, agreed
upon data and analysis, and implementable projects; and 3) intangible products such as
improved social, intellectual and political capital.129 Their work is grounded in the fields of
complexity science and communicative rationality. Complexity science, they explain, values
the intangible effects of shared learning and trust building that accompanies a consensus
building exercise. Communicative rationality is a structure for discourse that results in
emancipatory knowledge, “by engaging all those with differing interests around an issue or
topic.”130 They argue that this knowledge creation is critical for overcoming the
institutional and societal barriers that drive conflict and serves as an ideal for developing a
collaborative model. Much like scientific rationality, they say, “communicative rationality
represents an ideal...which is never actually achieved in practice, though it is a goal or ideal
against which to judge research or communicative practice.”131
Leach is most concerned with the democratic implications of collaborative resource
management and focuses on six qualities that are essential for success: inclusiveness,
representativeness, procedural fairness, lawfulness, deliberativeness, and empowerment.
His substantial work defines each of these six criteria and applies them to critically
analyzing watershed groups in California and Washington. In so doing, he establishes a
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normative framework of evaluation that he argues can be applied to virtually any instance
of collaborative public management.132
Similarly, McKinney and Field (2008) contend collaboration is, “...rapidly becoming
one of the dominant ideas in natural resources policy and politics.”133 They developed a
Participant Satisfaction Scorecard based on their review of the commonly accepted criteria
for measuring success. The scorecard is used to conduct a survey nearly 50 communitybased groups, including several BLM RACs. This scorecard contains a series of questions
that address participants’ motivation for collaborating, as well as the tangible and intangible
products identified by Innes and Booher. Finally, the scorecard poses a series of questions
addressing potential process improvements on a Likert scale in terms of working
relationships, process criteria and outcomes that was partially based on the democratic
notions of collaboration framed by Leach.134
Additionally, Conley and Moote explore a range of evaluation approaches and
articulate that evaluation methods must be carefully designed to match the effort being
evaluated. They offer that comparing multiple efforts can show variations in process and
context that result in different outcomes, which is especially important to keep in mind
when using lessons from one process to help inform how to structure future processes.135
Ultimately, they argue that effective evaluation can, among other things, “assess and refine
efforts to institutionalize a movement that has developed largely at the grassroots level.”136
Williams and Ellefson, two scholars who have studied collaborative forestry
partnerships across public and private lands, define success as, “a group able to attract and
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keep individuals and organizations engaged in partnership activities.”137 They also
acknowledge that success requires open communication of values, differences, concerns,
ideas, and solutions; as well as a certain degree of understanding and flexibility.138 Williams
and Ellefson’s definition of success implies a measure of longevity, in that groups who are
able to attract and keep individuals over time can be considered successful. This success
sustained over time is what is particularly interesting about the BLM RACs, in that, with the
exception of one, where they were established, they have been functioning continuously for
twenty years.
The BLM RACs are a longstanding (20 year) experiment in local collaborative
governance that has been instituted by a policy mandate which, at minimum, fulfills
Williams and Ellefson’s definition of success, “a group able to attract and keep individuals
and organizations engaged in partnership activities.” This investigation seeks to
understand how the BLM RACs measure up to the other principles of dispute resolution
systems design and evaluation methods outlined here. However, before proceeding to
evaluating the RACs, it is important to understand how they were developed and their
relationship to the BLM in general. The following chapter is a brief walk through the history
of the BLM and their approach to public involvement in land use planning and decision
making.

3. The BLM, Rangeland Reform, and the advent of the RACs
This chapter begins with an overview of the BLM and the lands the Agency
administers to establish the relevant background for explaining the institution of the RACs.
It traces the evolution of public participation in the BLM’s land and resource management
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from the days just prior to the implementation of the Taylor Grazing Act through the
Rangeland Reforms developed by Secretary Babbitt which established the Resource
Advisory Councils in 1994. By doing so, it seeks to understand the regulatory requirements
that set up the expectations and desired outcomes intended to be produced by the RAC, and
how those requirements have shaped the activities of the RACs. Finally, this chapter
addresses the first research sub-question: what catalyzed the use of collaboration in
establishing the RACs?
Today the BLM manages 245 million acres of surface land and 700 million acres of
sub-surface minerals primarily in the Western United States.139 Organizationally, the
agency is divided into State wide districts and regional field offices within those districts.
The RACs are organized within the State Districts to provide advice on issues affecting
either the State as a whole, or to one or more regional field offices. Of the RACs in the Rocky
Mountain States investigated by this study, Wyoming, Utah and Arizona each have one RAC
that provides advice on issues across the entire state.140 New Mexico has four RACs, and
Montana, Idaho, and Colorado each have three that enables them provide advice on a
smaller geographic area and from a more localized perspective.
The RACs are the result of a long history of public management of the lands and
resources administered by the BLM. The thread of public involvement that ultimately led
to the modern system of RACs used today stitches together three distinct eras of rangeland
management in what was once generically referred to as the public domain. First, prior to
1934, a relatively unmanaged common rangeland was equally accessible by all. An
unregulated system of unfettered grazing consumed this “sea of grass,” eventually resulting
http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/planning.html accessed on Sept. 30th, 2015.
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in a classic example of Garrett Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons.” Severe declines of a
resource that once seemed so limitless during the period of westward expansion marked
the desperate need for some system of regulation.141
Second, the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934142 enacted such a lease system, divided the
commons into grazing districts and imposed fees on use of the public domain. One of the
BLMs predecessor agencies, the U.S. Grazing Service established an early model of the RACs,
the Grazing Advisory Boards, to assist in implementing the Taylor Act as early as 1935. The
Grazing Advisory Boards were comprised of permittees from the local grazing districts and
provided advice on all management decisions while the lease system guaranteed a degree of
certainty to permitted ranchers and established a revenue stream for the nascent Federal
Grazing Service.143
The third era began in 1976, when Congress enacted the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act. FLPMA broadened the scope of BLM management directives under the
philosophical umbrella of Multiple Use, Sustained Yield. 144 Originating in a time when shifts
in cultural expectations challenged the bureaucratic expert model of agency decision
making, under FLPMA, Congress required public involvement and a process for judicial
review in the management of the public lands.145 In order to guide management actions,
Congress required the BLM to develop resource management plans, and directed the
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Secretary to develop regulations for including the public in the development process.
However, FLPMA failed to articulate clear guidelines as to the nature and scope of that
involvement, leaving interpretation of a vague statutory mandate to the BLM and the
courts.146 FLPMA also reconstituted the Grazing Advisory Board model, calling them Citizen
Advisory Boards, and expanded their purview and membership to include a diverse cross
section of interests. The Citizen Advisory Boards were empowered to provide advice and
recommendations on the implementation of the act and resource management planning
generally.147
The regulatory reforms implemented by Secretary Bruce Babbitt in 1994 called
Rangeland Reform ’94, extend this third era by combining the Grazing Advisory Boards and
the Citizen Advisory Boards into the modern Resource Advisory Councils.148 These new
regulations embraced FACA as an organizing framework, while continuing FLPMA’s
authorization for the advisory committees to provide advice on the “full array of ecosystem
and multiple use issues associated with BLM administered public lands...”149 Incidentally,
the Rangeland Reform ‘94 Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) points out that the
Secretary of Agriculture has “...the authority to set up advisory boards consisting of a variety
of interests and viewpoints...” and, “...could use these boards to gain input for rangeland use
and management planning.”150 However, to date, the use of RACs within the Forest Service
has been on a much more limited and temporary basis.151
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An Unregulated Commons
Prior to the implementation of the Taylor Grazing Act in 1934, the public domain
was a commons, generally free to use and open to all with little oversight or regulation.
Under the Unlawful Enclosures Act of 1885, Congress declared that the commons could not
be fenced in, while the Supreme Court case of Buford v. Houtz guaranteed the public’s right
to access public lands, but according to Coggins and Lindberg-Johnson, beyond that, “federal
law applicable to grazing on the public domain was notable mostly for its absence.”152
During the nineteenth century, homesteading ranchers led the westward expansion,153 and
maintaining a policy of disposal of the vast estate it so recently acquired, the United States
sold off or gave away parcels of land typically in tracts of 160 or 320 acres. Offered up by
the General Land Office back in Washington D.C., these parcels in the arid West were
considered relatively small and found to be insufficient to support viable ranching
operations. Forced by necessity, ranchers adopted the Spanish style of letting cattle graze
freely across the vast public domain for months at a time.154 Simultaneously, Congress
largely ignored range management and the responsibility for regulating grazing and other
activities on the public domain fell largely to the States and Territories.155 The state laws,
which focused more on securing private property rights than conservation of the resource
base, largely ignored the effect overgrazing had on the public domain.156
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By the turn of the twentieth century, Congress had authorized several means for
withdrawing reserves of land from the public domain and placing them under systems of
federal management. The National Park System and the National Forest Reserves both
cleaved off the most scenic or the most productive lands. By 1905, as Coggins and LindbergJohnson explain, “the public domain had been carved up into parks, forests, and all the
rest.”157 The BLM’s other predecessor, the General Land Office ultimately became
responsible for managing, “the lands that nobody wanted...”158 but was still primarily in the
business of disposition. In 1929, President Hoover offered to give the remaining
unreserved public lands over to the states. The states refused, fearing that a transfer of
ownership would result in the loss of significant federal financial benefits and an
accumulation of even more lands they could, “...neither sell nor lease.”159
Largely in response the deterioration of range productivity that resulted from
uncontrolled grazing, the Taylor Act was Congress’s move to regain control over an
untenable situation and begin to improve the condition of the public domain. A hastily
created Grazing Division under the Department of the Interior was given the responsibility
for implementing and administering the Act. In its early days, the Grazing Service faced
many challenges from the conflicts on the range, the depletion of resources, and a lack of
administrative direction or guidance from the Department or Congress.160 Nonetheless, the
significance of the Taylor Act cannot be overstated: “The act is a step in the direction of
conservation and regulated use on land hitherto without ownership and direction of a
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branch of Federal Government.”161 Additionally, today the Act, “...remains the conceptual
foundation of rangeland management and the source of asserted range rights...”162
Provisions of the Taylor Act
The primary goal of the Taylor legislation was, “...to stop injury to the public grazing
lands by preventing overgrazing and soil deterioration, to provide for their orderly use, to
stabilize the livestock industry dependent upon the public range, and for other purposes."163
In fact, bad stewardship practices and overgrazing had depleted vegetation cover and
subsequently the grazing capacity of the range by fifty percent.164 The Taylor Act
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to, “...promote the highest use of the public
lands...”165 through three main provisions: 1) to reserve and organize the unappropriated
public lands into grazing districts166; 2) to establish provisions for protection,
administration, regulation, and improvement of the districts,167 and 3) to establish a permit
system to authorize use of the range upon payment of reasonable fees.168 The
requirements for public participation in the implementation of the act and subsequent
management of the range are woven throughout these several provisions.
For example, a provision in Section 315 provides for a public hearing, and public
notice of such a hearing prior to the establishment of any grazing district to allow for the
input of, “...State officials, and the settlers, residents and livestock owners of the vicinity...”169
Additionally, Section 315(h) made considerations for the Secretary to provide opportunities
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to cooperate with associations of Stockmen, State Agencies and other entities interested in
the conservation of wildlife.170 Finally, Section 315(o)-1a, as it was added with the passage
of the Grazing District Advisory Board Act in1939, officially authorized the Secretary to
establish the Grazing Advisory Boards, “...so that the Secretary may have the benefit of the
fullest information and advice concerning physical, economic, and other local conditions in
the grazing districts...”171
The unregulated grazing that caused the deteriorated conditions of the range was
one of the major catalysts to the passage of the Taylor Act. World War I saw the demand for
meat production explode which resulted in an increase in grazing on the western public
lands and consequently increased degradation to the range. Shortly after the War, the Great
Drought exacerbated the deterioration of range productivity and nearly ruined the livestock
industry in the West.172 Under the Taylor Act, improvement of the range was to be
accomplished by controlling the amount of grazing through the permit system while
providing for the expenditure of funds, “to perform such work as may be necessary amply to
protect and rehabilitate the areas subject to [this act]...through such funds that may be
made available for that purpose.”173 In fact, twenty five percent of grazing fees collected
were to be used for making improvements to the range, but the conditions were so bad that
ranchers didn’t want to wait for the accumulation of funds from the grazing fees.174 Some
advocated for the use of the Civilian Conservation Corps and the Works Progress
Administration to begin making immediate improvements. Consequently, because of the
provisions providing for range improvements and greater certainty for grazing operations,
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ranchers were overwhelmingly in favor of the Act, despite the increased regulation and
federal control imposed upon the once free range.175
A Unique Species of Range Democracy
Ferry Carpenter was appointed as the first Director of the Department of Interior’s
new Grazing Service and charged with the difficult task of implementing the Taylor Act.
Believing that the ranchers themselves were the ones best capable of developing effective
range management guidelines, and reluctant to impose a top-down management regime, he
hastily, and without express authority from the Act, organized local ranchers into grazing
advisory boards.176 Trying to grasp a thread of management control and start reversing the
trend of degradation, Carpenter empowered the advisory boards to classify lands,
recommend licenses, and create rules for grazing operators.177 This “...unique species of
range democracy...”178 was given free rein to establish the boundaries of the grazing
districts, implement the grazing fee system, account for the local range conditions and make
recommendations on the improvements that needed to be made. This system of local
advisory boards catalyzed what came to be known as “home rule on the range”179 and gave
a small collective of local landowners an inordinate degree of power.180
During the first few years of implementation of the Taylor Act, the ranchers became
ever more comfortable with the level of power delegated to them by Carpenter and
interpreted it as an implied authority over all range management decisions.
Simultaneously, the grazing boards became dominated by large-scale operators whose
parochial view of the range seemed to favor of their own economic interests at the expense
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of the ecological integrity of the landscape.181 As the BLM report, 50 Years of Progress points
out:
These boards were expected to address the problem of overgrazing, but the economic
well-being of individual ranchers and, indirectly, that of the local communities in
which they lived, was closely tied to the number of animals the rancher was allowed to
run on the Federal range. This meant that the local advisory board member could have
placed his friends and neighbors in financial hardship. Many simply refused to make
the hard decisions that were necessary to reverse the process of range
deterioration...182
By 1938, the both Congress and the Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ikes were becoming
concerned that the grazing boards wielded too much power and came dangerously close to
violating the principle of constitutional sub-delegation. They began to pull back on the
reigns. Carpenter resigned under pressure from the Secretary and was replaced by Richard
Rutledge, a former Forest Service employee who favored greater federal control. In their
part, Congress enacted The Grazing District Advisory Board Act of 1939.183
The Grazing District Advisory Board Act gave statutory authority to the advisory
boards for the first time, while at the same time it augmented their structure in three
fundamental ways that are still relevant today. First, the act implemented a two-step
process whereby the Advisory Board members were nominated through an election by local
permittees and then officially appointed to the board by the Secretary.184 This appointment
process can easily be construed as the mechanism by which Congress returned the final
authority over the membership of the Boards and decision making power back to the

Olinger (1998): 653-654.
Paul Herndon. “History of Grazing on the Public Lands.” In: Bureau of Land Management. The
Taylor Grazing Act 1934-1984: 50 Years of Progress. Department of Interior (July 1984): 4. [BLM:50
Years of Progress is a collection of essays written by current (at the time) and former BLM Land
Managers discussing the legal and statutory history of public land grazing and management.
Individual essays are cited throughout this discussion, but the collection is also cited generally as
BLM: 50 years of Progress.
183 Pub. L. 76-173, codified as amended in 43 USC § 315(o)-1(a&b).
184 Ibid
181
182

47

Secretary, ensuring that the Agency is not subjected to the undue influence of a single
dominant set of interests. In addition to the appointment process, the Act reserved the right
of the Secretary to remove members from the board.185 Second, the act attempted to
balance the represented viewpoints on the board by requiring the inclusion of one wildlife
advocate to supplement the local stockmen on the twelve to fifteen-member committee.186
Finally, the Act provided limitations on the advice the boards were to give, and expressly
prohibited a member from offering advice that would result in a benefit in which that
member held a direct interest.187 These three provisions resemble those later adopted by
FACA, FLPMA, and that currently exist within the regulatory framework structuring today’s
Resource Advisory Councils.
While the Taylor Act was able to bring the rangelands under federal control and
implement some measure of regulatory authority to curb overgrazing, a combination of
funding and administrative shortfalls prevented the Grazing Service from rehabilitating the
range to its former productivity. In fact the condition of the range continued to decline and
was seen as indicative of two things. First, it exhibited the inability of the Grazing Boards to
put the protection of rangeland ecosystems above their economic wellbeing.188 Second, it
highlighted a fundamental problem with the Grazing Service’s philosophy of decentralized
administrative authority and reliance on the grazing permittees information and advice to
direct management.189 Rather than balancing the two competing provisions of the law, the
Service subordinated its directive to “...stop injury to the public grazing lands...” to,
“...stabilizing the livestock industry...” and consequently facilitated a continued over-use of
the range by the industry.
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The Evolution of Range Management between 1934 and 1976
In 1970, the congressionally appointed Public Land Law Review Commission
released its report enumerating a long list of changes to administrative and procedural law
governing the management of the public lands, some of which were adopted by congress
when it enacted FLPMA. Additionally, between 1970 and1976, the BLM frequently sought
“organic legislation,” similar to that of the Forest Service, to grant it express management
authority over the Nation’s public lands.190 In 1976, Congress enacted the Federal Lands
Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) in response to these and a number of other public
concerns roiling just beneath the surface. Under the Taylor Act, the Federal government
retained the authority to manage the public lands so long as those lands remained in public
ownership. At the time, it was still the official policy of the administration that the lands
remaining in the public domain would eventually be disposed of through the General Land
Office either directly to the states or to private entities. The enactment of FLPMA in 1976
reversed that policy, declaring the Federal government would largely retain ownership of
the remaining public estate.191 In the forty years between the implementation of the Taylor
Act and this new organic legislation, several other important developments took place to
shape the future of land and resource management within the BLM.
The first notable development was the merger in 1946 of the Grazing Service and
General Land Office within the Department of the Interior to create the BLM. With this
merger, the BLM inherited both the strengths and some of the weaknesses of its
predecessor agencies. A combination of shrinking appropriations from Congress, budgetary
constraints, staff capacity, and the influence of the, by then, well-established Grazing
Advisory Boards (GABs) hindered the new agency from making notable progress towards

Coggins (1984): 4.
Lee Sharp. “Overview of the Taylor Grazing Act.” In BLM:50 Years of Progress (1984): supra note
138 at 10.
190
191

49

improving the conditions and productivity of the public rangelands.192 Instead, for the first
two decades of its existence, the BLM spent the majority of its time re-adjudicating grazing
permits and allotments to bring livestock numbers within carrying capacity.193
Various attempts to increase grazing fees and reduce the permitted numbers of
livestock in the 50’s and 60s met with resistance from the powerful GABs.194 In the early
fifties, the BLM tried to balance grazing use with the carrying capacity of the range by
adjusting the numbers of permitted animals based on a scientific approach, a measure
which largely failed to bring about significant change.195 Initially, grazing fees were set by
the Grazing Service to cover their administrative costs but shortly after, due to pressure
from the Grazing Advisory Boards and the powerful livestock interests, fees were allowed to
drop far below what administration of the permit system cost the Agency.196 By 1949,
grazing fees charged by the BLM were six time less than what the Forest Service charged.197
In the 1950’s, grazing fees were adjusted slightly to reflect inflation but a joint Department
of Interior/Department of Agriculture study in 1966 determined fees should be increased
by both departments to $1.26 per animal, nearly quadruple the thirty-three cents the BLM
was charging at the time.198
The growth of the environmental movement in mid-sixties and early seventies
brought newfound public attention to how the public lands were being managed. At that
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time, an increasingly urban population began to increasingly value outdoor recreation and
advocate for protection of wildlife habitat, watersheds and non-consumptive uses of the
public lands.199 The conservation organizations that had sprouted up began to decry the
dominant use management philosophy that had guided the BLM since the beginning.200
Then, in 1970, the congressionally appointed Public Land Law Review Commission
submitted their final report recommending over 100 actions agencies or Congress should
take to improve or augment the management of the public lands. Among the
recommendations were that both the Forest Service and the BLM reduce the number of
permitted animals to improve range health, and the use of the “fair-market value” standard
for determining grazing fees.201 Shortly after the report was submitted to Congress, the
BLM sought out legislative action to gain “organic” management authority over the public
domain.202
The enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act in 1969 (NEPA) and the
Federal Advisory Committee Act in 1972 (FACA), as discussed in the previous chapter,
brought about landmark changes in the public’s ability to interact with public lands
management. FACA ensured that groups advising federal agencies consisted of a balanced
representation of all the interests and provided the framework within which the current
RACs were developed. In addition to the public participation provisions in NEPA, the Act’s
major significance was the requirement that any “major federal actions” proposed by a
federal agency include a statement of environmental impacts affecting the quality of the
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human environment, any expected adverse environmental effects of the proposed action,
and a range of possible alternatives to the proposed action.203
The passage of NEPA in 1969 gave the budding environmental community a legal
stick to wield in order to remedy the degradation occurring on the federal public lands over
the past decades. In 1974, the Courts landed a resounding blow to the BLM. The Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) brought suit against the Secretary of the Interior,
insisting that the BLM’s use of a single, programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) to address the entire grazing management program was insufficient.204 NRDC sought
sight specific EIS analysis for each grazing unit. The courts generally agreed.205 The NRDC
v. Morton ruling prompted Congress to finally address the condition of the public
rangelands and pass FLPMA two years later.

FLPMA, PRIA and the Multiple Use Mandate
By enacting the Federal Land Policy and Management Act in 1976 (FLPMA) and the
Public Rangeland Improvement Act of 1978 (PRIA), Congress acknowledged what ranchers,
conservationists, and the BLM had been telling them for decades: the federal public
rangelands were in deplorable condition.206 Recognizing that, Congress reversed the 200
year old policy of disposal in favor of retaining the public lands under federal ownership. 207
They mandated the BLM use a Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield management philosophy,208
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and provided the Agency with the organic legislation it so desperately needed, directing it to
improve the ecological conditions of the public lands and providing it with the management
authority to regulate the formerly uncontrolled land uses.209 FLPMA explicitly protected the
scientific, scenic, historic, ecological, and other values, and, “...where appropriate, protect
certain lands in their natural condition...for the benefit of fish, wildlife and outdoor
recreation.”210 Not only was protection of resources declared a management requirement,
but the rehabilitation of the range is facilitated through a new funding allocation system.
Fifty percent of all grazing receipts were directed to go towards on-the-ground range
rehabilitation, protection and improvements.211 FLPMA also adopted the “fair market
value” standard for setting grazing fees recommended by the Public Land Law Review
Commission.212
PRIA supplemented and refined the management requirements laid out in FLPMA,
provided further funding for rangeland improvements, and declared rangeland
improvement to be the overall management goal. Legal scholars, public lands managers,
policy makers and academics 213 have analyzed and discussed the statutory nuances and onthe-ground effects of FLPMA and PRIA extensively in the forty years since its enactment far
more thoroughly than can be constructed here, but what is important for the purposes of
this study is that PRIA is a recognition of the continuing deterioration of the public
rangelands while FLPMA substantiates the public involvement strategies the BLM and its
predecessor the U.S. Grazing Service developed by instituting the Grazing Advisory Boards
in the 1930’s.
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Despite the fact that the early Grazing Boards wielded a powerful influence over the
BLM, oftentimes “hogtying” the agency and compelling it to elevate the needs of the
livestock industry over ecological improvement, Congress recognized the value in
preserving the advisory board model. The Grazing Advisory Boards were retained by
Congress in FLPMA, but their power was substantially curtailed.214 Instead, Congress
directed the Secretary to establish a new form of Citizen Advisory Boards under the
provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, and granted them with the general
power to, “...furnish advice on land use planning, classification, retention, management and
disposal.”215
Establishing the Citizen Advisory Boards under FACA was an important
development in the management of the public rangelands and instituting collaborative
governance over public land and resource management. In a time of increasing public
concern over the environment, especially the ecological condition of the public lands, this
development heralded two things: 1)the changing relationship of the public to federal land
and resource management, and 2) the increasing employment of alternative dispute
resolution techniques to resolve conflicts over public policy issues.
Rangeland Reform ’94 and the Dawn of the RACs
Shortly after the Clinton Administration was elected to office in the early 1990s,
Bruce Babbitt was appointed Secretary of the Interior. As a cattle rancher and the former
Governor of Arizona, Babbitt was well-known as a consensus builder and someone who
could straddle the divide between the conservation and livestock interests. Babbitt felt
compelled by the public concern over the environment that, in part, brought the Clinton
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Administration into office, and took on range reform as one of his first orders of business.
The previous decades had seen marginal improvements in rangeland management and a
stabilization of the BLMs budgetary and administrative insecurities that had plagued them
prior to the enactment of FLPMA and PRIA. So, at the turn of the decade, why the need for
yet another set of reforms?
NEPA, FLPMA and PRIA had shed substantial light on the environmental problems
caused by the overgrazing that had occurred throughout the history of the public
rangelands.216 The changing demographic and economic realities of “the New West” saw a
shift in public policy perspectives and concerns over the use (and overuse) of the public
lands. A population that, prior to WWII was primarily employed in the ranching, mining, or
timber industries, was increasingly moving to urban communities and reliant on an
economic base focused around the manufacturing, technology and service industries. 217
This increasingly urban population began to value the public lands for non-consumptive
recreation purposes. Combined with the increased influence of environmental groups
across the country clamoring for protection of fish and wildlife habitat, the BLM faced
mounting pressure to improve range conditions and consider values other than ranching
and mining in land use planning and management.218 Finally, Babbitt recognized that the
administration of the grazing permit system was unsustainable, and the agency needed to
realize a better return from the grazing fees.
According to the Final Environmental Impact Statement for Rangeland Reform ’94,
the new regulations attempt to better implement the multiple-use mandate, further
addresses deteriorating ecological conditions on the range by imposing federal Standards
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and Guidelines for rangeland rehabilitation, outline a new grazing-fee structure, and
combine the Grazing Advisory Boards with the Citizen Advisory Boards into the more
comprehensive Resource Advisory Councils known today.219 The ingenuity of the reforms
was exemplified in the collaborative process that was used in their development, but the
significance was not fully realized until they began to be implemented. As the Final EIS for
Rangeland Reform ’94 explains:
A major policy element of the reform package consists of national requirements and
guiding principles for the local development of state or regional standards and
guidelines for livestock grazing on BLM-administered lands. Fallback standards and
guidelines in the Preferred Alternative would take effect if regional standards and
guidelines have not been developed within 18 months.220
This statement underscores the purpose of the new reforms and also the original intent of
the Resource Advisory Councils, to develop from a local perspective state and regional
standards and guidelines for livestock grazing. The regulations implemented a federal floor
or “fallback standards and guidelines”, as the baseline for managing the ecological condition
of the public rangelands, in the event that the RACs were unable to agree.221 Rangeland
Reform ’94 established the RACs to develop, with consideration of the local conditions and
cultural heritage, Standards and Guidelines to meet or exceed this federal floor for
rangeland management. The regulations also pose limitations on the RACs authority that
previously were not specifically voiced in other legislation.222 In addition, the reforms
addressed several other difficult issues the BLM found themselves dealing with: the
unauthorized sub-leasing of grazing permits, methods for protecting desert ecosystems,
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how to spend range betterment funds, directing an ecosystem approach to rangeland
management, and adjusting grazing fees to realize a fair value.223
The Rangeland Reform regulations define the core purpose of the RACs by
instituting a process for collaboratively developing the Standards and Guidelines for
rangeland management. In the process, they recognize FACA as an effective governing
structure for instituting collaborative decision making in public land use and resource
management. Requiring the establishment of a standing FACA committee authorized to
provide advice on “the full array of ecosystem and multiple use issues associated with BLMadministered public lands...” is a unique feature of the BLM RACs and brings the institution
within the legal framework outlined in the previous chapter. The question then turns to
why, considering that local control of rangeland management resulted in nearly seventy
years of degradation to the ecological resources found on the public rangeland, did
Secretary Babbitt insist on continuing a policy of decentralized management and looking to
local users for information for decision making?

Why the RACs? A Continued Experiment in Collaborative Governance
In establishing the RACs, Rangeland Reform ’94 continued a policy of local
governance of public rangeland management but with some substantive changes from the
previous models that simultaneously diversify the interests represented, limit their power,
and provide them with a sense of direction. In order to better account for the values of the
competing and complementary uses of the public lands, the regulations outline distinct
membership categories that, “...reflect a balance of views.”224 The membership categories
are as follows: Category 1) Persons who hold Federal grazing permits or leases within the
area for which the council is organized; represent interests associated with transportation

223
224

ibid
Rangeland Reform ’94 FEIS: 18.

57

or rights-of-way; represent developed outdoor recreation, off-highway vehicle users, or
commercial recreation activities; represent the commercial timber industry; or represent
energy and mineral development. Category 2) Persons representing nationally or
regionally recognized environmental organizations; dispersed recreational activities;
Archeological and historical interests; or nationally or regionally recognized wild horse and
burro interest groups. Category 3) Persons who hold State, county or local elected office;
are employed by a State agency responsible for management of natural resources, land, or
water; represent Indian tribes within or adjacent to the area for which the council is
organized; are employed as academicians in natural resource management or the natural
sciences; or represent the affected public-at-large.225
The BLM has a nearly eighty-year history of collaboratively managing the public
domain, from the days of the informal grazing advisory boards set up by Ferry Carpenter to
today’s modern Resource Advisory Councils. As Olinger succinctly puts it, “...local control
was not a new concept in grazing management. In fact, it was a concept that dated to nearly
the beginning of federal regulatory control of the ranges, and which, as the current
condition of the range indicates, has been largely unsuccessful in protecting the
environment of the public range.”226 The reasons for continuing with this experiment in
local governance reflect the evolving nature of public lands management and an increase in
the use of alternative dispute resolution techniques throughout the Federal government to
resolve conflicts and move policies forward.
This evolution is prevalent in the work of the Colorado Group. Without the efforts of
this diverse group of ranchers, wildlife advocates and conservationists, the RACs may have
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met with much more resistance, especially by the national environmental organizations
who were already weary of instituting another system of local control.227 Initially, Secretary
Babbitt held four town-hall style meetings to develop the proposal for new regulations.
After significant pressure by Congress and Western ranchers, Babbitt promised to work
more closely with the affected parties to develop the second round of proposed regulations.
This promise led to the establishment of the Colorado Rangeland Reform Working Group
(the Colorado Group) in 1993 by Secretary Babbitt and Governor Romer of Colorado. The
group’s membership included ranchers, environmentalists, and elected officials who were
committed to forging solutions through a consensus-based process. The group met nine
times between 1993 and 1994, hammering out recommendations to issues around public
input, range use, range improvement funding, enforcement, grazing fees, water issues, and
other concerns. The recommendations of the Colorado Group were almost universally
adopted in the Rangeland Reform ’94 package.228
Environmentalists involved in the Colorado Group favored keeping ranchers on the
land, “as a way to avoid sprawling development and maintain cultural integrity, while the
group's ranchers were willing to place more emphasis on ecosystem management in their
operations to satisfy environmental concerns.”229 The Colorado Group’s recommendations
emphasized both community and ecosystem health equally, acknowledging the importance
of promoting sustainable communities, producing good stewards of the land, and favoring
ecosystem function over resource extraction.230 The Group also felt that a centralized, topdown management structure could never adequately implement ecosystem management,
which inherently reflects the nuance of the local ecology and local culture. Here,
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concessions were made to the environmental concerns over the past problems with local
control of the range, and the RACs were developed to include members of national
environmental groups. As such, the Colorado Group laid the foundation for the current
model of collaboration and consensus-building adopted by the BLM through Rangeland
Reform ’94. In fact, included in their report to Babbitt, the Colorado Group produced a paper on
their consensus-building process titled Models for Enhanced Community-Based Involvement in
Rangeland Reform. The DOI noted in their final published rule that in general the Department,
“...agrees with the findings of the group and has attempted to incorporate all key elements of the
model for public involvement in this proposed rule."231
As it was adopted, Rangeland Reform ’94 amended nearly all of the regulations
governing advisory committees detailed in 43 CFR § 1780.232 The language used in the
Federal Register describing the final adopted rule indicates that the BLM intended that the
RACs fulfill the role of the advisory committees and all their associated functions required
under FLPMA stating:
FLPMA directs the Secretary to establish advisory councils of not less than 10 and not
more than 15 members. Members must be appointed from among representatives of
the various major citizens’ interests concerned with problems relating to land use
planning, or with the management of the public lands located within the area for
which an advisory council is established. At least one member must be a publicly
elected official. The department envisions that the RACs formed in each State under
the final rule will fulfill these statutory requirements.”233
Also according to the final adopted rule, the RACs were established to accomplish two
primary goals: providing advice on the full array of multiple use issues, and consulting on
the preparation of standards and guidelines for rangeland health. As the final rule dictates:
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The role of the RAC is to provide advice to BLM. Each RAC will focus on the full array of
multiple use issues associated with public lands within its area of jurisdiction. They
will consult on the preparation of standards and guidelines for grazing
administration...They will also provide advice on preparation, amendment, and
implementation of land use management plans and activity plans and consult in
planning for range development and improvement programs. 234
The final regulations also implemented a variety of provisions that helped to
structure the RACs and provide them some initial direction moving forward. First, they
established and organized the categories used to ensure diverse representation of the
public’s interests.235 Next, it provided authorization for specifically assisting with resource
management planning in addition to the other duties already authorized by FLPMA in
section 1784.0-6.236 It also outlined the three models of RAC organization from which the
district managers could choose to structure the RAC’s initial charters.237 One of the most
interesting provisions of the RACs is a paragraph in § 1784.6-1 that states, “Where the
resource advisory council becomes concerned that its advice is being arbitrarily
disregarded, the council may request that the Secretary respond directly to such concerns
within 60 days of receipt...”238 This is presumably implemented to provide a measure of
accountability to the RAC by the State Director and the local managers.
The last provision of the regulations affecting the RACs amends the grazing
management requirements, characterizes the federal fundamentals of rangeland health, and
requires the local standards and guidelines be consistent with the described
fundamentals.239 The federal fundamental standards are intended to, “...address the
necessary physical components of functional watersheds, ecological processes required for
healthy biotic communities, water quality standards and objectives, and habitat for
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threatened or endangered species or other species of special interest.”240 The RACs are
specifically directed to assist in the development of local standards and guidelines, “...to
provide specific measures of rangeland health and to identify acceptable or best
management practices in keeping with the characteristics of a State or region such as
climate and landform.”241 The regulations require local standards and guidelines to at
minimum meet the federal standards and address a suite of ecological concerns.242 Section
4180(C)(3)(f) also dictates that until these local standards and guidelines are approved by
the Secretary, federal fallback standards and guidelines will apply and be implemented.243
Unique to federal land management, this provision implements the model of creating a
federal regulatory floor and encouraging the states or local regions to develop measures to
meet or exceed the baseline standards.
Upon release of the initial EIS, the Rangeland Reform package came under fire from
national environmental groups, ranchers and some federal lawmakers. For some, the
reforms didn’t provide strong enough environmental safeguards, others lambasted the
grazing fee increases, while still others chided the provision allowing direct appeal to the
Secretary.244 In response to these criticisms and the over 38,000 comments received by the
DOI on the draft EIS, some changes were made to the final rule delaying the implementation
of the grazing fee increase and establishing the requirement for RAC members to reside
within the State in which they have jurisdiction. Shortly after the rules were adopted, the
Public Lands Council filed a facial challenge to the regulations claiming the new regulations
on grazing were incompatible with the Taylor Grazing Act and FLPMA and that the,
“security of their ‘historical adjudicated’ preferences in terms of numbers of AUMs was
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lost.”245 The challenges found their way through to the Supreme Court which ultimately
upheld all of the provisions of Rangeland Reform ’94.246 In the end, Secretary Babbitt’s
commitment to the Colorado Model and writing “a new chapter in range management...”247
guided the reforms through these tempests and finally saw twenty-three RACs established
late in 1995.248
The language used by the agency in the Federal Register adopting the final
Rangeland Reform ‘94 regulations provides an illuminating backdrop for considering
whether the RACs have fulfilled their regulatory requirements. Their two principle
requirements developed under Rangeland Reform ‘94 and codified in the regulations are to:
1) consult with the BLM State Director to develop local standards and guidelines for
rangeland health249; and 2) provide advice on, “policy formulation, program planning,
decision making, attainment of program objectives, and achievement of improved program
coordination and economies in the management of public lands and resources...”250
Remembering these two critical functions of the RACs when assessing their effectiveness
will highlight why they have been continuously reauthorized by the Secretary of the Interior
for twenty years.

4. Assessing the BLM RAC Model
Chapter four examines the RAC model from the participant’s point of view and the
extent the Rocky Mountain RACs are able to fulfill their responsibilities as directed by the
regulations. This examination relies on in-depth interviews conducted with representatives
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from four Rocky Mountain region RACs to gain their insights into how the RACs function,
how they define success, and their perceptions of effectiveness. A summary table of
recommendations and advice provided to the BLM by all sixteen Rocky Mountain RACs was
also constructed from the review of the meeting minutes that was conducted as background
research for this study (see Appendix IV). This table is used to identify and discuss the
degree to which the RACs are accomplishing the goals and mandates under which they were
established. Section one of this chapter outlines the interview methods in detail, while
section two discusses the criteria used for evaluating the RAC model. Finally, section three
discusses the RAC participant interviews and recommendations in detail through the lens of
the evaluation criteria discussed in section two.
According to Hesse-Biber and Leavy, in analyzing in-depth interviews, the
researcher is, “looking for patterns that emerge in the ‘thick descriptions’ of social life
recounted by their participants...” with the goal of, “...gaining rich qualitative data, from the
perspective of selected individuals, on a particular subject.”251 In this study, the subject
under investigation is the effectiveness of the RACs as an institution, and the patterns that
emerge are represented by quotes from the interviewees. The qualitative data gained
through the interviews is used to develop a picture of the overall effectiveness of the
institution and extract lessons to inform refinement or the future development of similar
processes of collaborative governance.
Using interview quotes to paint a picture of the RAC’s, their effectiveness is
evaluated based on the criteria laid out in section two. The evaluation criteria developed
for this study are based on the literature review conducted for chapter two about evaluating
processes of ECR. By relying on quotes of the participants in this study and the patterns
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that emerged from an analysis of the interview transcripts, section three addresses the
remaining two research sub-questions: 1) what has enabled the RACs to achieve their core
purpose; and 2) what sustains the RACs over time as a collaborative arrangement instituted
by a policy mandate within a federal land management agency?. The discussion of these
findings is divided into two sections, each addressing one of the research sub-questions.

Interview methods
Interviews followed procedures detailed in the literature evaluating collaborative
processes of ECR. Many scholars have relied on participant perception to evaluate success
of collaborative processes, as well as a variety of methods to gain those perspectives
including semi-structured interviews and formal survey instruments. 252 In their
investigation of over fifty cases of community-based collaboration on federal lands,
McKinney and Field use a standardized survey instrument and base their evaluation on the
premise, “...that participants are in one of the best positions to evaluate the relative success
of their effort.”253 Lu and Schuett, use semi-structured interviews to gain an understanding
of concerns over forest management issues on the Sam Huston National Forest in Texas.254
Schuett, Selin and Carr also discuss the use of purposive sampling techniques, open ended
questioning, and analyzing the content of collected responses to their questioning. In
analyzing the responses to their questions, they look for common themes, develop
categories from those themes, and use quotes to, “...illustrate the richness of these data...” in
their reporting.255
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254 Jiaying Lu and Michael A. Schuett. “Examining the Role of Voluntary Associations in
Environmental Management: The Case of the Sam Houston National Forest.” Environmental
Management; Vol. 49 (2012): 334–346.
255 Schuett, Selin, and Carr (2001): 588-589.
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The RACs selected as the sample population for this study were purposely chosen to
capture a cross section of the geographic and ecological characteristics that exist in Rocky
Mountain region, as well as the diverse RAC models described in 43 CFR § 1784.6-2. Each
interview respondent was purposely-selected to represent one of the three interest
categories that make up the RAC membership. Additionally, one BLM staff member directly
involved with the RACs was also selected to be interviewed. In three of the four RACs
studied, a full array of one agency representative and three RAC members (one from each
interest category) were interviewed. In one case, only one Agency representative and one
RAC member were able to be interviewed. In total, fourteen phone interviews were
conducted between March and June of 2015.
Respondents were provided with the interview questions and letter of informed
consent prior to the call (see: Appendix I). Interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes
with the average interview lasting just about an hour. Interviews were digitally recorded
with the permission of the interviewee and transcribed by hand by the principle
investigator. At the time of the interview, each participant acknowledged receiving the
informed consent form and interview guide, and also verbally expressed their consent to
both participate in the interview and to have the interview recorded. To ensure
confidentiality, recordings were transcribed absent of any information that could identify
the respondent. Audio files and transcriptions were also kept in separate folders on a
password protected computer accessible only to the principle investigator.
The sample size naturally poses some limitations on the ability to generalize
theories from the interview responses. The sample was limited to maintain a manageable
number of interviews in the time allowed for the study to be completed, and to understand
from a more regionalized perspective if further investigation into the RAC’s nation-wide
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effectiveness is warranted. Since only RAC members and agency representatives were
interviewed, responses to the questions may be biased in favor of the views of those who
already believe in the RAC as a valuable process for decision making, and who inherently
have a stake in ensuring its success. Consequently, the views of those people who are
affected by or have an interest in BLM management decisions, but who are outside the RAC
process are not accounted for in this study. Although a limited sample population, the indepth interviews collected in this study provided detailed insight into the consensusbuilding process and overall effectiveness of the Rocky Mountain RACs from the point of
view of the diverse interests involved.

Evaluation Methods
After the interviews were transcribed, the content of the text was analyzed for
relevant quotes, and quotes were categorized into themes256 based on the evaluation
criteria presented below.257 The evaluation criteria used for this study was adapted from
the literature on evaluating ECR and ADR described in chapter two (see also: Table I,
below). The following discussion of the findings weaves quotes from the interviews
through the evaluation framework constructed by the criteria. Drawing on the views and
opinions of the RAC members and BLM staff highlights many of the RAC’s successes,
challenges, and critical enabling features. Quotes used in the discussion were chosen
because they were representative of themes discussed by other interviewed RAC members
and BLM representatives.

Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2006):343-359 describe the process of analyzing qualitative data and
coding collected data into themes using a grounded theory approach. See Also: Carl F Auerbach and
Louise B. Silverstein. Qualitative Data: An Introduction to Coding and Analysis. New York, NY: New
York University Press (2003): 31-73. The coding techniques used in this study to categorize content
into themes from the responses of the participant interviews was largely adopted from the approach
described here.
257 See generally: Lu and Schuett(2012); Schuett, Selin, and Carr (2001) for justification on using
semi-structured interviews, content analysis and theme development as an approach to evaluating
collaborative process design through participant perspectives.
256
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This evaluation of the RAC institution is based on the views and opinions of the RAC
members and the BLM staff most closely involved in the process. According to Conley and
Moote, participant perceptions can be used to, “...identify stakeholder attitudes, opinions,
and relationships; reduced conflicts between parties; increases in social capital; and other
social changes.”258 Relying on participant perceptions inherently poses some limitations to
the evaluation. According to McKinney and Field, “This approach to evaluation creates
some selection bias because it does not include the views of people who are not part of a
particular [community-based collaboration], but who may nevertheless be interested in and
affected by the outcomes.”259 While this study includes only the insights of RAC members
and the agency staff involved in the program, it is a good platform from which to begin an
exploration into the RAC institution.
The evaluation criteria used in this study has been adopted from the substantial
literature on evaluating community-based collaboration and processes of environmental
conflict resolution that has accumulated over the past two and a half decades. The criteria
used in this study mainly account for tangible and intangible effects of the process of the
RAC’s deliberations. Interview questions were developed to elicit responses related to
representation and inclusion, the ability to build consensus and make consensus-based
recommendations, the development of social and political capital that often accompanies
successful collaborative and consensus-building processes of public engagement.
Many evaluations of collaborative process focus on the on-the-ground or tangible
outcomes resulting from the deliberation of the group.260 However, as the
recommendations provided to the BLM are advisory only, it is difficult to evaluate the RACs

Conley and Moote (2003): 380.
McKinney and Field (2008): 421.
260 Conley and Moote (2003): 374.
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based on the implementation of their recommendations. Therefore, despite the RACs
demonstrated ability to produce collaborative, consensus-based advice, this study focuses
less on the tangible, on-the-ground outcomes in favor of the process-based evaluation and a
cursory overview of the RAC’s ability to provide consensus-based recommendations to the
Agency. Conley and Moote suggest, “...people’s perceptions are often seen as less
appropriate for measuring tangible outcomes, due to their subjectivity and reliance on
respondent’s memories.”261 Therefore, as discussed above, an analysis of the meeting
minutes of the sixteen Rocky Mountain RACs was used to construct a table of
recommendations and advice that supplements the interview responses (see Appendix IV).
This analysis is used to show what topics the RACs have discussed over the past two years
and where they have found success in providing consensus-based advice to the BLM. These
recommendations qualify as one type of successful outcome of a collaborative process and
are discussed throughout the results. On the other hand, even when the RACs fail to
produce a specific recommendation, discussion of a topic around the RAC table often still
results in a more informed decision being made by the BLM.
The evaluation approach used here is divided into process criteria and outcome
criteria. This approach was adopted from Innes and Booher, who organize their framework
by separating the tangible and intangible effects of the process from the on-the-ground or
implementable outcomes of the agreements produced. 262 They also maintain that the
process of collaboration may or may not lead to implementable outcomes, but the lack of
implementable outcomes does not necessarily indicate a failure of the process and therefore
each must be evaluated independently.263 This is especially pertinent in the case of the
RACs where the agency has no statutory obligation to use the recommendations and advice
Ibid: 381.
Innes and Booher (1999): 419
263Ibid: 414.
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the RACs provide and there is a limited ability to track what is done with the
recommendations once they are provided to the BLM.
The categories utilized within the process tract are: representation and
inclusiveness, shared purpose, self-organization and procedural fairness, engagement and
empowerment, deliberativeness, and builds consensus. The categories utilized within the
outcome tract are: produces agreements, ends stalemates, efficient in costs versus benefits,
increases creativity, builds social and political capital, and produces information resources.
Definitions for each of the evaluation categories, and key words or phrases used in
identifying relevant interview quotes are listed in Table I on the next page. These criteria,
definitions and key words have been adopted from a variety of sources including primarily
Innes and Booher,264 Leach,265 and McKinney and Field.266 These criteria are used in the
following discussion to frame the evaluation of the effectiveness of the RAC institution.

Innes and Booher (1999)
Leach (2006)
266 McKinney and Field (2008)
264
265
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Table I: Evaluation Criteria, definition of terms, and key words

Process Criteria
Representation and
Inclusiveness
Shared purpose
Self-Organization/
Procedural Fairness

Description
Includes representatives of all relevant and significantly
different interests. Provides substantial opportunity for
public input and incorporates public input in formulating
options and decisions.
Process is driven by a purpose and tasks that are real, and
shared by the group. Group is able to identify and prioritize
issues collectively.
Allows participants to decide on ground rules, objectives,
tasks, working groups, and discussion topics; and treats all
parties equally and respectfully in the establishment of such
procedures.
Engages participants, keeping them at the table, interested
and learning through in-depth discussion, drama, humor, and
informal interaction. Enables participants to influence the
decisions of officials or administrators.
Fosters creative thinking, shared learning, examination of
each other’s assumptions, identification of common interests,
out-of-the-box ideas, and challenges to the status-quo

Key Words
other interests, diverse
interests, perspectives,
comments
Common ground, shared
values, compromise,
shared development,
had my say, felt heard,

Seeks consensus only after discussions have fully explored
the issues and interests and significant effort has been made
to find creative responses to differences

Influenced management,
felt empowered,
encouraged, gained
access,
common interests,
understand other
perspectives, learned a
lot, shared learning
Consensus, all agreed,
we all decided,
Collaborative decision

Description

Key Words

Produces
Agreements

Produces high-quality agreements (formal recommendations
in the RACs case) that are agreed upon by the participants
and substantially satisfies their interests.

Ends Stalemate

Ends stalemate, increases understanding, and results in the
implementation of agreed upon projects, activities, or plans.

Efficient in Costs v.
Benefits

Compared favorably with other planning methods in terms of
costs and benefits.

Increases Creativity

Produces creative ideas or innovations that would not
otherwise be achieved.

Builds Social and
Political capital

Builds trust and results in improved working relationships
between participants, agencies, and the public. Results in
improved ability to be responsive to future change and
conflict.
Produces high-quality information that participants agree
upon, understand, and accept. Results in learning and
change beyond the group.

Came to agreement,
provided advice,
developed
recommendations
Overcome conflict, get
along, understand each
other, respect other
perspectives.
time commitments,
Efficient process, less
costs, beneficial,
Creative results, new
ideas, see things they
weren’t thinking about
build relationships,
understand other points
of view, build trust,
respect,
Shared knowledge,
understand the issues,

Engagement and
Empowerment
Deliberativeness

Builds Consensus

Outcome Criteria

Information
resources
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Findings
The discussion in this section is organized around the two remaining sub-questions:
1) What enables the RACs to achieve their core purpose? 2) What sustains the RACs over
time as a collaborative arrangement instituted by a policy mandate in a federal land
management agency? The assumption that the RACs are achieving the core purpose is
based on the fact that, with the exception of when the Governor of Wyoming allowed his
state’s RAC charter to expire in 1997,267 all sixteen Rocky Mountain RAC charters have been
continuously renewed every two years since they were established in 1995.
This discussion proceeds by first addressing the preliminary definition of success,
have the RACs accomplished their primary goals? Next, the discussion addresses how the
RAC participants and agency representatives define success for themselves. Following that,
the discussion traces themes identified from the participant interviews through the
evaluation framework discussed above. A summary of participant responses and the
themes that were identified through those responses is represented in the tables in
Appendix III. This discussion relies on quotes from the interviews to highlight key points
and contrasting opinions about the ability of the RACs to achieve success, the key benefits
realized from participating in the RAC program and some of the challenges the RACs face in
accomplishing the stated goals. The interviews are discussed in aggregate and focus on
both the similarities and differences in the participant’s experiences as well as the successes
and challenges that were discussed.
Defining Success
One fundamental way to identify a successful collaborative process is to ask the
question: did the group accomplish what they set out to do? Did they accomplish their

267

Olinger(1998): 677.
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stated goals?268 In the case of the RACs their most basic goals are explicitly stated in the
regulations.269 As discussed in the previous chapter, the two principle requirements
developed under Rangeland Reform ‘94 and codified in the regulations are to: 1) consult
with the BLM State Director to develop local standards and guidelines for rangeland
health270; and 2) provide advice on, “policy formulation, program planning, decision making,
attainment of program objectives, and achievement of improved program coordination and
economies in the management of public lands and resources...”271
Without exception, the RACs were able to develop and have the Secretary approve
local standards and guidelines within the appointed deadline.272 Once the standards and
guidelines were approved, many RACs found success by providing advice to the Agency on a
variety of issues such as Resource Management Plan alternatives, the siting of energy and
mineral development projects, administering the wild horse and burro program, and
habitat, rangeland, or riparian restoration projects.273 The table in Appendix IV highlights
many of the official recommendations provided to the BLM by all sixteen of the Rocky
Mountain RACs over the past two years.
In addition to this analysis, many of the interview respondents discussed specific
recommendations they had helped to formulate during their tenure on the RAC. For
example, wild horse and burro management is one issue that affected several of the RACs
investigated for this study. Ten of the sixteen RACs had some discussion or provided advice
on the management of the wild horse herds such as in Wyoming where, “One of the first
Conley and Moote (2003): 377.
43 CFR §§ 1784.0 – 1784.6-2
270 43 CFR § 4180.2(a)
271 43 CFR § 1784.0-6
272 Olinger (1998): 678. The Record of Decision for each state district or field office’s Standards and
Guidelines can be found by searching “standards and guidelines” in each BLM District website.
273 Synthesis of Meeting Minutes from past two years of Rocky Mountain RACs; on file with the
author. See also: Appendix IV for table highlighting recommendations provided by all sixteen Rocky
Mountain RACs in the past two years.
268
269
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things we tried to do was put down on paper what we thought about it...Then every time
there is a new chapter in the development or litigation over management of wild horses, we
go back to that letter...”274
The recent national level discussions around sage grouse recovery and possible
listing on the Endangered Species List transcended nearly all the RACs investigated for this
study. Eleven of the sixteen RACs had a discussion regarding sage grouse management
detailed in their meeting minutes during the past two years.275 Many of the discussions
persisted through multiple meetings as the Agency kept the RAC up to date on or included
them in the discussions of amending resource management plans as a result of the
proposed listing. As one respondent discussed:
The Sage Grouse issues of course is huge in the West and we wrote a letter to the State
BLM Director as a RAC,...how they and the Forest Service needed to work together and
work with the State of Utah and find something that would satisfy most of the
stakeholders...and I thought we got through that in pretty good shape, and came up
with a pretty good letter that was sent on to the State BLM , a recommendation letter
explaining the feelings of the RAC.276
Resource and travel management planning are also topics that equally affect all the
RACs. Fourteen of the sixteen RACs had a discussion around Resource Management
Planning, Travel Management Planning, or both over the past two years.277 In fact, at the
time of the document review, ten sub-RACs were involved in assisting with some form of
resource or travel management planning.278 In addition, RACs help the BLM discuss
specific issues that arise in the process of resource and travel management planning such as
where to allow or restrict motorized activity, trail development, recreational shooting,
forest management activities, and oil and gas leasing.
Wyoming RAC member comment, on file with the Author
Synthesis of RAC meeting minutes, on file with the Author
276 Utah RAC member comment, on file with the Author
277 Synthesis of RAC meeting minutes, on file with the Author
278 Ibid
274
275
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These issues represent merely the tip of the iceberg of the “full array of multiple-use
management issues” that exists on BLM managed public lands. The RACs have the ability to
engage these issues and topics at a variety of scales from listening to updates from field
managers, having deliberative discussions within the group, or forming sub-committees to
facilitate a more in-depth exploration of the issue. One thing that is apparent from this
synthesis is that even where the RACs do not advance a formal recommendation to the State
Director or the Secretary, the discussions help the BLM to understand the effects their
proposed actions have on the broad cross-section of the public prior to making a final
decision.
In addition to analyzing how the RACs measure up to a definition of success
imposed upon them from the outside, it is equally important to understand how the RAC
participants define success for themselves. In many of the interviews, success was
determined by the ability, after deliberating from all sides of the issue, to build a consensus
recommendation or position on a topic.
[Success is] an ability to present options in an open manner and have discussions on
it...279
[The RAC] is a broad cross section [of interests]...So, to bring all of those people
together and come up with a recommendation letter...I think that’s pretty good success
for a group that’s that broad and that diverse. Everybody knows that something needs
to be done, the question is just how much...I think overall in trying to come up with
position statements and recommendation letters to our state BLM agency that they
could put in an EIS, I think that speaks volumes for a group of citizens that have varied
interests.280
I feel like when I talk to the managers or the BLM folks that we’re advising, they
always seem to leave the conversation thinking, “wow, this is really great information,
I’m really glad we have this opportunity.” So, when we help the managers see

279
280

Utah RAC member quote, on file with the Author
Utah RAC member quote, on file with the Author
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something they weren’t really considering and if that was a way to save, to keep a
process valuable for the public, I think that’s a really good thing.281
For these individuals, success was broadly defined in terms of both the process and
outcome criteria. The process involves choosing a topic to address, deliberately discussing
that topic from the multiple viewpoints, and building a consensus view towards resolving
the issue. The outcome consists of producing an agreed upon recommendation and
providing that recommendation as advice for the BLM to consider. Whether that advice
appreciably influences the management decision is a point of contention that will emerge
later in the discussion.
The BLM had a similar definition of success. For the Agency, success is largely
determined by the RAC discussing an issue from all sides and deciding upon a consensus
recommendation:
Success is being able to present multiple views but be able to discuss them and be
flexible enough to hear other points of views.282
I define success when we identify together the things we need advice, and the RAC gets
to the place where they feel comfortable giving us that advice...they will usually craft a
letter from the entire body that they will send to the state director, and they will
provide input on the solution that we have asked them for, or they will provide
alternatives for us to pursue.283
How I define success of the RAC is that the RAC is wanting to take up issues or provide
advice to the BLM, and they actually provide that advice and tackle those issues...They
may be telling us stuff we don’t want to hear, and to me that is not a bad thing.284
These last two definitions highlight an interesting point in that, to these individuals, success
means identifying issues together, and that the RAC wants to take up issues. These phrases
imply that the RAC membership must feel empowered to identify the topics they discuss
and define their mission with some level of independence. Issues of empowerment with the
Colorado RAC member quote, on file with the Author
BLM Representative quote, on file with the Author.
283 BLM Representative quote, on file with the Author
284 BLM representative quote, on file with the Author.
281
282
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RAC membership will come up later in the discussion, but for now, it is instructive to
remember that these Agency staff members view an engaged and empowered RAC, at least
in part, necessary for success.
For some members of the RACs, success has not been achieved unless the
recommendations result in on-the-ground action or the implementation of a policy
directive.
Success is getting all the information on an issue, then having a good discussion on
how do we want to advise the state director, then having them take that advice...We
can do our due diligence of study and debate and synthesizing concepts and writing a
good recommendation, then one might say the RACs been successful, we did our job.
But to ultimately succeed, [the recommendation] needs to be put in place.285
For individuals with this point of view, success is more narrowly defined and requires onthe-ground action or policy change. The RACs success, then, is ultimately determined by the
BLM who must use the recommendations to augment a policy or affect management in
some way. This definition creates a tension with the fact that the RACs are explicitly
authorized to function in an advisory capacity only and do not hold any binding authority or
enforcement mechanism over the agency.286 The BLM’s obligation to retain final decision
making authority over management actions coupled with the fact that the RACs have no
express assurance that their recommendations will be implemented left some RAC
members feeling that their advice was not being used by the BLM to the extent that they
hoped. As one RAC member lamented, “We developed a position paper and gave it to [the
State Director], and we might as well have made it into a paper airplane and pitched it out
the window, because they don’t use it. Because it’s from this broad based group and not a

Wyoming RAC member quote, on file with the Author
43 CFR § 1784.5–1 states: “The function of an advisory committee is solely advisory, and
recommendations shall be made only to the authorized representative specified in its charter.
Determinations of actions to be taken on the reports and recommendations of a committee shall be
made only by the Secretary or the designated Federal officer.”
285
286
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greedy group of rape the land ranchers, I think it was very powerful, but it’s not being
used.”287
Interestingly, despite the provision allowing a RAC to appeal directly to the
Secretary if they feel their advice is being arbitrarily ignored by the State Director, not a
single respondent could identify a time when that had been utilized. One RAC member
specifically discussed this:
...a few of us recognize that [appealing directly to the Secretary is] a possible next step.
That is also a pretty unpopular. You know for Wyoming to go to the Feds, the state
office is enough of the feds, so to go to the Secretary, even among the folks who agree
that this [recommendation] should be implemented, it would be hard to get them to
agree that that is the next step. We’re all about fixing it at the local level, we can’t go
cry to DC.288
However, even with this provision, most of the RAC members understand the fine line the
agency walks in not abdicating their authority over final decisions:
In my experience they listen really well, but they can’t always go there. You know, a
rancher wants livestock to be able to go everywhere and water developments, energy
developers want energy development, wilderness advocates want wilderness – you
know what I’m getting at – mountain bikers want mountain bike trails. So even if
there is a recommendation that is supportive of one of those interests, it doesn’t mean
that the BLM can implement it. So I think if the RAC is doing a good job, then
everyone’s a little happy and everyone’s a little pissed off.289
The few frustrations expressed around implementing the recommendations don’t detract
from a general belief that the process is valuable. Almost every RAC member and BLM
representative interviewed agreed that the RACs were a successful experiment in
integrating a collaborative public body into public land and resource management. Only
one interviewee explicitly warned against using the RAC as a model for future collaborative
process design citing limitations on the RAC’s on-the-ground effectiveness, “don’t use the
Wyoming RAC member comment, on file with the Author.
Wyoming RAC member comment, on file with the Author.
289 Colorado RAC member comment, on file with the Author.
287
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RAC because of the Constraints of the RAC. Formally the RAC is to give advice. Now Forest
Service RACs have the ability to put together natural resource projects, fund them, it’s a
different set of rules as I understand. BLM RACS, as this one is, are chartered only for
advice.”290
What enables the RACs to achieve their core purpose?
As discussed in chapter three, the major policy elements of Rangeland Reform ’94
were intended to create a national requirement to manage the public rangelands to improve
ecological health and facilitate their recovery, and to maintain opportunities for long-term
sustainable development. 291 If the RACs had not succeeded in their first task of formulating
their own standards and guidelines, the federal fallback standards would have been
implemented and the likelihood of the RAC charters being reauthorized would have been
minimal. As it was, the RACs were able work with the BLM State District managers to
submit and have the Secretary of the Interior approve local standards and guidelines within
the allotted timeframe.292 Since that time they have moved on to addressing the full array of
other multiple-use management concerns. However, absent the clear statutory mandate
that directed the development of the standards and guidelines for rangeland health, some
RACs struggled to find a clear sense of direction.
The RACs were originally created to help the bureau come up with some rangeland
health standards. So that was a very definite charge, we were asking for a very specific
product. And when you have direction that clear, it’s really a lot easier to come up
with a good product. I think since that effort was completed, both the RAC and the
BLM has sometimes struggled to be very clear as to what their charge was.293

Wyoming RAC member comment, on file with the Author.
Rangeland Reform FEIS (1994): 3, 8. “A major policy element of the reform package consists of
national requirements and guiding principles for the local development of state or regional standards
and guidelines for livestock grazing on BLM-administered lands. Fallback standards and guidelines in
the Preferred Alternative would take effect if regional standards and guidelines have not been
developed within 18 months.”
292 Olinger (1998): 678.
293 BLM Representative quote, on file with the Author.
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I think you need a little bit of a sense of mission when you put these collaborative
groups together. Perhaps if the BLM could produce a bit more sense of mission, and
perhaps that’s really the option of the State Director...but if the State Director was
motivated to use that RAC ...he or she could find some things that not only meets his or
her needs but also takes advantage of the various skills and informational levels that
that appointed RAC brings.294
On the other hand, not having a prescribed agenda allows the RACs a degree of autonomy
and flexibility to discuss topics and management problems that are timely, of interest to the
group, and of most pressing need for the BLM.
Process Criteria Themes
Probing a little deeper into what enables the RACs to fulfill their regulatory
requirements illuminates four main process themes that simultaneously enable success and
create challenges. The themes can be categorized into 1)Issues of representation and
inclusiveness, 2) Issues of self-organization and procedural fairness, 3) issues of
deliberativeness, and 4) issues of building consensus. Each theme is discussed in detail
below.
Representation and Inclusiveness
Two critical principles for successful collaboration are interest representation and
process inclusiveness. Representation refers to a process that includes representatives of
all relevant and significantly different interests,295 while inclusiveness refers to a process
that is publically accessible and places few formal restrictions on participation.296 Public
engagement processes tend to negotiate these values along a continuum. A representative
process is modeled on the concept of representative democracy whereby selected members
represent an interest group and are empowered to speak on behalf of that interest. An
inclusive process much more resembles pure participatory democracy and offers the

Utah RAC member quote, on file with the Author
Innes and Booher (1999): 419.
296 Leach (2006): 101.
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opportunity for everyone who has an interest to participate freely and equally. Often, as
pointed out by Leach, a tension exists between a representative process that balances an
equal number of opposing interests and an inclusive process that places few restrictions on
involvement.297 He suggests,
Restricting access to a select group of stakeholders invariably raises doubts about
legitimacy. If an agency with a stake in the issue selected the participants, did the
agency try to influence the outcomes of the process by excluding the agency’s harshest
critics? On the other hand, a perfectly inclusive process can jeopardize
representativeness if it creates an imbalance in the number of individuals representing
each major faction.298
One of the challenges the BLM faces with the RAC program, which is an inherently
representative group, is balancing the limited access by creating opportunities for decisions
to be informed by the views of the public the RAC purports to represent. They navigate this
tension in a variety of ways. First, each RAC meeting has a designated public comment
period that provides an opportunity for the public-at-large to make their views known on
the topics or issues being discussed by the RAC. Second, the RAC members, who are
members of the public themselves, are expected to communicate with the interest group
they have been appointed to represent to get feedback on the issues the RAC discusses.
Third, the RACs often form sub-RACs (also known as subcommittees or sub-groups) to
directly include members of the public in gathering information from local residents and
resource experts, discussing possible solution options, and formulating recommendations
on complex problems and management issues.
The public comment periods must be incorporated into the agenda and published as
part of the Federal Register notice announcing each RAC meeting at least thirty days prior
to the meeting date. According to the regulations, “Notices shall set forth meeting locations,
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topics or issues to be discussed, and times and places for the public to be heard.”299
Generally, the public comment periods are well-organized and designed to allow the public
at-large to make their feelings known about the issues being discussed by the RAC. As one
BLM representative discussed, “The public is not allowed to speak until the public comment
period which is set up and defined in our Federal Register notice. That is their opportunity
to make a presentation to the RAC and interact with the RAC members. Other than that
public comment period, they are absolutely allowed to be there, to observe what’s going on,
but they cannot participate.”300
As noted, public comments are restricted to the times designated in the agenda and
adherence to that policy is typically enforced by the RAC Chairperson. This allows the RAC
to efficiently conduct its business and prevents the conversation from devolving into a
chaotic public hearing. The public comment period is designed to elicit the public views on
the topics being discussed to assist the RAC in creating a more informed recommendation to
the BLM. While some RACs have managed to engage the public through the public comment
periods quite effectively, others have been challenged by a “...public comment period [that]
is inevitably empty...”301
As a representative body of the public’s interests, the RAC sees itself as a crucial
conduit for public input on BLM management issues. In the eyes of some RAC members, the
conversation is supposed to be, “...between the RAC members, who are representing the
public and the BLM... [There is]opportunity for public input at every meeting...but it’s not
really designed to solicit public input because the RAC members themselves are supposed

43 CFR § 1784.4-2(b)
BLM representative comment, on file with the Author.
301 Wyoming RAC member comment, on file with the Author.
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to be the public input...If every one of those was a public meeting, you would just get
distracted”302
Occasionally, the BLM will solicit outside groups or members of the public who have
particular expertise on a topic to give presentations to the RAC. These types of
presentations are another way for the RAC to interact with the public on specific issues.
The presentations also encapsulate a device for gathering shared and agreed upon
information resources, and help the RAC understand the social, political, ecologic and
economic implications of the issue.
We’ve had for example Friends of the Wild Mustangs come and present to the RAC. It
wasn’t during the public comment periods...and to have those people come in and
advise the Resource Advisory Council on some of those issues is very helpful...303
[Before becoming a member] I was actually asked by the BLM to give presentations to
the RAC on grazing management. That was kind of my first exposure to the BLM RAC
and how they operate...304
The second method for involving the public is by engaging the constituents of the
interest groups the RAC members are appointed to represent. The RACs were developed
based on a model of representative democracy and RAC members are expected to regularly
communicate with their constituents. Ideally, the RAC members are approaching their
communities for feedback and input on the issues the RAC is discussing. If there are
particular issues that concern an interest group or member of the public, they can also go
through their RAC representative to get that issue put on the meeting agenda.
Ideally what those members should be doing is interacting with the members of the
interest group they represent...they should be getting feedback...that is the interaction
that they would have with the public.305
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I think [the RAC is] very grass-rootsey. Each RAC member represents a public
constituency, so that RAC member is getting feedback and information and there is a
two-way communication with those constituents that they represent. [That’s] the
representative democracy piece.306
Most of the RAC members suggested that engaging with their constituents is a substantial
part of their job as a RAC member. Many insisted that communicating with the people in
their peer circles helps them gain a more nuanced perception of the issue, the values that
are critical to represent on that issue, and helps them in how they approach the discussions.
Ultimately, as one RAC member discussed, the perspective of these engaged constituencies
influences the advice the RAC develops, “We do have organizations that represent those
groups that I communicate with about a variety of things, but I also send along to them
activities of our BLM RAC to ask for their input.”307
Finally, the RACs often form sub-RACs when more input from the public is needed
on particularly complex location or issue-specific topics. Sub-RACs enable the RAC to dive
deeper into an issue by creating a committee that resembles the RAC’s diverse
representation of interests, but that is temporary and only deals with one particular issue.
The most successful sub-RACs usually are made up of members of the public who are
engaged in or experts on the issue being discussed. They have the flexibility and autonomy
to hold public meetings, meet more frequently than the full-RAC, and take adequate time
and space to thoroughly investigate the issue in question. Sub-RACs may gather and
synthesize new information about an issue, discuss solution options, and ultimately make a
recommendation to the full RAC. In turn, the full RAC retains the responsibility for
approving the final recommendation and offering it as advice to the State Director.
Alternatively, they can modify it themselves or refer it back to the sub-RAC for further
consideration and refinement.
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Essentially [with sub-RACs] we have a need to get the actual people from that field
office who are using the land to advise us on how we should be advising the BLM...So
the key there, is working with... who might be interested and who might be able to
contribute to the process valuably and then making sure we, the RAC, are giving the
sub-RAC the freedom to make recommendations as they see fit, that we have a RAC
liaison that brings that information back to the RAC and says this is what the Sub-RAC
said, and then we can decide what to do with that information...308
Sub-RACs have been used by all the RACs studied in this project.309 In one way or another,
every participant interviewed suggested that sub-RACs are an innovative tool that the RACs
can use to engage the public-at-large, and formulate recommendations that are more
informed by local perspectives, responsive to local conditions, and have broad public
support.
The diversity of interests that sit on the RAC and the quality of people representing
those interests were two of the most consistently cited factors enabling the RACs to have
high-quality discussions and consistently develop balanced advice for the BLM. Achieving a
diversity of interests is facilitated primarily by the regulatory requirements guiding the
RACs.310 However, the BLM representatives unanimously acknowledged that the RACs
legitimacy and ultimate success depends on a diverse and inclusive process that encourages
its members to challenge each other and the agency.
We are very thoughtful and deliberate when we consider[new RAC members], and it’s
not that we, we do not want people who think the same way we do...what we are
looking for are people with a diverse background and people who have a track record
of being able to work collaboratively.311
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You absolutely need to get people who aren’t always going to agree with you and just
don’t think that everything that the agency going to do is going to be correct...we need
that input from those people who are willing to disagree, and do so respectfully312
Representation, as noted by the analytical framework definition, means including
the diverse perspectives of all interests affected by the issue in the discussion. Clearly that
is an important factor. However, both the RAC members and agency representatives
strongly agreed that not only does the group need the diversity of interests, but they need
people who embody a willingness to sit at the table, set aside their differences, and work to
find solutions to management problems. Nearly all of the interviewees suggested
representation of interests by those willing to collaborate is an important factor in
achieving success. This is not to say that in nominating members the BLM looks for people
who always agree with what the agency proposes. Indeed, the ideal RAC members are those
who are also able to respectfully disagree but who also have a willingness to come to the
table with a collaborative and solution oriented frame of mind.
I think in part it’s [successful] because of the people the BLM selects to be on this
committee... I’ve always said the trick to having committees that work is to pick people
who are open minded, and who are willing to work with interests that they don’t
always agree with or understand...the BLM has done an excellent job in selecting the
RAC members...I know in part the BLM picks these people for open mindedness. We
have an amazing ability to work together; that’s why I’ve stayed. Broad interests,
people are willing to work together, and I’ve learned a whole lot.313
When we look at public involvement you have to look at it like a spectrum...you have
very extreme people who are never going to be involved, never going to be encouraged
by a resource advisory council, and we’re never going to reach those people. And then
you got on the other end of the spectrum is the people who are going to be involved in
everything. And so where we’re targeting is people [in the middle], and I say targeting
because that is where we can develop those relationships and make good collaborative
decisions that affect the future of how we manage public land.314
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One tension that remains around representation is the consideration of the
stakeholders who focus on other methods such as litigation and appeals to see their
interests satisfied. In selecting members who are willing to come to the table with a
collaborative mindset, the BLM inevitably limits the scope of interest group involvement.
Those who are critical of community-based, consensus-building processes as a legitimate
forum for making natural resource management decisions are invariably not going to
volunteer for participation in a RAC. This is difficult, as a collaborative process cannot be all
things to all people, and those who are not willing to collaborate will inherently be left
behind. The BLM navigates this tension by adhering to NEPA for any major actions it
eventually takes.
Finally, the structural framework dictated through the regulations and by FACA was
cited by several interviewees as a distinguishing feature of the RAC that enables success.
Organizing under FACA requires a charter to be approved and signed by the head of the
agency to whom the committee reports.315 The charter provides legitimacy for the group
but also articulates clear guidelines regarding scope of activity, meeting requirements,
transparency and accessibility that ensures the diversity of interests is represented and the
public has equal access to participate in the process.316
I think it’s incredibly helpful to have those constraints [FACA]. It’s helpful to have that
blueprint that we’re free to operate under so that we know that we’re following the
policies that American public ultimately wanted to see in action or that has been
indicated to us by the President or by Congress...By following those rigid guidelines we
are being good stewards of the public trust that is given to us. It’s also a great resource
whenever we have questions about how to be deal with certain issues, it helps us look
back and understand direction specifically on issues where we don’t deal with that
often.317
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Unfortunately, the structure sometimes reduces the efficiency of the RAC. The
number one challenge discussed by both the RAC members and the Agency representatives
was the difficulty in getting new members appointed to the RAC. The problems discussed
by RAC participants follow two divergent paths. First, RAC members and Agency
representatives discussed the difficulties in getting high-quality representatives to apply for
vacant positions. Second, they discussed the length of time it takes to get applicants through
the appointment process.
In soliciting new applicants, both the RAC members and the BLM representatives
discussed having difficulty finding adequate numbers of candidates to fill the vacancies on
the committee. As one Agency representative suggested, “At times it has [been a challenge
to find new members]...if we don’t have a high enough number of applicants...the
Department of Interior will dictate that we run it again for applicants. They want to see
large enough numbers, they want to be sure they have enough applicants to select from...”318
Getting new members acclimated to the issues once the appointments are made also
poses a challenge. Enabling informed discussions at the RAC meetings requires all members
are acquainted with the issues to satisfactorily contribute to the conversation. Some RAC
members feel like by the time they become familiar enough with the issues to contribute
productively to the discussion, their first term is up, as discussed, “...as a RAC member,
coming in, and there is so much turn over...That’s a real challenge, when there’s a long
lasting issue, the learning curve, and getting up to speed to really feel valuable. I’ve heard a
couple RAC members say, “yeah you spend your first two years figuring out what’s
happening and then your term is up...”319
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A second common frustration expressed about membership turnover was related to
the appointment process. According to many of the RAC members and the Agency
representatives, the time it takes to get through the appointment process often inhibits the
ability of the RAC to conduct its business.
The lack of timely appointments by the Secretary of Interior [is a challenge]...it causes
is the inability of the RAC to be effective...there are timely issues that need to be dealt
with. And for whatever reason...the appointments weren’t timely a year ago, and now
we’re facing the same situation.... the BLM has put out a notice for this year’s
applications, and they still haven’t heard about last years.320
What’s really sad is now we are announcing for filling our vacancies for those positions
that are set to expire in September of 2015, and I still haven’t got my 2014’s filled yet.
So I may not be having a council because I won’t have enough to make a quorum.321
The unfortunate effect of the inefficiencies of the appointment process, apart from
preventing the RAC from conducting business, is that it leaves many of the RAC members
feeling like the program is not a priority for the Agency.
The appointments could, should [be made faster] if they made it a priority. I think at
the local field office level it’s a priority. I think they seem to really value the RAC’s
advice. But in the DC Office, State Office? I don’t know what it is; maybe they have
more pressing issues or something.322
RAC members discussed several possible solutions to help overcome these barriers
and improve the efficiency of the RAC. First, a program of public education to inform what
the RAC is, what it does, the value it adds to public land management, and the influence RAC
members can have on management decisions could help to engage a broader base of
engaged members of the public from which to draw. Such a program could dramatically
improve both the visibility and the relevance of the RACs in the eyes of the public. RAC
members also suggested two policy changes that could improve the appointment process.
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First, entrusting the appointments to the Director of the BLM rather than the Secretary of
the Interior could speed up the process by keeping the decisions in house while still
ensuring a level of Federal oversight. Second, allowing RAC members to continue sitting on
the committee after their terms expire until a replacement is appointed would allow the
RACs to continue meeting and conducting business while they wait for new members.
Self-Organization and Procedural Fairness
According to Innes and Booher, a successful collaborative process is one that is,
“...self-organized and evolving, good at gathering information from the environment, and
effective at making connections among participants.”323 Facilitating the ability of
participants to decide on ground rules and discussion topics, and develop objectives, tasks
and working groups creates a legitimate process that is accepted by the group. Treating all
parties equally, respectfully and impartially in the establishment of discussion and decision
making procedures is one of the bedrock principles of democratic theory.324 The ground
rules and operating procedures of the RACs are discussed in each of their charters and
standard operating procedure (SOP) documents.325 The representation and equality of the
membership, the requirements for public notice and features of public participation
discussed above are prescribed by the regulations promulgated under Rangeland Reform
’94.326 The particular discussion topics, tasks and working groups are typically decided
upon collaboratively by the agency and the RAC members.
The discussion topics are driven by the meeting’s agenda, which is required to be
published in the Federal Register and distributed to local media at least thirty days prior to
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each meeting.327 The most effective RACs develop their agendas by synthesizing the
interests of the RAC members with the needs of the agency.
...it’s kind of a collaborative process for putting agenda items on for the next meeting.
We get feedback from the BLM on what they’re working on, what they think we might
be interested in, but we also self-identify topics that we either want to discuss and
make recommendations on, or that we want to learn more about...There’s themes –
you know grazing, energy development, wild horses, recreation are all reoccurring
topics for our RAC. 328
At the same time, the BLM and the RACs recognize the need to limit the number of
topics discussed at each meeting to ensure a robust rather than cursory exploration of each
issue. Prioritizing the ever-expanding list of discussion topics and deciding on which should
be discussed at each meeting is a constant task that usually falls to the RAC chairperson and
the Agency Coordinator. The challenge is scheduling and addressing the issues that are top
priorities for the group while allowing space to address unforeseen and unanticipated
issues.
We share with [the RAC] the things that we’re struggling with...and the RAC members
list the things they think are really important, and then we try to marry the two lists
and then prioritize them. One of the dangers is that if you take on too many different
topics, you’ll never get to a result on any of them...we’ve tried in the last year or so, is to
try to focus each session on one particular set of issues.329
One challenge the RACs face is ensuring all members are equally engaged on a topic.
However, this may be a simple byproduct of cogitating on, “...the full array of ecosystem and
multiple-use issues associated with BLM-administered public lands.”330
Sometimes the RAC can devolve into one side of an issue against another, and if you
don’t have a dog in that fight, you’re kind of just sitting on the sidelines to a certain
degree. I guess the challenging thing, is when those issues come up and there are two
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dug-in perspectives or sides to it, it often leaves many of the other RAC members in a
place where they’re struggling to figure out how to participate.331
Often, discussions will transcend multiple meetings.332 Typically, no
recommendations are made until a thorough deliberation of the subject accounts for all the
views within the group, the thoughts and opinions of the resource experts, public input is
weighed, and the history of recommendations or advice that have already been given on
that or similar topics is analyzed. As one RAC member put it, “It’s usually a multiple
meeting process, in which we get information, we revisit what past RACs have done on the
issue if it’s something that’s been reoccurring and if there is a sub-RAC that needs to be put
in place then there is time that is allowed for that and then the sub-RAC will come back and
advise the RAC so that we can then advise the BLM.”333
Who participates in designing the agenda poses another challenge that was
discussed by some of the RAC members interviewed. Two of the RAC groups commented
that the agenda was used as a mechanism for the agency to control or restrict what the RAC
discusses. RAC members discussed feeling frustrated that they were not empowered by the
agency to design their own agenda, “...for a while we didn’t seem to have an agenda that
anyone was interested in polling us in...our mission was not clear, and we really weren’t
doing anything in a mission oriented direction.”334 For these two groups, the agenda topics
dictated to them by the BLM were said to be, “...usually pretty banal.”335
There’s a sense that the Wyoming BLM didn’t want the RAC...I think they express that
hesitation by trying to constrain some of what the RAC does. We’re trying to figure out
if, or how we can try to write our own agenda. The chair seems to think that the RAC
guidelines say that the RAC doesn’t write its own agenda, we just approve what they
give us. Most of us agree that if we could design our own agenda that would address
Colorado RAC member comment, on file with the Author.
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what we want to address and gather information together, that that would be
motivating. We would create more buy-in in the meetings, and create a feeling like we
were doing something at the meetings.336
Selin and Chavez point out that, “The institutional culture within agencies often
hinders collaboration.”337 Leach expands upon this by explaining, “In relatively traditional
venues, such as NEPA (National Environmental Policy Act) scoping meetings, the public
becomes involved only after a lead agency has invested large amounts of time and money
drafting a proposal. Considering these sunk costs, agencies may be less interested in
revising or replacing proposals than in trying to win public support or acquiescence.”338
Probing the notions of institutional culture and resource investments in developing an
agency agenda is especially poignant in the Wyoming case, where the RAC was disbanded
shortly after implementation of the Standards and Guidelines for rangeland management
and has only been reconstituted in the past five years. The Wyoming RAC seems to struggle
the most with issues of membership empowerment and engagement.
Other RACs have navigated issues of empowerment and engagement very well.
Generally, the more freedom the RAC members have to design their own agenda, develop
tasks, working groups, and set discussion topics, the more empowered and engaged the
membership seems to be. Conversely, if the agenda is used, as the above RAC member says,
“...to constrain some of what the RAC does...” the members leave feeling disempowered and
as if, “...we sit through a lot of fun presentations with a lot of information, but we never
chew on that information, analyze it, come up with something we can do about it....”339
Consistent with the principles of democratic governance, an effective process is one
that increases opportunities for self-organization and empowers its membership to design
Wyoming RAC member comment, on file with the Author.
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objectives, tasks, work groups, discussion topics and procedures.340 Leach discusses
empowerment as one of his seven components of democratic governance, noting that an
empowered process, “would involve the public at the earliest stages, long before a fullfledged project proposal has been announced, thereby allowing stakeholders to signal their
concerns when the issues are still being defined.”341 Moote, McClaran, and Chickering agree
stating, “The participatory democracy approach is said to improve decision implementation
by resolving conflicts during the planning process, rather than delaying implementation of
completed plans while decisions are reviewed through appeals and adjudication.”342 In this
case, involving the RAC membership early in the process of designing agenda items,
projects, and discussion topics that address their concerns and the problems they are
hearing from the interests they represent would be a measure of an empowered RAC
process. The greater degree a RAC empowers its membership to be involved in all aspects
of the agenda setting and discussion process, the more successful they might be said to be.
It is difficult to have an influence on decisions when the group doesn’t feel empowered to by
the process.
Deliberativeness
The extent that a collaborative process fosters creative thinking, shared learning,
examination of each other’s assumptions, identification of common interests, development
of out-of-the-box ideas, and challenges to the status-quo is a function of its deliberativeness.
Leach offers three measurable factors that contribute to a deliberative group process. The
first measure is the amount of effort devoted to mutual education of the group’s
membership. Second, Leach asks to what extent is joint fact finding used as a tool to
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collectively define the problem and either synthesize existing information or generate new
information that helps the group to develop solutions. The degree to which a group is able
to collectively define and synthesize information around a problem or topic is a measure of
deliberativeness. Leach’s final measure of deliberativeness is the ability of a group to build
trust and maintain a culture of civility and respect.343
By engaging the diversity of interests in the process of forming recommendations,
the RACs soon begin to exhibit the first measure of deliberativeness: the members
immediately educate each other on their own perspectives of the issues. Indeed, Leech says,
one way to increase deliberativeness is to, “engage in a period of mutual education and
discovery prior to any negotiation over substantive commitments or com-promises.”344 The
BLM recognizes the importance of this mutual education process and often witnesses a shift
in RAC member attitudes early on.
I think what’s most rewarding is to have a group you feel you can share with pretty
honestly, and they, they began to see that it wasn’t that easy, that their perspective
was one piece of a very large and much more complex puzzle. They became a very
valuable member of the RAC because of their background but also because they kind of
grew and changed a little bit in the process.345
Several of the ways in which the RACs educate themselves have previously been
discussed. The Sub-RACs often research the issue, and talk with experts or local people
affected by the issue prior to making a recommendation to the RAC. The BLM often invites
resource specialists, members of the public, or outside experts to give presentations to the
RAC during one of their regular meetings. The RAC members also educate each other from
their differing perspectives on the issue. The RAC is an institutional structure that has been
constructed by a regulatory mandate for the express purpose of gathering a diverse group
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of interests to engage in shared learning about problematic management issues and build
consensus recommendations on those issues. The discussions that occur inevitably compel
the RAC members to learn about each other’s perspectives and views on the issues they
discuss. Naturally, if they are open to the process, they begin to understand how those
other perspectives contribute to the complexity of resource management decisions. By
learning about each other’s perspectives together, they begin to examine their own and
each other’s assumptions.
I felt like we did a really good job helping the recreation and energy folks understand
the issues with grazing, and in the same turn, the recreation and energy folks educated
us old cowboys too.346
Being able to get out and really understand the cross section and how these different
land management mandates intersect with each other and how the different uses
intersect with each other that is really valuable 347
In turn, the RAC members also begin to understand the challenges facing the BLM in making
management decisions.
As a person who is just naturally prone to complain about some of the things that the
government does sometimes, and then to gain an appreciation for the quality of the
people who work for the federal government, you get a better appreciation for the
charge that they have. They do the best they can with what they have to work with. I
have a better appreciation for the difficulty of the job they have and hopefully I can
give them some advice or we can give them some advice as to how it can go a little
easier.348
By having deliberate conversations about topics that account for and respect the diverse
interests represented by the RAC members, a common understanding begins to be built
about the issue. Shared learning takes place when new information is synthesized from the
working groups, conversations with resource specialists, outside members of the public and
agreed upon by the RAC members. Here again, the sub-RACs play an important role. When
Utah RAC member comment, on file with the Author.
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collectively agreed upon information is used to form a recommendation, creative solutions
to complex problems are often found.
Shared learning, the process of building a common understanding around complex
issues, builds a social bond that transcends the formation of recommendations and
contributes to a sense of accomplishment and empowerment within the group. Witnessed
by one RAC member, “I also feel like whenever we take on a new subject...we go from not
knowing really anything about it to understanding a great deal about the project. I think
there is a strong sense of accomplishment around learning; us collectively learning”349 The
notion of the “social bond” is discussed in public policy literature as being a necessary
component of effective problem solving, resting on the theory that, “fostering more or
better discourse around any given issue will lead to agreement about key values and in
doing so, create the social bond necessary for the problem to be resolved.”350 The
implication is, the more participants in a consensus building process build a social bond by
learning about each other’s values, the easier it becomes to find agreement:
The more that we can learn from one another and make well thought out, well
rounded recommendations to the BLM the better we’re doing.351
I always said to the group, we’re not always going to agree or disagree but if we’re
equally informed we’re going to be closer to agreement than anything else.352
Finally, in providing consensus-based recommendations to the BLM, the RACs often
compel the agency to look at problematic issues from a different perspective. As already
illustrated, in selecting members, the agency looks for people who don’t always agree with
them, insisting these opposing viewpoints challenge the agency’s beliefs and contribute to
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creative and balanced recommendations. Understanding of the impacts of a management
decision from the perspectives of the people who are affected and who don’t always agree
with them helps the agency see the on-the-ground implications of their decisions.
Having local people who are most impacted by our decisions giving us some direct
guidance is critical because a lot of the things we do, while it sounds good on paper,
when it actually gets to the implementation phase there are things we can miss that
people who are most impacted by our decision can pick up on.353
Having the perspectives of people that live and work in the communities alongside us
helps us to see the bigger picture.354

Builds Consensus
Innes and Booher argue that through effective consensus building processes,
“...agreements can be reached among stakeholders who would otherwise not talk to each
other, much less participate in a joint proposal.”355 Additionally, they contend that
agreements between adversarial parties are not the only by products of consensus building
process and outline a host of “intangible outcomes” that often result, including increased
social and political capital, increased trust and mutual understanding between members,
and improved relationships that radiate beyond the consensus building process.356
Consensus can have different definitions depending on the group, but at minimum, it
generally means that discussions have fully explored the issues at hand and the concerns of
the interests at the table before making a decision.357 The process for reaching consensus
often includes developing creative responses to management problems that consider the
diverse viewpoints of the group’s individual members.358 This process takes substantial
time, a sense of open mindedness within the group, and the conversation space to have
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deliberative discussions and discover shared interests. Developing multiple options that
satisfy the shared interests of those at the table often increases creativity and the likelihood
of an agreement.359 According to mutual gains negotiating theory, developing multiple
options that satisfy mutual interests allows each member some positive gains, and options
can be traded back and forth to produce a greater overall agreement.360 Getting the entire
group to agree on a final recommendation requires compromise, a precise problem
definition, development of options to address the problem, and a willingness to set aside
differences in order to focus on where there is common ground:
We strive for consensus and there are various definitions [of consensus]. On our RAC
there’s an ongoing discussion on what consensus really means, but the closest I’ve
come to understanding our version of consensus is that not everyone has to totally
agree but they have to be able to live with it, the decision. So if someone totally can’t
live with a decision that everyone is making, and is totally 100% against it, then you
discuss it until you get to a better place. That’s sausage making at its finest...361
Recognizing that building consensus is not an easy task for any collaborative group,
many of the RAC members and Agency representatives expressed that the process of
building a consensus recommendation increases group buy-in and demonstrates a balanced
representation of the public’s interests. They also cautioned that if the RAC cannot come to
consensus on an issue, then the future resolution of that issue is questionable at best.
...sometimes there’s a lot of conversation that goes on to get [to consensus], but they’ve
always been able to get there...I think consensus is about coming up with something
that works for everyone. And that’s not an easy thing to do. But I think the result of
that is a more balanced approach...I think it just leads to more balanced decisions that
have a more universal aspect to them.362
You can pick advocates for any interest, you know from recreation, to grazing, to oil
and gas, you can put those people together but if they can’t work for a common
Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton. Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without
Giving In. Penguin Books. New York. (2011): 73-74.
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solution, then you’re not going to accomplish your purpose...you can get more bodies
who are advocates, but will they be able to look at a problem and see other people’s
point of view and respect that and work to find win-win solutions, if you can’t do that
then you have a problem.363
If we can’t get a group of fifteen people to all agree on an issue that affects the public,
if we can’t come to consensus knowing all the facts, it’s kind of telling what our future
is.364
Allowing adequate time to thoroughly deliberate on a topic is an important factor in
the ability to build a consensus recommendation. The RACs often use the sub-RACs or other
small working groups to gather information, engage the broader public, and formulate the
pieces of a recommendation behind the scenes and in between full RAC meetings. The subRACs and working groups are more flexible in their ability to hold meetings, define the
problem and decision space, build the group in response to the defined problem, gather and
synthesize new information, develop options as possible solutions, and bring those options
back to the full RAC for consideration. The full RAC must then decide if the
recommendations of the sub-RACs or working groups are ready to be brought to the BLM in
the form of a recommendation. This process often takes several meetings and months of
work, but ultimately results in agreements and recommendations that are well thought out
and representative of the broad interests of the public the RAC represents.
...everybody gets to look at what the proposals are prior to the meeting. We’ll have a
majority of what I’ll call unanimous decisions because of the way that our council
works, that’s with representation of each category on the sub-groups, and getting
information out prior to our meetings so you have an opportunity to take a look at
it...if it’s a point that we can’t reach unanimous decision then we’ll send it back to the
sub-group until the next meeting.365
Ensuring everyone in the group has equal access to the information resources is
another important consideration in the process of building consensus. The RACs have
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generally found that providing everyone with all the information, making sure everyone is
working with the same information, and the group has enough time to consider the
information and the proposed solutions eases the path to consensus. Even so, sometimes a
vote is required to push a recommendation over the finish line, “I always said to the group,
we’re not always going to agree or disagree but if we’re equally informed we’re going to be
closer to agreement than anything else so let’s try to get equally informed on the issue and
then we can weigh our biases after that and eventually come to a vote and democracy
rules.”366
The interesting thing about the RACs is their ability to reach consensus without the
use of neutral facilitators or outside mediation. When asked, every RAC member denied
using outside mediation or facilitation services. Without exception they cited the quality of
people, their willingness to set aside differences and look for common ground, and the
balance of interests at the table as factors that enable the RAC to reach consensus
recommendations:
...the RAC is really interesting because we’re asked, at least my perspective of it, is it’s a
formalized process but it’s not super formalized, it’s more of a culture from what I’ve
understood. So the RAC members are supposed to be able to self-facilitate themselves,
and are supposed to be able to reach consensus, and are supposed to be able to selfgovern themselves, and the BLM is there to hear what’s happening but the BLM isn’t
going to interject and try to help the RAC get to consensus, and there isn’t a neutral
facilitator.367
What sustains the RACs over time?
As noted earlier, according to Williams and Ellefson, one factor determining the
success of any collaborative partnership is the ability to, “...attract and keep individuals and
organizations engaged in partnership activities.”368 Simultaneously, one goal of instituting
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an effective dispute resolution processes is to enable the process to continually address the
management problems that invariably arise over time. As McKinney, Field and Bates
suggest, “...the intent of disputes system design is to create systems for dealing with not just
a single dispute, but the stream of disputes that arise in nearly all relationships,
communities, and institutions – so called, ‘chronic disputes.’”369 Ideally, an effective
consensus-based planning and decision making advisory council would encapsulate many
of the same goals. By this measure alone, the BLM RACs can be determined a successfully
instituted collaborative arrangement in federal land management planning.
Probing the question of what sustains the RACs over time illuminates three major
themes. First, the structure of the RACs ensures longevity and consistency across
geographies. However, without producing some outcome or perceived value for the BLM,
the RAC membership, and the public at large, the structure would remain an empty shell.
Therefore the second theme, the RACs ability to build social and political good will between
its members demonstrates one of the intangible by-products of consensus building
discussed by Innes and Booher370 that supports the structure and cultivates trust between
the agency and the public. Finally, as the aphorism suggests, “The ends justify the means.”
For over twenty years, the RACs have demonstrated an ability to forge agreements around
complex management problems, and this success has galvanized the BLM to continue its
twenty-year experiment in collaborative governance.
The Structure: Embracing FACA
Much like the organizational structure enables the RACs success, the structure also
helps to sustain the RACs over time. The RACs were instituted through Bruce Babbitt’s
regulatory reforms under the Clinton Administration in the 1990s. With each subsequent
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administration, the question invariably comes up within the Agency, will the RAC program
endure, and how much influence will the RACs continue to have on the agency? However,
with each incoming administration, the value of the RACs has been reaffirmed.
Everyone recognizes the value. There was some thought that when President Bush
came into office they were going to eliminate the RACs, and that didn’t happen. Then
when President Obama came in, there was thinking that they were going to eliminate
the RACs, that didn’t happen again. They see this as being valuable to the agency...
Now then so the stature of the RAC changes also with that, how much weight [they are
given]. We say, ‘well the RAC recommended that we do this.’ Sometimes that carries
more weight depending on who’s sitting in Washington, who’s in the Whitehouse.371
Aside from recognizing the value to the agency, the fact that the RACs were constructed into
the statutory and regulatory structure of the agency (through FLPMA and the Rangeland
Reform ’94) at a time when the public demanded more access to decision making provides
some level of certainty around the program’s continuation. The regulatory structure was
said to provide the ability for the public to develop a deeper and more meaningful
relationship with the agency.
I think the fact that we have, that there is FACA, that the secretary appoints members,
and there’s strict categories, there’s a process for how the meeting is run, the federal
register notice, the designated federal officer and a chain of command - all of those
structural pieces are actually really important, and they provide a common set of
rules, or set of circumstances that level the playing field for participating. So
regardless of geography or what the general population believes, they’ll get a general
cross section of the population that lives there. I think all the structure stuff is
important.372
Every BLM representative interviewed suggested that having a standing group of
engaged members of the public to provide them with advice on issues they struggle with is
incredibly helpful. The values they highlighted included gaining advice from a diverse
range of perspectives, helping to find creative solutions to difficult management issues, and
enhancing public support of the decisions that are made. Additionally, the RAC can be
371
372

BLM representative comment, on file with the Author.
Colorado RAC member comment, on file with the Author.

103

employed during NEPA scoping, and the recommendations they provide can be used
directly as an alternative in agency planning documents. Agency representatives also
suggested that the RAC helps the BLM understand how their decisions affect the public, and
in turn, the RAC helps to build trust between the agency and the public.
We can come to the RAC and say we’re struggling with this and without having to go
out and form a blue ribbon panel, we already have one set up for us. We have that
standing group as a sounding board, to provide us advice if were really heading in the
wrong direction.373
Because it’s a federal advisory committee chartered group, we can use that stuff, we
can take that recommendation and write it right into an alternative that we can write
an analysis on. So, in selecting that alternative we know that it’s already had some
level of diverse group discussion and consensus on it and that should make our project
and what we’re trying to accomplish better.374
Several RAC members had a similar view. Having a standing collaborative group that is
equipped to provide advice on the constant stream of issues that the BLM struggles with is a
positive development over building a grassroots or ad hoc collaborative process over single
issues.
The benefits [of the RAC], as opposed to the grassroots performance, is that you have
the funding, the logistics are all set up, you know where you’re meeting, there is a
meeting space that has been reserved, you set aside three days and go in and do it. At
the grassroots, you have all the obstacles of logistics, and funding, but the motivation
and experience at the grassroots level is that you know what you’re going to go and
do...So we’ve gotten over that first hurdle of grassroots development...sometimes that’s
where you get stuck, but that’s the one thing that we’re doing well so how do we take
advantage of that.375
Two of the key features sustaining the RACs and enabling their success are the legal and
regulatory structure under which the RAC’s operate coupled with the flexibility to tackle
diverse issues of concern to the agency and the members when they arise. Indeed, both the
BLM and the RAC members view the ability to have a consistent, reliable group to provide
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advice on complex management issues from a diverse perspective of public peers is seen as
a major benefit. Concurrently, the opportunity to have a real influence on BLM
management decisions is one of the tangible effects of this collaborative process that
enables the RAC to attract and keep individuals engaged.
That said, at one time or another, the question came up with each RAC group
interviewed as to how much influence they actually had over the Agency’s management
decisions. Some interviewees indicated that they felt like at the local level, their
recommendations were very well valued, but the further the recommendations traveled up
the administrative hierarchy, or the further they were removed from the field office level,
the less weight they carried.
I appreciate the folks in the state office, I appreciate the folks that are trying to
manage the land out of the district offices, there’s a lot of BLM land ...and they can’t
make everyone happy, they’re lucky to make half the people happy. I trusted [the State
Director] because he was the type of guy to sit down and talk about the issues with all
the stakeholders, and at least try to get the job done somehow, and get a decision
made. After it left his office and went to Denver or Washington, I about lost hope.
Seemed like if the feds, and the people out in DC would just stay out of it, we could get
the job done...376
Other members expressed an understanding of an added layer of complexity, or a filter
between the recommendations the RAC provides and the BLM’s responsibility to ultimately
make and implement the final management decisions.
I think they’re [the BLM] very responsive...I think it’s a balance because I think the BLM
really listens, and understands where we’re coming from, and they do as much as they
can to have our recommendations translate into management, but I think at the end of
the day we end up asking for things that the BLM can’t do...there’s a difference
between them listening to us, taking us seriously, and attempting to implement our
recommendations is one thing, and what it looks like in the end is another.377
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The other major challenge the RAC faces with its organizing structure is the
tendency to be bound by it too rigidly. Several of the RAC members agreed that while the
organizing structure, being chartered under FACA, and having the weight of law and
regulation behind what they do is a critical feature contributing to the RAC’s success,
sometimes they needed a little more, “...space to move around...” within the structure.
I think there’s a balance to be found between the cemented structure to get people
inside, and then a little bit more of give them the boards and nails, say here is what the
law says, here is what we need to do, can you help us create this together? I think right
now were the former, were plugged into something we can’t change and we end up
beating our head against the wall. Again you look at the ground-up, grassroots,
organic process there is a sense of creating that structure together. So within the
guidelines, within the law can they give us some more space to move around?378
I think that having the land management agency or the government step back during
the meetings, and, you know, they create all this structure, then once folks are into the
structure and a part of the RAC, they step back and make sure they are not trying to
unduly influence the conversation, or steer the RAC towards specific outcomes, or
impede the process in any way once it gets going. I think they should create the
structure and the boundaries and all that and let it go, so it can self-form and develop
its own connections, come up with its own conclusions and feel empowered.379
Finding that balance is no easy task, and takes time for any collaborative group. All groups,
whether agency initiated or developed through grassroots efforts go through the classic
process of forming, storming, and norming before ultimately performing. Each RAC must go
through its own group process collectively to identify, understand and implement the best
way to enhance their performance. For some, developing the agenda based on the interests
of the RAC members allows a higher degree of performance. For others, capitalizing on the
ability to constitute sub-RACs allows greater flexibility and engages members and the public
on the issues in which they are most interested. For the agency, sometimes a higher
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performing RAC results from finding the courage to let go of the reigns and trust the process
to proceed under its own impetus.
Outcome Criteria Themes
Innes and Booher discuss two types of products that often result from successful
consensus building processes: tangible and intangible.380 One of the intangible benefits of a
successful collaborative process is the building of trust among the members that results in
improved working relationships between participants, agencies, and the public.381
Improvements in trust and relationship quality between parties, gaining knowledge and
understanding about the issues, and increasing the capacity to address future conflict are
the social qualities that define the criteria building social and political capital that often
results from a consensus-based dispute resolution process.382
Conversely, the tangible products often take the shape of formal agreements such as
plans, policies, legislation, or voter initiatives.383 Additionally, the process outcomes often
produce favorable results for the ecological function or environmental integrity of the place
such as improvements to wildlife habitat, forest health or water quality.384 Finally,
consensus building processes also often result in second- and third-order effects such as
implementation and monitoring agreements between parties, and spin-off partnerships that
are better able to address future problems collectively.385 These second and third order
effects are what Moote describes as keys to “closing the feedback loop.”386 Necessary are an
individual participants willingness to learn and experiment with new ways of doing things,
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and an organizational commitment to adaptive management.387 Leighninger discusses
implementation of agreed upon outcomes as a key strategy for democratic organizing and
an explicit goal to strive for.388
Intangible Outcome: Builds Social and Political Capital
Building lasting relationships between members of a collaborative group often
facilitates, “...genuine communication and joint problem solving...”389 which results in an
improved likelihood to share information, negotiate around potentially conflicting issues,
and be responsive to future change and conflict.390 Without exception, the RAC members
interviewed consistently cited the improvement of working relationships and trust between
interest groups as one of the greatest benefits of working on the RAC.
We got to know each other as individuals, we got to understand what we had in
common and what we disagreed on, but I think we became people who respected one
another and when we were finally given some assignments on long range planning I
think we functioned [well], certainly.391
RAC members have taken the time to get to know each other outside of the meetings
and can understand where each other is coming from, and that’s a really big piece, the
opportunity we get as RAC members...[to] understand where the other side is coming
from. So that trust building is a really important component...392

Another benefit of building trusting relationships within the group is that it begins to
radiate outward and influence the public outside of the RAC setting. As one RAC member
pointed out, “I think there is some trickle down in the RAC...I think the RAC enables some
cross communication between the interest groups, and I think the trust that’s built between
the RAC members serves as a conduit so the BLM doesn’t always have to play traffic cop
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between the different interests.”393 It was also suggested by the Agency that this trust
eventually permeates into the communities and generates understanding between the BLM
and the public at large, noting, “The RAC, being a spectrum of public peers, validates the
decisions we made and shows that the agency is listening to the concerns of the public
which ultimately helps to improve trust.”394
This is not to say that the public always agrees with what the agency’s management
actions or policies even with the input of the RAC. Controversy still persists, and a certain
degree of conflict will always be an inherent part of multiple-use management. This is not
necessarily a bad thing. Disagreement over solutions to a problem often results in stronger,
more adaptive and politically savvy options to consider. A problem arises when conflict
over the issues results in inaction and prevents the agency from effectively fulfilling their
management requirements or causes degradation to the resources. The RACs have
demonstrated an ability to bring together the agency and the public to identify and solve
problems collaboratively.
Yes I do [think the RAC provides a good interface between the agency and the public].
You have an area that is having some problems, the locals are stirred you can go to
that area and you listen to the BLM’s position and you can listen to the local’s position.
And I’ll guarantee you the answer is not always with the agency, and it’s not always
with the public, its somewhere in between. And unless, or until you have those
interfaces with those groups you really don’t start talking, and if you don’t talk you
can’t resolve the issue...the RACs are a good way to start those conversations.395

The Tangible Outcomes: Produces Information Resources that Increases Creativity, Ends
Stalemate, and Results in High-Quality Agreements
Aside from looking at on the ground improvements, one of the most common
criteria for evaluating a consensus building process is simply whether or not the group was
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able to reach an agreement.396 A successful collaborative process often results in
synthesizing shared knowledge and information resources, incorporating that information
into creative ideas that result in formal agreements.397 Through this process, ideas that
otherwise would not be considered are often brought to light and developed into
management plans, legislation, or policy.398 However, these steps in the agreement forming
process are often so intertwined that it is difficult or inefficient to discuss them individually.
As Innes and Booher suggest, “Consensus building by its nature is deeply embedded in the
ongoing stream of political and social action, collective learning and change. The threads
can be followed to some degree to show how one action links to another and another, but
they can never be disentangled or even fully articulated.”399
The purpose of the RACs, as codified by 43 CFR § 1784, is to provide advice to the
Secretary and Director of the BLM, “...regarding policy formulation, program planning,
decision making, attainment of program objectives, and achievement of improved program
coordination and economies in the management of public lands and resources...”400
Inherently, the process of formulating that advice compels the participating members to
discover common ground and areas of agreement though deliberative discussions. RAC
members suggested that the most common way to discover shared interests and produce
recommendations is to focus on where there is agreement rather than where there is
disagreement.
There are some things we don’t agree on; we just kind of set those aside. You don’t
have to focus on getting total agreement on an issue. The real question might be how
many [wild] horses belong on an allotment? It’s a lot easier to come to agreement on
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that than whether you think there ought to be a wild horse program or not. So you
just bite off as much as you can chew and work on it.401
Another frequently used measure of success is to ask whether the agreements were
implemented.402 Because the RACs function in an advisory capacity only and there is no
mechanism for enforcing the recommendations, or binding authority over the BLM,
implementation of agreements is not a good measure of success in the RACs case. However,
herein lays the importance of understanding participant satisfaction as a factor in
evaluating success. If the recommendations that are offered as advice to the BLM satisfy the
interests of the RAC members, then the group has largely achieved the purpose under which
it was organized. If the recommendations lead to creative or innovative management
solutions then the BLM benefits all the more. As Innes and Booher point out, “Even a
process without an agreement may be a success if the participants have learned about the
problem, learned about each other’s interests, and about what may be possible.”403
Every RAC member interviewed spoke of at least one recommendation their group
has developed during their tenure on the committee that has helped the BLM with difficult
management decisions. In addition, the review of the past meeting minutes as summarized
in the table in Appendix IV illustrates the diversity of management issues discussed by the
RACs. Many of the issues discussed by the RACs overlap, existing consistently across
landscapes regardless of district boundaries, indicating that management problems, much
like wildlife, tend not to be bounded by lines on a map. Wild horse and burro management,
siting of energy development projects, resource management planning, vegetation and
riparian restoration projects, grazing management, and recreation fees were among the
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major issues commonly addressed by the RACs.404 Many of the interviewees discussed the
RACs demonstrated an ability to develop agreements that improved management plans or
resulted in creative solutions to management problems across these varied landscapes.
Over the past 19 years our...RAC has provided the DFO with between 25 and 30
recommendations. These included the Standards and Guidelines, which was at the very
beginning of the RAC...issue papers, fee proposals, travel plan guidance, and that just
names a few things.405
[The] five year strategy for the NCLS lands...was really interesting. I mean, the BLM
RAC almost totally rewrote it. And the funny thing about it is, I think, even the staff
people ...were very excited about the outcome of that, and it has since become the five
year strategy for the Utah BLM office for the NLCS.406
We spent one entire RAC meting talking about [the Three Creeks Grazing Strategy],
and then it was pretty clear... that quite a few of the people on the RAC just didn’t get
it, didn’t understand. So we took a two-day tour, and it was just incredibly productive.
People when they got on the ground they could see what you were talking about. So
then the BLM RAC wrote really quite a sophisticated letter. It was approved by the
RAC; we all voted for it, it was a recommendation that the State BLM should support
the Three Creeks Grazing Strategy.407
Here again, the sub-RACs aid the RACs in diving deeper into substantive issues and
developing creative responses to management problems. Creativity contributes to
satisfying the interests represented by the RAC as a whole, but can also inspire options that
otherwise may not have been considered. The sub-RACs are one such mechanism to gain
public feedback and induce creativity.
So we have our discussions, and if it is something that rises to the magnitude of a
position paper... somebody will say... will you chair a subcommittee and develop
something. Then, the subcommittee person will bring back a recommendation and we
go around the room and say, Yeah what about this, what about that...and then they
would say we think you need to re-draft, the group would ask, could you take this back
and fix these things, and so on and so forth...and we got to a point where the chair said,
everybody agree with what we’ve got? Somebody makes a motion, and second and we
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vote on it...we don’t have conflict there, we talk it out, and try and consider, and
include everybody’s opinion. If somebody’s exact wording doesn’t get in there,
generally somebody will pick it up and make sure it’s in the statement.408
This back and forth conversation between the subcommittee and the full RAC allows
recommendations to be developed that address the public’s concerns, or proposes creative
solutions to a local management problems:
[The sub-RAC] brought in some outside folks [who were] claiming to have some
legitimate complaints against the BLM office over the oil and gas leases. The main
issue was they had really hot and heavy activity in the area where he lambed in the
spring, and he had to lamb there because it was the only place where he had adequate
water. It was really very simple, we just convinced him by spending 30-40 thousand
dollars they could provide him water and he could lamb away from the activity and
everybody could be happy.409
The RACs have the ability to gather information about a topic by soliciting the
informed opinions of outside interest groups and the Agency’s resource specialists. This
allows outside information to be synthesized prior to or concurrently with the process of
developing a recommendation. As one RAC member recalls, “We’ve had two resolutions
that the advisory council has put together concerning wild horse and burro and they sought
out Friends of the Mustangs, and also our wild horse and burro specialists to be able to
bring them information as they were crafting those resolutions to help them understand
what some of those issues are.”410 In turn, recommendations generated by the RAC often
empower the agency to tackle issues that they would otherwise be reluctant to take on:
Some of the things we have heard from our partners at the BLM...is that they would
have felt that their hands were tied and intimidated to work on tackling an issue like
invasive plants if they had to do it on their own, but since they had a collaboration of
people who could bring lots of capacity and lots of resources to the table they feel like
they actually stand a chance.411
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Conversely, on issues they know to be controversial, a recommendation from the
RAC can alleviate the Agency’s anxiety over moving in a particular direction. A
recommendation can make the decision easier to implement because the Agency can be
confident that the recommendation already accounts for the perspectives of the diverse
cross section of the public interests the RAC represents. As one BLM staff member
suggested, “[The BLM] can take that recommendation and write it right into an alternative
that we can write an analysis on. So in selecting that alternative we know that it’s already
had some level of diverse group discussion and consensus on it and that should make our
project and what we’re trying to accomplish better.”412
Finally, the consistency of having the RACs and their history of recommendations
over time creates a significant record of decisions that can be used to inform future
discussions and recommendations. According to one RAC member involved in a wild horse
discussion, “One of the first things we tried to do was put down on paper what we thought
about it...Then every time there is a new chapter in the development or litigation over
management of wild horses, we go back to that letter and go, hmm, I guess we don’t need to
revisit that, we got it right the first time.”413
The tangible outcomes produced by a particular collaborative process are but one
measure of success. Again, as the recommendations of the RACs are purely advisory, and
the BLM may or may not implement such advice into management action, it is difficult to
evaluate the success of the RACs based on tangible or on-the-ground management actions.
However, where the RACs have come to agreement and offered consensus-based advice or
recommendations to the BLM, they succeed in fulfilling their regulatory requirements. The
results of this survey are limited to the perspectives of those participating in the RACs and
412
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therefore do not account for the perspectives of parties who may be affected by a
management decision but not a part of the RAC process. This is an inherent limitation on
fully evaluating the RAC process through this investigation. This highlights one remaining
question: to what degree have the RAC’s recommendations or advice had an effect on
objections or appeals to decisions or management actions ultimately implemented by the
Agency? This question is beyond the scope of this investigation but could present an
interesting topic for future research. What this study does demonstrate is the RACs ability
to innovate locally crafted solutions to management problems that helps end stalemates
between represented interests and often result in high-quality, agreed upon information
resources and advice to the BLM from a diverse representation of the public.

5. Analysis: What can be learned from the RAC model?
As discussed in the previous chapter, the RAC’s twenty year tenure of collaborative
governance with the BLM has demonstrated nearly all of the criteria that describe
successful collaborative, consensus-building processes of environmental conflict resolution.
The only criterion that remains questionably fulfilled is that of efficiency. There are several
factors, such as the appointment process and the inherent limitations on meeting frequency
that frustrate efficiency. At the same time, the use of sub-RACs can be used to improve
efficiency by meeting outside of the limitations imposed by structure of the full RAC. In
evaluating the RACs based on the criteria outlined in chapter four, in various ways, the RACs
demonstrate representation and inclusiveness, self-organization and procedural fairness,
deliberativeness, building consensus, producing agreements, increasing creativity,
producing information resources, ending stalemate, and building social and political capital.
First, the RACs exhibit an ability to balance representation and inclusiveness
through several processes that include public input and public participation in the
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formation of their recommendations. The use of public comment periods in each meeting,
presentations on the issues by resource experts and members of the affected public, and the
use of sub-RACs all demonstrate a commitment to closing the gap between agency decisionmaking and the implications of those decisions on the public’s use of the public lands.
Second, the RACs navigate a tension around self-organization whereby the most
successful RACs are those who develop an agenda, working groups and discussion topics
collectively with the Agency. Some RACs find this challenging while others have managed to
smoothly navigate this process. Where local managers maintain a tight grip over the
discussion topics and use the agenda as a mechanism to limit the activities of the RAC,
whether intentionally or not, RAC members feel dis-empowered and that their ability to
effectively influence management decisions diminishes.
Third, the BLM has developed a collaborative process that by nature fosters creative
thinking, shared learning, identification of common interests, development of out-of-thebox ideas, and challenges to the status-quo. The RACs engage the diversity of interests in a
shared learning process about the identified discussion topics and develop consensus-based
recommendations that often challenge individual participant’s version of the status quo.
The RACs use several methods, such as sub-RACs and solicited presentations to educate the
individual members, and use that knowledge to inform their discussions and decisions.
Fourth, the RACs strive for consensus in when building their recommendations. If
consensus is not able to be reached, often the discussion is tabled until more information
can be gathered, or is sent back to the sub-committee or sub-RAC level for further
deliberation. The most successful RACs focus on the areas where agreement can be found
and work from there to address management problems that are identified by the group and
the agency together.
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Finally, successfully moving through these process criteria often result in improving
social and political capital, and tangible outcomes in the form of consensus-based
recommendations and advice to the BLM. RAC members consistently cited improved
working relationships, improved trust, better appreciation for other interests and the
challenges the Agency faces as resulting from participating on the RAC. The Agency
discussed that where these improvements in relationship quality and trust were most
profound, they radiating outward into the community. Where this happens, the agency
perceived an improvement in their relationships with the public at large.
The formal recommendations and advice the RAC provides to the BLM constitutes
the bulk of the tangible outcomes. The process of forming that consensus-based advice
weaves together the strands of developing shared information resources, creative problem
solving, overcoming stalemate, and producing agreements around collectively defined
problems. Every RAC studied has examples of producing consensus-based advice through
this deliberative process. Their ability to do so is evidenced by the continual renewal of
their charters for over twenty years.
The remainder of this chapter addresses the overarching goal and primary research
questions of this study: What can be learned from the Rocky Mountain Region RACs, as an
example for how collaborative problem solving can be instituted in public lands management?
How can these lessons inform future attempts to institute collaborative governance within the
legal and institutional framework of federal public lands? The section is divided into two
parts. First, an analysis of the above findings highlights the major benefits of the RAC model
for instituting collaborative governance within federal agency planning and decisionmaking. The second part focuses on key lessons learned from studying the RAC model that
could either address some of the challenges of the RAC itself or be applied in the
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development of collaborative processes to be instituted within other agencies. This analysis
draws on the interviews to understand how the RAC institution fits within the models of
collaborative process design discussed in chapter two.
Reflecting on the model for dispute resolution system design developed by
Leighninger that was discussed in chapter two can help with a more thorough
understanding of why the RACs succeed, where they face challenges, and what could be
done to overcome those challenges. Recalling the four principles: 1) Recruit diverse
interests, 2) involve interests in deliberative dialogue, 3)provide opportunities to compare
options, 4) effect change by applying citizen input to decision making and
implementation.414 Applying this framework to the RACs highlights a number of benefits
and key lessons to take away when thinking about the development or refinement of future
models for instituting collaborative governance in public lands and resource management.
To achieve this, the four tables in Appendix III were developed from participant responses
to the interview questions that illustrate the major benefits experienced from participating
in the RAC process, key features enabling the RAC’s success, common challenges
experienced by the RACs, and where the RACs exemplify the models of collaborative
process design. These tables are shown in Appendix III and were used to inform the
discussion below.

What are the major benefits of the RAC model?
The major perceived benefits of the RAC model that were discussed by the
participants and BLM representatives who were interviewed for this study can be
summarized in four distinct categories. First, as discussed, the purpose of the RACs is to
empower a diverse cross-section of interests to provide the BLM with consensus-based
recommendations on the full array of management issues. By developing recommendations
414
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through the multi-faceted lens of diverse interests, the RAC fulfills the first principle of
engaging diverse interests.
Second, an empowered RAC facilitates a process of mutual education through
deliberative dialogue that leads to overcoming differences and results in consensus-based
recommendations to address complex resource management problems. A democratic
governance approach to management that engages participants in shared learning and
mutual education prior to decision- making is said to result in actions that have more public
buy-in, and to improve implementation by addressing conflicts during the planning
process.415 The advice the RAC provides to the BLM constitutes an ongoing conversation
about particular issues that works to educate the agency, the RAC members, and the public.
Third, from a RAC participant’s point of view, the institution provides access to the
BLM decision makers and a way to influence, or effect change on the decisions being made.
This perception of access to and influence over the BLM management decisions also
addresses the principles of engagement and empowerment that are critical elements of
success discussed by Leach and Innes and Booher. From the BLM’s perspective, they
appreciate the access the RAC brings them to the mind of the public, which their decisions
and management activities effect.
Finally, the RAC builds social and political capital that improves relationships and
communicative ability between the Agency and the interest groups that embody the RAC.
Often that communicative ability trickles down to the larger public sphere. In the RACs
case, social and political capital manifests itself in the form of increased trust between the
interests themselves, and between the interests and the BLM. The process also results in an
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improved ability to communicate with each other, and more productive working
relationships outside of the RAC discussions.416
Representation of interests in decision making
Every RAC member interviewed expressed that they benefited in some way from
the diverse representation of interests involved in the group. These benefits were
manifested in a variety of ways. First, the RAC members highly-valued learning about the
issues from other people’s points of view. The ability to learn from others on the committee
created well-rounded discussions and led to finding common ground. Second, RAC
members highly-valued the RAC as a vehicle to educate other interest groups about their
concerns and viewpoints. Many RAC members discussed one of the major advantages of the
RAC being the ability to educate others or help others understand their concerns in a civil
and pro-active arena. Third, it was felt that developing recommendations through such a
diverse, collaborative body of interests lent some validity and legitimacy to the advice that
was ultimately given. According to one RAC member, “The fact that we were a spectrum of
public interests I think that validated those decisions when we finally made them.”417
The BLM agreed that the support of a range of interests validated their decisions.
Additionally, the Agency described four other key benefits from having this collaborative
body sit in an advisory capacity. First, the RAC provides a conduit to the public to have proactive conversations about management issues prior to making a final decision. This is
viewed as an improvement over the decide-announce-defend model of traditional decisionmaking. Each staff member interviewed was emphatic in their appreciation of the RAC
program for facilitating discussions between such a diverse cross section of community

416
417

Innes and Booher (1999):
Utah RAC member comment, on file with the author.

120

interests. They unanimously suggested that the balanced, consensus-based advice the RAC
provides on complex management problems helps them make better decisions.
Second, the RACs help the BLM understand how their management decisions both
are perceived by and affect the public. The conversation that ensues between the Agency
and the RAC results in decisions that are more informed by and responsive to at least some
of the interests that are affected by the issue. Even in situations where people don’t agree
with the entire decision, it helps to create buy-in. Generally, if the RAC members feel they
have been heard and their interests acknowledged, they are more likely to feel better about
the decision, “If I know that they’ve heard my opinion, I’m going to feel better about that
decision they make whether it agrees with my opinion or not.”418
Third, it was suggested that the RAC provides political cover to the agency when
making difficult decisions about controversial issues. There was a perception by some RAC
members that the agency has a tendency to avoid making hard decisions and allows
problems to compound on each other. The RACs, being a diverse cross section of the
community of interests affected by the both the problems and the responses to those
problems can act as a shield when the members of the public inevitably complain about the
decision.
To be able and look them in the eye and say look we have a RAC that is truly
representative of the population...they brought me these recommendations and I
agree. I think it provides some legitimate political cover for the state director to make
the right decision rather than be pressured into a decision by a particular group.419
Finally, according to one BLM Staff member interviewed, because the
recommendations are coming from a FACA chartered group, the agency can write the RACs
suggestions directly into a planning document as an alternative to be analyzed by an EA or
418
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EIS through the NEPA process, “[The BLM] can take that recommendation and write it right
into an alternative that we can write an analysis on. So in selecting that alternative we
know that it’s already had some level of diverse group discussion and consensus on it and
that should make our project and what we’re trying to accomplish better.”420. Grassroots
collaboratives cannot have this degree of direct access to the agency without risking a
violation of the major provisions of FACA. This may be why so many grassroots
collaboratives pursue legislation as a means of final resolution and ensuring their
agreements are implemented. The recommendations made by the RAC are said to be more
broadly accepted because the RAC can act as that conduit between the represented public
and the Agency’s decisions. Their recommendations have already had a degree of
collaboration and consensus built into them. Granted, this process inherently excludes the
parties who would chose not to participate in collaboration, however, groups who attempt
to get their interests met through other means, such as legislation, litigation, or the appeals
processes are not excluded from the opportunity to participate through the public comment
periods, and the regular NEPA process that the RAC recommendations typically navigate in
order to be implemented. Analysis of the recommendations through the NEPA process
allows outside interests the opportunity to inform and shape the ultimate actions taken. As
it is, no major federal action, even those recommended by the RAC, can be implemented on
public lands without paying homage to NEPA.
By bringing together a, “fair membership balance, both geographic and interest
specific, in terms of the functions to be performed and points of view to be represented...”421
the RACs inherently engage the diversity of its membership in a process where, through
discussion of the issues, they educate each other about their own perspectives, values and
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concerns. This discussion results in advice and recommendations that are balanced and
generally agreeable to all parties involved in the discussion. Conversely, not every member
of the group is going to be equally engaged in all issues. Interests and priorities are
different, and personal engagement in any one issue is naturally determined by the level to
which that issue rises on the interest and priority meter of the individual member. As one
RAC member stated, “Sometimes the RAC can devolve into one side of an issue against
another, and if you don’t have a dog in that fight, you’re kind of just sitting on the sidelines
to a certain degree.”422 However, if a lack of engagement by one or more interests or
interest categories is a consistent and persistent problem, it may be indicative of power
imbalances within the group that need to be addressed.423
Deliberative Dialogue leads to Consensus-based Agreements
The RAC fosters deliberative dialogue that commonly results in mutual education,
finding common ground, and inventing creative solution options to address the
management problems. According to Moote, McClaran and Chickering, “In addition to
improving the information base upon which decisions are made...” improved dialogue is
said to, “...aid participants in the revision and refinement of their own values and
interests.”424 Granted, it’s not an easy process. Often, substantial time and resources are
invested into researching the issues, developing solution options and cultivating agreement
upon a final recommendation.
Coupling this deliberative dialogue with opportunities for feedback from RAC
member’s constituents and the public at-large develops advice that is ultimately reflective
of the interests of the greater public. Ideally, the knowledge RAC members gain through the
discussions flows back to the constituencies they represent and results in a trickle-down
Colorado RAC member comment, on file with the Author.
Ansell and Gash (2007): 552.
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effect of information sharing and public education beyond the group. One RAC member
observed, “I think there is some trickle down in the RAC...I think the RAC enables some cross
communication between the interest groups, and I think the trust that’s built between the
RAC members serves as a conduit so the BLM doesn’t always have to play traffic cop
between the different interests.”425 Facilitating learning and change beyond the group is
one consequence of successful collaborative consensus building processes.426 As this
investigation only pertains to the observations of those within the RACs, one area for future
research could be to investigate the degree to which the knowledge gained through RAC
discussion actually matriculates outward to the larger community of interests affected by
BLM land and resource management activities.
Access and Influence creates buy-in
By providing access to the BLM decision making process and influence over
management activities, the RAC institution offers a key advantage over other grassroots
collaborative processes that are not FACA chartered groups. The RACs facilitate access to
BLM administrators and influence over management decisions, which directly relates to the
principles of engagement and empowerment discussed by Leach. As already discussed,
engagement is defined as engaging participants, keeping them at the table, interested and
learning through in-depth discussion, drama, humor, and informal interaction, while
empowerment enables participants to influence the decisions of officials or administrators.
Eight of eleven RAC members interviewed discussed the ability to have access to agency
administrators or the ability to influence management decisions as a benefit of the RAC
institution that kept them coming back.
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The fact that the RACs are sustained by the regulations over time facilitates a
constant stream of informed public input on the issues. The balance of interests on the RAC
keeps discussions informed by the diversity of public interests on the landscape, educates
the members about each other’s perspective, and provides balanced advice to the Agency on
the array of multiple use management issues. The term limits and timely influx of new
members, and the diversity of membership maintained are features of the structure that
simultaneously contribute to stability of the institution and prevent stagnation, even if they
frustrate efficiency.
The provision of the regulations that authorizes the RAC to appeal directly to the
Secretary of the Interior if the committee feels as though its advice is being arbitrarily
ignored by the Designated Federal Official is one other feature that enables this access.427
Again, the interesting thing about this feature is that despite its potential usefulness in
holding the BLM accountable is that none of the interview respondents could identify a time
when it has been used. Recalling the RAC member who discussed this explicitly:
...a few of us recognize that [appealing directly to the Secretary is] a possible next step.
That is also pretty unpopular, you know for Wyoming to go to the Feds. The state
office is enough of the feds, so to go to the Secretary, even among the folks who agree
that this [recommendation] should be implemented, it would be hard to get them to
agree that that is the next step. We’re all about fixing it at the local level, we can’t go
cry to DC.428
This statement indicates reluctance, at least in Wyoming, to use the provision even if it gets
facilitates resolution of the issue because of an apparent cultural aversion to federal
interference in what are considered local matters. It also highlights the effect social bonds
and cultural dynamics have on group process. In Wyoming, like in much of the West, RAC
members subscribe to a cultural identity that is fiercely independent and wary of Federal
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interference in local politics. At the same time, appealing to the Feds could result in
improvements to the landscape or the decision making process itself. While from an
outside perspective this provision may appear to be a valuable tool for ensuring agency
accountability, if cultural dynamics frustrate its use, then it may be worth less than the
paper on which it is written. This also illustrates an enduring tension of collaborative
decision making and one the RACs must navigate when deciding how to approach
resolution of their concerns or satisfaction of their interests: is it better to preserve fragile
relationships built during the process or to influence management outcomes by making the
tough decisions necessary to benefit the landscape?
Builds Social and Political Capital
For Innes and Booher, building social and political capital, “can be more important
than tangible agreements...”429 as it increases trust, leads to mutual understanding of the
problems, and often results in enabling stakeholders to work with each other outside of the
consensus building process.430 The RAC members interviewed were unanimous in their
insistence that the RAC contributes to improved communication between interests, the
agency, and the public; to building relationships between interests that otherwise would
not be built; and cultivating trust and good- will between the agency, the members, and the
public. As one RAC member put it, “It’s a trust building experience. When you sit across the
table from somebody who has almost diametrically opposed views of what public land is
for, if you can sit across the table from them or next to them for two years, and as long as
you keep it civil, people tend to change their perspective a little...I at least understand why
they feel the way they do...” The question of whether RAC members have engaged with each
other in project work outside of the RAC process was not explored in this study but could be
another topic for further research.
429
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What are the key lessons learned for instituting a collaborative governance
model?
In the end, the major question driving this study is could the RAC model be applied
elsewhere, and if so, what are some of the key lessons to be learned? Five major lessons
stick out that are imperative to the RAC’s success. These lessons could provide guidance for
either improving the RAC model or instituting collaborative conservation in other areas of
land use and public resource planning and decision making. The lessons are as follows:
Embrace the structure
First, having the agency embrace the FACA structure and the regulatory model is
considered critical by both the Agency and the RAC members. As one BLM representative
stated:
Because of the FACA they almost have to get it into a regulatory standpoint and make
it something agencies have to do. Otherwise, it will change with whoever is sitting in
the White House and the politics will take over. [Without that], it would have been
easier for [the next] president to do away with the RACs. But because [it’s in the
regulations] it takes some of the politics out of that decision, and it does
institutionalize it.431
This statement summarizes the feelings of many of the RAC members well. It was suggested
by many of those interviewed that the regulatory structure of the RAC institution provides
direction to the agency and helps depoliticize the process. It also answers some of the
questions around representation, inclusion, access and funding that ad hoc, grassroots
collaborative processes often struggle with. The structure creates a consistent playing field
across geographic, political and social landscapes, and it provides a system of federal
oversight that may help to settle the nerves of those who are apprehensive towards
community-based collaborative governance. Seeking congressional authorization for
instituting a collaborative arrangement within an Agency is no easy task. However, as noted
in chapter two, the USFS was given the authority to establish Resource Advisory Councils
431
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under the National Forest Management Act but, unlike the “thou shalt” requirements under
FLPMA, implementation of this authority under NFMA was left to the discretion of the
Secretary.432
Indeed, framing the process through a regulatory structure provides the agency
with an opportunity to create a management floor for a variety of issues, as demonstrated
by the creation of the federal fallback standards and guidelines for rangeland management
through Rangeland Reform ’94. This opportunity does two things for the agency and the
collaborative group it establishes. First, it creates a baseline of resource protection,
allocation, use or conservation that can be used to ensure sustainability at a national level.
Using a federal regulatory floor for protection, use, or pollution prevention has recently
been demonstrated in other areas of environmental management such as the use of Clean
Air Act provisions to curb carbon emissions from energy production at the State level,433
and recent legislative proposals prescribing specific levels of timber harvest on National
Forest lands.434
Second, creating a federal management floor can be used as a motivating factor for
local groups to develop their own regulations or management prescriptions that better
account for the perspectives, and conditions of the local areas and at the very least meet the
federal floor. From the public perspective, creating legal hooks such as the requirement to
develop local rangeland standards and guidelines compels the agency to listen to the
concerns of affected interests. Witnessing the RAC’s recommendations directly affecting
land and resource management empowers RAC members to stay involved. Further, it helps
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to attract and retain new members to the process. Without the requirement for the RAC to
produce local standards and guidelines or be subject to the federal fallback standards,
questions remain as to whether the agency would have been as responsive to public’s input.
The initial success experienced by the RACs and the Agency in implementing local standards
and guidelines has resulted in an agency who, in general, largely values the advice and input
derived from the RAC. Consequently, this experience reinforces the perception that the
RACs have access to and influence over management decisions.
Saddle the horse; let go of the reins
The second lesson from this exploration into the RAC institution can be summarized
by the statement, “...build the table but let the process proceed naturally.”435 With the legal
structure in place, many RAC members felt like it was important for them to be able to
create the process collaboratively with the BLM. Where RAC members didn’t have as much
influence over designing the agenda, or where the managers failed to bring up issues or
tasks for the RAC to work on, the RAC membership felt increasingly frustrated, uninspired
and disempowered. This indicates a need for the BLM to balance the legal structure with
the principles of self-organization and shared purpose to maintain an engaged and
empowered membership. As one RAC member put it, “give [us] the boards and nails, say
here is what the law says, here is what we need to do, can you help us create this
together?”436 The degree to which RAC members had the ability to collaboratively develop a
shared purpose with the agency, to organize their own working groups, and to feel
empowered developing an agenda on which they were interested in working directly
correlated with a perception of influencing management and overall effectiveness of the
RAC.
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For the agency, as long as the membership represents the diversity of social,
political and demographic makeup of the surrounding region required by law, and the
recommendations the RAC provides are lawful, then they should feel compelled to
implement the recommendations. Minimizing adversarial confrontations with public
interest groups on the management decisions under their jurisdiction is in the Agency’s best
interest. Engaging and empowering the RACs to assist them in that mission will only
increase the likelihood that those decisions are made with public participation and public
support. As one RAC member succinctly put it, “A RAC is only as good as the state director
is willing to use them. I think a state director who really pays attention to their RAC,
dedicates some resources and effort to try to get out of a RAC what they’re really supposed
to do, can’t help but benefit from what the RAC recommends.”437
Value added equals value gained
Both the agency and the participants have to perceive value coming from the
process in order to be committed and open to it. As one BLM representative insisted, “You
have to mean it. You can’t tell people you want to collaborate with them and then just do
whatever you want to do. We have to honor the process, because if we don’t we destroy our
trust with those folks and what’s in it for them to work with us next time.”438 The BLM
representatives interviewed perceived the value coming from the advice and
recommendations supporting their ability to make tough management decisions. They also
perceived value in improving their ability to communicate with the public and understand
of how their management decisions affect and are perceived by the public.
For the RAC members interviewed, several values were perceived as resulting from
participation, including: shared learning and developing a mutual understanding of the
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issues; building relationships, trust and good will between members; and gaining access to
and influence over BLM management decisions. Additionally, one of the most important
issues for RAC members was feeling that the BLM valued the input and advice the RAC gave
them. “The key is that the BLM really values what we’re bringing to the table. I don’t know
how they got there, if it was their leadership placing a high value on that or just years and
years of it working that helped the staff get there...It’s not just a policy but it’s also a
commitment to the process, and taking the time on the staff side to get the value back from
the public people.”439
However, as some of the RAC members pointed out, the perception of success is
often dependent on the outcomes of on-the-ground management. If the RAC or the public
isn’t able to perceive the advice and recommendations affecting management actions, a vital
element of communication about the value added to decision making by the RAC is missing.
Several RAC members questioned if their time and effort had an effect on the ground. As
one RAC member stated:
Our job is to tell [the] state director ...on this issue, this should be done. Well he can
take that advice and write an instructional memo (IM), or he can throw it into the
hopper and revise procedures, or he can totally ignore us, and we’re just blowing in
the wind. So the challenge is to see your comments and advice used, and in this
forum it can be. I’ll say in most of these things it has had some influence but maybe
not as much as I would have liked.440

This indicates a need for the agency to be more transparent with the recommendations and
advice the RAC provides. Implementing some mechanism to track the advice through the
rest of the BLM’s decision making process and other processes of public engagement (EIS
alternative development for example) would allow the public to understand the value the
RAC brings to the agency decision making process.
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The RACs are conferred with a degree of access and influence that rises above the
level of basic public participation: the RACs synthesize the views of the public to help craft
solution options before the decisions are made. Additionally, RACs utilize their resources to
educate each other, gather information and perspectives from a diverse cross section of the
community. They are a wealth of knowledge, talent and creativity. The agency shouldn’t be
afraid to task them with tackling difficult questions. Empowering the RAC to provide advice
on the issues the agency really struggles with not only leads to an empowered and engaged
membership, but it builds the social and political capital necessary to implement difficult
decisions.
I’m saying there’s a history in BLM to let some fairly significant problems compound
rather than deal with them. If the RAC could provide some long term advice to the
state director on issues like that, if the state director could say to them, this is a vexing
problem that I’ve had, I’m not asking you to solve it for me but could you give me some
sense of direction on that, I think the RAC could be very useful in that. But it’s kind of
like taking your clothes off in public in some respect, because you’re not sure what the
answer you get is going to be.441
By providing a sense of mission and empowering the RAC to engage in finding creative
solutions to vexing problems, the perceived value of the RACs can be increased. Rangeland
Reform ’94 did this explicitly with the requirement to develop local standards and
guidelines for rangeland management or become subject to the federal fallback standards.
Recreating this kind of requirement could help to catalyze an institutional arrangement
elsewhere. Over time, listening to the collective voice of the RAC, which represents the
community of interests who have a stake in the landscape, increases the perceived value to
both the RAC members and the public at large. The degree to which the perceived value of
the institution accumulates over time increases the likelihood of continued success.
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Invest in the Strongest Asset
An engaged and empowered public are the RAC and the Agency’s strongest asset.
Investing in successive crops of collaboratively-minded, solution-oriented leaders who are
willing to disagree but also find common ground is critical to the success of the institution.
One RAC member put it nicely, “The thing about it is that a RAC is only as good as the
representation that’s on it.”442
One way to accomplish this could be to build loop-backs to the process, much like
Ury, Brett and Goldberg suggest building loop-backs to negotiation. By intentionally and
strategically engaging members of the public, and building pathways to the collaborative
group through that engagement could sow the seeds for a sustained crop of new
membership applicants. Additionally, it could lead to a public that is more informed about
what the group is and what it does. In the end, more active public engagement by the group
could be lead to a cultural shift that embodies respect and civility, collaborative problem
solving, and collaborative public education about resource problems. Enhancing loop backs
to public involvement and engagement with the group could raise awareness of the value it
brings to public land and resource management.
The Sub-RACs have been an especially helpful tool for the BLM RACs to engage the
public at a deeper and more meaningful level. All the RACs interviewed discussed using
sub-RACs and the benefits they bring to the discussions, and several RAC members
discussed first participating on a sub-RAC before applying to sit on the full RAC.
Encouraging sub-RACs to play a more active role in the communities and with the public-atlarge regarding the issues they are working on could only increase the two-way
communication that they already facilitate. Several RAC members spoke of sub-RACs
holding their own public meetings. Infusing the RACs and sub-RACs with tools of
442
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collaborative process and encouraging them to have a more direct connection with the
public could also lead to increased trust and improved communication between the public
and the agency, a more empowered RAC, greater mutual learning and increased
understanding, and improved management decisions.
Finally, to improve the efficiency of the BLM RACs or in implementing a similar
collaborative group elsewhere, the challenges created by the appointment process need to
be addressed. The inefficiency resulting from the appointment process was unanimously
cited by the RAC members and BLM representatives as the number one challenge. One
simple solution brought forward suggested letting the RAC member whose term is expiring
continue sitting on the council until their replacement is officially seated. Another
suggestion was that the appointments be made by the Director of the BLM rather than the
Secretary of the Interior, thus removing a layer of complexity from the process.
FLPMA directs the Secretary to establish the advisory councils, and further states
that, “appointments shall be made in accordance with rules prescribed by the Secretary.”443
The councils are required to comply with FACA,444 but no language in FLPMA requires
appointments to be made directly by the Secretary. The regulations governing the RACs
discuss requirements for establishment,445 membership composition,446 and terms of
service and interest group representation,447 but none of the regulations require
appointments to be made by the secretary. In fact, 42 CFR § 1784.3 (a) states, “Members
may be appointed to additional terms at the discretion of the authorized appointing
official...” which seems to indicate that the Secretary has the discretion to delegate the
authority of making appointments to another official. The possibility of implementing legal
Pub. L 94-579 § 309(a).
ibid
445 43 CFR § 1784.1-1
446 43 CFR § 1784.2–1
447 43 CFR § 1784.3
443
444
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or procedural solutions to the challenges posed by the appointment process should be
explored further.
Capitalize on partnership opportunities
Any program of collaborative governance should capitalize on partnership
opportunities that emerge to implement agreements and recommendations. The RACs are a
bridge between the agency and the public, and this bridge is buttressed by the effective use
of sub-RACs. The most successful RACs assume at one time or another three of the four
collaborative designs discussed by Selin and Chavez: appreciative planning, dialogues, and
negotiated settlements.448 The ability to connect the recommendations and advice the RAC
provides to partnership opportunities outside the group is largely a missed opportunity. As
one RAC member discussed, “There’s a feeling among myself and other RAC members that
we sit through a lot of fun presentations with a lot of information, but we never chew on
that information, analyze it, or come up with something we can do about it...”449
Leveraging partners for implementation, monitoring and public education may
require a greater expenditure of effort on the part of both the RAC members and Agency
staff, but it may also result in greater continuity between the decisions and implementation
of those decisions, and a greater understanding of on-the-ground activities by the public. As
Moote, McClaran and Chickering point out, “Under a participatory democracy approach,
administrators give up some discretion and agree to share decision making authority with
other participants. In return, participants share responsibility for the successful
implementation of decisions.”450

Selin and Chavez (1995): 193.
Wyoming RAC member comment, on file with the Author
450 Moote, McClaran, and Chickering (1997): 880.
448
449
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The Forest Service has implemented this philosophy under the Collaborative Forest
Landscape Restoration Program, whereby the collaborative group creates the plan but also
assists with the implementation by leveraging the strengths and talents of the collaborators.
CFLRP is a multi-million dollar program that was created around the specific goal of forest
restoration and provides funding to accomplish that goal. While the idea of implementation
goes beyond the scope of the RAC, it is the final piece of Selin and Chavez’s design models
that is left unresolved by the RAC. Building a funding component into to the RAC program,
much like what has been done by the Secure Rural Schools RAC program in the Forest
Service, could simultaneously help to achieve this implementation goal and provide a
clearly mandated purpose with which to further empower the RACs.
By all other measures, the BLM RACs nearly encompass all four strategies of
collaborative process design described by Leighninger451. The RAC engages diverse
interests, involve interests in deliberative dialogue, provides opportunities to compare
options, and effect change by applying citizen input to decision making. The RAC also
utilizes three of the four design models described by Selin and Chavez452: appreciative
planning, dialogues, and negotiated settlements. The missing piece of the puzzle in both
models is engaging the stakeholders and connecting the lager public to implementation,
monitoring and evaluation of the decisions and management actions. Granted this is
beyond the scope of the RAC institution as it exists today, but when considering future
design, building in a loop back for participation in implementation, monitoring and
evaluation closes the circle and completes the life cycle of a collaborative ECR process.

451
452

Leighninger (2006): 3.
Selin and Chavez (1995): 193.
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6. Conclusion
The BLM’s Resource Advisory Councils are a continuation of a nearly eighty year
experiment in collaborative governance of public land and natural resource management.
Beginning with the Taylor Grazing Act and the establishment of the Grazing Advisory
Boards by Ferry Carpenter, local people have been integrally involved in determining the
conditions under which the range and resources are utilized, conserved, protected and
improved. Followed by the Citizen Advisory Boards instituted under FLPMA, the model for
collaborative governance has evolved to capture an ever more diverse representation of the
interests and concerns the public holds in the management of the shared estate.
The RACs program is certainly not without its challenges. This experiment has
traveled a bumpy road at times, both in terms of socio-political acceptance and ecological
effects. It certainly has not always resulted in the best outcomes for the condition of the
watersheds, wildlife and landscapes which they were charged with stewarding. In fact
much of this history is distinguished by attempts to correct exploitations of the past.
Efficiency, engagement and empowerment are all dependent on the degree to which the
agency is open and committed to the institution at all levels, from the federal office, to the
district managers, to the field staff. Building this culture within an agency certainly takes
time, dedication and a commitment of resources.
The RACs were instituted by a policy mandate over twenty years ago. Prior to that,
the Department of the Interior has been working at including local perspectives in
management decision making for nearly eighty years. As such, the RACs have demonstrated
an ability to able to help the BLM make more informed decisions that are more responsive
to local conditions and concerns, that have more buy-in from the affected public. Their
continuity of service is but one measure of success. In that time, the RACs have also found
success in improving trust and relationships between the interests at the table, the BLM,
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and the public. Producing consensus-based recommendations that translate into
management action is the ultimate goal, but even where topics are merely discussed, the
deliberate nature of the discussions helps to better inform the final decisions made by the
agency. An interesting topic for future research would be to conduct a survey on the
condition of the public rangelands after the institution of the RAC program and if they could
be tied directly to improved ecological conditions. However, absent that, providing a
platform for mutual education and public engagement simultaneously informs and supports
the recommendations and advice provided to the agency, and each of these factors supports
the premise that the RAC are a successful example of collaborative governance instituted
within a federal land management agency.
Finally, none of this is to discount the voices of those who chose means other than
collaboration to pursue the satisfaction of their interests on public land and resource issues.
Nor is it meant to undermine the role litigation and appeals can play in ensuring compliance
with statutory mandates. Further, the RAC is not able to pursue legislative solutions to
management problems, yet legislation has proven a significant tool for ad hoc collaborative
groups to implement policies or designate management priorities. The RACs clearly cannot
be all things to all people, and certainly are not a panacea to alleviating all conflict over
public lands management.
To inform instituting future processes of collaborative governance in agencies that
manage public lands and natural resources, several lessons can be learned from this
investigation into the BLM RACs. The RACs support the argument that including local
people in decision making improves both the quality and durability of the decisions. They
also support the argument that collaborative forms of environmental conflict resolution can
be successfully instituted in a federal agency through a policy mandate. According to the
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RAC members and BLM representatives interviewed for this study, the major benefits of the
institution are:


The required diversity of represented interests leads to shared learning and mutual
education about an issue and legitimizes the decision making process.



Engaging in deliberative dialogue about complex issues prior to making decisions
cultivates a shared understanding of the problem, contributes to developing
creative solution options, and builds consensus-based solutions.



Access to and influence over the agency decision making processes increases buy-in
and acceptability of the decisions ultimately made.



Including the public in formulating solution options to management problems
builds social and political good will that improves relationships and communicative
abilities, reduces conflict, and supports proactive solutions.

RAC members and BLM representatives also identified several critical factors that enable
the RACs success. Those factors include:


Embracing the regulatory structure provides consistency across jurisdictional
boundaries, political and social legitimacy, a reliable funding stream, and an
institutional memory that transcends the individual members terms. Embracing a
regulatory structure also provides an opportunity to guarantee federal standards
are met while encouraging the development of community oriented solutions to
local management problems. The structure creates a critical foundation and a
mechanism for accountability from which a successful process for collaborative
governance may be built.



The agency must construct the framework and provide a sense of mission, but then
should trust in the process and the people to produce good outcomes. Any group
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activity is going to inherently go through the classic steps of group process, the RACs
are no exception. The agency should empower the group to address specific issues
it struggles with but also let go of the reigns and allow the group the freedom and
ability to build the process, identify issues of interest, and collectively formulate
advice on those issues without the agency maintaining a tight grip. After all, the
agency must retain final decision making authority. This empowerment to selforganize increases the engagement of the membership which contributes to the
social bonds built within the group, and ultimately the strength of the process itself.
A strong and empowered group inevitably improves the likelihood of producing
high-quality, tangible outcomes.


Both the participants and the Agency overseeing the group need to understand the
value the process contributes to the landscape. Trust is built when commitments
are carried out, interests are satisfied, and mutual value is realized. If the members
don’t perceive more value gained from participating in the process than they can
find elsewhere, they will seek satisfaction of their interests through other means. If
the agency doesn’t perceive value resulting from its effort, the process becomes just
another box to check in a long to-do list of procedural requirements. Value is
realized not only through a successful process but also from the on-the-ground
implications of the process. Implementing a mechanism that transparently tracks
the recommendations and advice given through the agency’s decision making
process could simultaneously communicate the value the RAC adds to on-theground management and hold the agency accountable for honoring the outcomes of
the public engagement process it purports to value so highly.



An engaged and empowered public is the strongest asset to any collaborative group.
Building loop-backs to public engagement strengthens the public’s perception of the
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group and elicits a perception of direct access to and influence over decisions that
are unavailable through other means. Investing both time and resources into
cultivating public engagement is critical to continued success.


Capitalize on partnership opportunities. One final place where the RAC program
could be improved is in their ability to capitalize on the social and political good will
that is built through the process. By utilizing this conduit to engage outside groups,
build spin-off partnerships, and capitalize on the improved relationships and
communicative ability produced the ECR circle of life is connected. Engaging the
membership and the public in collectively implementing and monitoring
management actions has been a major element of the next generation of policy
mandated collaboration (within the CFLRP and SRS programs). This can lead to
improved working relationships between the public and the agency by
collaboratively engaging in comprehensive action on the ground.

The RACs and their predecessors, the Grazing Advisory Boards and Citizen Advisory
Boards, are a nearly eighty-year experiment in collaborative governance over public land
and resource management. They have endured multiple efforts to reform their operation
and limit their influence, but they have also been consistently regarded as a critical conduit
for public participation within the Department of the Interior. The lingering question is
whether by hearing from the agreeable middle, an agency is better able to deal with the
fringes on either end. This is one of the eternal questions regarding the use of collaborative
decision making and alternative dispute resolution processes. On the other side, the
question remains: should the radical fringe hold up progress that the 80% in the middle
agree upon? This is an enduring tension in any area of public policy and the RAC certainly
can’t resolve that debate as of yet. However, we should learn from the past, and as it exists
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today, the RAC program is one tool that for twenty years has demonstrated an ability to
improve relationships between the public and the land managers, produce balanced,
consensus-based advice over natural resource management, and to manage conflicts over
natural resource decision making in a healthy and productive way.
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Appendix I: Letter of Informed Consent and Interview Guide
Letter of Informed Consent to Study Participants
Study Title: Instituting Collaborative Conservation in Public Lands Management
Principle Investigator:
Benjamin Donatelle
MS Candidate, Environmental Studies
University of Montana, JRH 106A
Phone: (406)580-1657
Email: Benjamin.donatelle@umontana.edu

Faculty Advisor:
Dr. Len Broberg
Professor, Environmental Studies Department
University of Montana, JRH 106A
Phone: (406)243-5209
Email: len.broberg@mso.umt.edu

Purpose:
You are being asked to take part in a research study analyzing the effects of institutionalizing, or mandating through law or policy,
collaboration in public lands management. This study is exploring the relationship and effectiveness of policy-mandated
collaboration in resolving conflict and increasing public participation in public lands management, by exploring the Bureau of Land
Management’s Resource Advisory Councils (BLM RACs) as a model. You have been invited to participate because of your
involvement with a BLM RAC working on public lands management issues or project planning and implementation on federal public
lands in your area. The results of this research will be used to partially fulfill the requirements for a master’s degree in
environmental studies at the University of Montana by the principle investigator. The project findings may also be submitted for
publication in relevant scientific journals, or for review by the BLM and/or other federal land management agencies, but will be done
without any information that could identify you as a participant.
Procedures:
If you agree to take part in this research study, you will be interviewed by the principle investigator listed above. Your records will
be kept confidential and will not be released without your consent except as required by law. Your interview can take place in
person or over the phone, whichever is most convenient for you. The interview session will last between 45 and 60 minutes. In
addition to this statement of informed consent, you have also received a copy of the interview questions/guide. You may have a
colleague or person of higher authority review the questions and/or be present during the interview if you think that is necessary.
Your interview will be recorded with your permission, transcribed by the investigator, and its content analyzed for themes and
commonalities with other participants in this study. The audiotape will be transcribed without any information that could identify
you and the tape will then be erased or otherwise destroyed. Your name, this form, and any other identifying information will be
kept separate from the recording, and you will not be identified in the report or any other written documents. If the results of this
study are written in a scientific journal, presented at a scientific conference, or submitted to the BLM or other land management
agency, neither your name nor any other identifying information will be used.
There is no anticipated discomfort for those contributing to this study, so risk to participants is minimal. However, answering the
questions may cause you to think about past conflict situations with other participants in your group and may bring up feelings that
make you sad or upset. There is no promise that you will receive any benefit from taking part in this study, but your participation
may help to increase general understanding of the effects of requiring collaborative processes in public lands planning and
management. Your decision to take part in this research study is entirely voluntary, and you may refuse to take part in or withdraw
from the study at any time. By giving your verbal consent at the beginning of our call, you are agreeing to an interview that will
cover general information about and your perception of participating in a Bureau of Land Management Resource Advisory Council
(BLM RAC).
If you have any questions about the research now or during the study contact: Benjamin Donatelle, by telephone at (406)580-1657,
or by email at benjamin.donatelle@umontana.edu. To ensure that your rights as a research participant have been safeguarded, this
study has been reviewed by the University of Montana Institutional Review Board. If you have any questions regarding your rights as
a research subject, you may contact the UM Institutional Review Board (IRB) at (406) 243-6672.
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Interview Guide: Instituting Collaboration in the BLM’s using Resource Advisory
Councils
The following questions are meant to guide personal interviews with participants in and observers of Bureau of Land
Management Resource Advisory Councils (BLM RACs). The focus of this inquiry is the exploration of an institutionalized
model of collaboration over public lands and resource management within a federal land management agency.
Prior to Beginning: Can you please confirm that you have received and read the statement of informed consent, that all your
questions and concerns have been answered or addressed to your satisfaction, and that you agree to take part in this research
project?
Interview Questions:
1) Stakeholders and interest group representatives often have very different reasons for joining a collaborative
group. Could you talk about why you became involved with the RAC and what keeps you coming back? (BLM
Representatives: Could you talk about the value you and the BLM gets from being involved with the RAC?)
a.

How long have you been involved, and what was your motivation to become involved?
i.

Why do you stay?

ii.

What has been challenging about participating in the RAC? Most rewarding?

b.

What has been your experience with other collaborative groups?

c.

What interest category do you represent in the RAC?

i.
2)

How does the RAC compare?

Successful collaborative efforts often have distinct features of their processes in common. Could you talk about the
RAC’s operating process, how you define success, to what degree you feel the RAC is meeting its definition of
success, and what enables it to be successful?
a.

How does the RAC decide on the issues it discusses and make final decisions or recommendations?

b.

How does the RAC manage conflict among members?

c.
3)

i.

Does the RAC use neutral 3rd party facilitation?

ii.

What is the DFO’s role in managing conflict?

How does the RAC engage the public and/or interest group constituents on the issues it discusses?

Collaborative processes often sustain themselves because of their ability to achieve results. What results have you
observed from working with the RAC that sustains this process, and why do you feel it has been able to sustain
itself?
a.

What formal agreements have been reached, projects implemented, or resources improved as a result of
RAC recommendations?

b.

How has the BLM used recommendations the RAC puts forth?

c.

How has participation in the RAC process affected working relationships with other members of the
group?

d.
4)

i.

With members of the public?

ii.

With other collaborative groups?

How does the RAC solicit and empower new members?

The RAC program is an example of an institutionalized collaborative process of public lands and resource
management. Thinking in terms of setting up future process for success, what advice would you give policy
makers trying to better institutionalize collaboration in natural resource planning and decision making?
a.

What do you see as the benefits of participating in the RAC? Drawbacks?

b.

How does the RAC provide opportunities for or limit discussion topics?
i.

Are there issues or problems you feel you would like to discuss in the RAC but cannot? Why or
Why not?

c.
5)

What challenges does the RAC face in achieving its goals or defined criteria for success?

Who else should I be talking to about this particular RAC? What other questions should I ask?
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Appendix II: Evaluation Criteria
Process Criteria
Representation and
Inclusiveness
Shared purpose
Self-Organization/
Procedural Fairness

Description
Includes representatives of all relevant and significantly
different interests. Provides substantial opportunity for public
input and incorporates public input in formulating options and
decisions.
Process is driven by a purpose and tasks that are real, and
shared by the group. Group is able to identify and prioritize
issues collectively.
Allows participants to decide on ground rules, objectives, tasks,
working groups, and discussion topics; and treats all parties
equally and respectfully in the establishment of such
procedures.
Engages participants, keeping them at the table, interested and
learning through in-depth discussion, drama, humor, and
informal interaction. Enables participants to influence the
decisions of officials or administrators.
Fosters creative thinking, shared learning, examination of each
other’s assumptions, identification of common interests, out-ofthe-box ideas, and challenges to the status-quo

Key Words
other interests, diverse
interests, perspectives,
comments
Common ground, shared
values, compromise,
shared development, had
my say, felt heard,

Seeks consensus only after discussions have fully explored the
issues and interests and significant effort has been made to find
creative responses to differences

Influenced management,
felt empowered,
encouraged, gained
access,
common interests,
understand other
perspectives, learned a
lot, shared learning
Consensus, all agreed, we
all decided, Collaborative
decision

Outcome Criteria

Description

Key Words

Produces Agreements

Produces high-quality agreements (formal recommendations in
the RACs case) that are agreed upon by the participants and
substantially satisfies their interests.

Ends Stalemate

Ends stalemate, increases understanding, and results in the
implementation of agreed upon projects, activities, or plans.

Efficient in Costs v.
Benefits

Compared favorably with other planning methods in terms of
costs and benefits.

Increases Creativity

Produces creative ideas or innovations that would not
otherwise be achieved.

Builds Social and
Political capital

Builds trust and results in improved working relationships
between participants, agencies, and the public. Results in
improved ability to be responsive to future change and conflict.

Information
resources

Produces high-quality information that participants agree upon,
understand, and accept. Results in learning and change beyond
the group.

Engagement and
Empowerment
Deliberativeness

Builds Consensus
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Came to agreement,
provided advice,
developed
recommendations
Overcome conflict, get
along, understand each
other, respect other
perspectives.
time commitments,
Efficient process, less
costs, beneficial,
Creative results, new
ideas, see things they
weren’t thinking about
build relationships,
understand other points
of view, build trust,
respect,
Shared knowledge,
understand the issues,

Appendix III: RAC Themes Tables
Table III – I: Key Benefits of participating in the RAC
Key Benefits
Access to decisions and
decision makers

Opportunity to influence
decisions and land or
resource management

Stay informed on the
issues affecting public
lands and resources
Mutual education and
shared learning between
the diverse interests leads
to discovering common
ground

Representative Quote
We worked really closely with permittees and our goal was to improve grazing
management...So it was really important for us to have a connection with the
public land agencies and of course the BLM RAC was a great opportunity to do
that.
The RAC for me was of interest to one, build relationships with the land
managers but also just to find out if there was more of a role for us to be
playing in terms of how BLM works on river management issues in general, and
to be able to have access to more of a cross cut of the public and
environmental field in general and how they interact with the BLM.
When we help the managers see something they weren’t really considering
and if that was a way to save, to keep a process valuable for the public, I think
that’s a really good thing;
There’s a ton of influence and diversity on BLM RACs and they have an
incredibly sway on public land management policy, and hardly anyone knows
what the heck they are.
The reason I applied for the RAC was I knew it... was a forum that I could stay
informed on BLM issues across the state.

It’s interesting sometimes to sit back and listen to their philosophies and how
they got them, then you sit down over lunch or something and tell them yours
and, “...oh, I never really thought of that...” Or you realize that you hadn’t
thought about their position. I often have felt that two people, equally
informed seldom disagree. That’s where I come from.

Builds trust and
communicative ability
which improves
relationships between
interests

Being able to...understand the cross section and how these different land
management mandates intersect with each other and how the different uses
intersect with each other, that is really valuable.
I think what’s most rewarding is to have a group you feel you can share with
pretty honestly, and they...they began to see that it wasn’t that easy. That
their perspective was one piece of a very large and much more complex puzzle.
And they became a very valuable member of the RAC because of their
background but also because they kind of grew and changed a little bit in the
process.
It’s a trust building experience. When you sit across the table from somebody
who has almost diametrically opposed views of what public land is for, if you
can sit across the table from them or next to them for two years, and as long as
you keep it civil, people tend to change their perspective a little...I at least
understand why they feel the way they do...

Builds political good will
around controversial
issues

It improved my ability to communicate with people outside of the box that I
normally travel in.
The RAC, being a spectrum of public peers, validates the decisions we made
and shows that the agency is listening to the concerns of the public which
ultimately helps to improve trust.

Learn about diverse
perspectives of the issues

Provides political cover to
make difficult decisions

To be able and look them in the eye and say look we have a RAC that is truly
representative of the population...they brought me these recommendations
and I agree. I think it provides some legitimate political cover for the state
director to make the right decision rather than be pressured into a decision by
a particular group.
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Corroborating
Theory
Engagement and
empowerment

Engagement and
empowerment

Deliberativeness

Deliberativeness

Representation and
Inclusiveness,
Deliberativeness

Social and political
capital

Social and political
capital

Social and Political
Capital

Process of discussions
results in consensus based
agreements that enhances
management decisions

...the formal recommendations we make to the BLM. Whenever we do a
resolution or make a formal recommendation on an issue to the BLM that feels
like there’s some accomplishment. I also feel like whenever we take on a new
subject...we go from not knowing really anything about it to understanding a
great deal about the project. I think there is a strong sense of accomplishment
around learning; us collectively learning

Produces
Agreements

Table III – II: Features enabling RAC success
Enabling Features
The structure

Representative Quote

Corroborating
Theory

...there is a strong structure on the front end. I think the fact that we have, that
there is FACA...all of those structural pieces are actually really important, and
they provide a common set of rules, or set of circumstances that level the
playing field for participating.

Representation and
Inclusiveness,
Engagement and
Empowerment

...we can come to the RAC and say we’re struggling with this and without
having to go out and form a blue ribbon panel, we already have one set up for
us...and because it’s a federal advisory committee chartered group, we can use
that stuff, we can take that recommendation and write it right into an
alternative that we can write an analysis on.

Finding the right people
who want to work
towards solutions

Engaging the public

Sub-RACs

Support from the Agency
to organize the
discussions and develop
the agenda

Relationships built
contribute to shared
understanding
Establishes procedures for
shared learning

The benefits [of the RAC], as opposed to the grassroots performance, is that
you have the funding, the logistics are all set up, you know where you’re
meeting, there is a meeting space that has been reserved, you set aside three
days and go in and do it...So we’ve gotten over that first hurdle of grassroots
development...sometimes that’s where you get stuck, but that’s the one thing
that we’re doing well so how do we take advantage of that.
You can pick advocates for any interest, you know from recreation, to grazing,
to oil and gas, you can put those people together but if they can’t work for a
common solution, then you’re not going to accomplish your purpose...you can
get more bodies who are advocates, but will they be able to look at a problem
and see other people’s point of view and respect that and work to find win-win
solutions, if you can’t do that then you have a problem.
...a RAC is only as good as the representation that’s on it.
I think [the RAC is] very grass-rootsey. Each RAC member represents a public
constituency, so that RAC member is getting feedback and information and
there is a two-way communication with those constituents that they
represent...[it’s] the representative democracy piece.
...essentially [with sub-RACs] we have a need to get the actual people from
that field office who are using the land to advise us on how we should be
advising the BLM...So the key there, is working with... who might be interested
and who might be able to contribute to the process valuably and then making
sure we, the RAC, are giving the sub-RAC the freedom to make
recommendations as they see fit, that we have a RAC liaison that brings that
information back to the RAC and says this is what the Sub-RAC said, and then
we can decide what to do with that information...
It’s kind of a collaborative process for putting agenda items on for the next
meeting. We get feedback from the BLM on what they’re working on, what
they think we might be interested in, but we also self-identify topics that we
either want to discuss and make recommendations on, or that we want to
learn more about...There’s themes – you know grazing, energy development,
wild horses, recreation are all reoccurring topics for our RAC
RAC members have taken the time to get to know each other outside of the
meetings and can understand where each other is coming from.
On more complex issues we form work groups to study the issues and make
recommendations to the full RAC.
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Representation

Inclusiveness

Inclusiveness

Self-organization
and Shared
purpose,
empowerment and
engagement
Deliberativeness

Deliberativeness

communication about
difficult issues facilitates
educating each other from
diverse interests

We did a really good job helping the recreation and energy folks understand
the issues with grazing, and in the same turn, the recreation and energy folks
educated us old cowboys.

Builds Consensus

Balanced representation
and deliberate
conversations improves
ability to reach decisions

...if someone totally can’t live with a decision that everyone is making, and is
totally 100% against it, then you discuss it until you get to a better place

Builds Consensus

Produces agreements on
complex management
issues

We’ll have a majority of what I’ll call unanimous decisions because of the way
that our council works, that’s with representation of each category on the subgroups, and getting information out prior to our meetings so you have an
opportunity to take a look at it...if it’s a point that we can’t reach unanimous
decision then we’ll send it back to the sub-group until the next meeting
The more that we can learn from one another and make well thought out, well
rounded recommendations to the BLM the better we’re doing.

Produces
Agreements

Table III – III: Common Challenges
Theme

Representative Quote

Corroborating
Theory

The BLM has to be
open to the process

[The] challenges sort of stem from that history and the reluctance of the agency to
even have a RAC and I think they express that hesitation by trying to constrain some
of what the RAC does;

Empowerment and
Engagement

The design structure

Time Commitment

The agenda

I know before I got on the RAC the State Director didn’t use the RAC at all. They had
meetings that weren’t particularly productive at all, and sometimes that State
Director just didn’t convene the RAC because I think there was some question as to
whether that RAC would go in the direction that director wanted it to go in.
There is a balance to be found between creating the guidelines, providing the
cemented structure to get people inside, and letting go of the reigns a little, finding
the space within those guidelines to move around.

Empowerment and
engagement, Selforganization

I think you need a little bit of a sense of mission when you put these collaborative
groups together. Perhaps if the BLM could produce a bit more sense of mission, and
perhaps that’s really the option of the State Director, the Secretary isn’t going to get
involved in that, but if the State Director was motivated to use that RAC and has any
administrative skills at all, he or she could find some things that not only meets his
or her needs but also takes advantage of the various skills and informational levels
that that appointed RAC brings
That’s a real challenge, the learning curve, and getting up to speed to really feel
valuable.

Empowerment,
Efficiency

We don’t design our own agenda and the agenda is usually pretty banal.

Self-organization

We didn’t seem to have an agenda that anyone was interested in polling us in.
The appointment
process

You’re constantly taking on new members, and...because the old members are no
longer official, and the new members haven’t been approved, you run the risk of not
having a quorum.

Efficiency and
efficacy

Public engagement

...it’s supposed to be a conversation between the RAC members, who are
representing the public and the BLM...opportunity for public input at every
meeting...but it’s not really designed to solicit public input because the RAC
members themselves are supposed to be the public input...If every one of those was
a public meeting, you would just get distracted

Inclusiveness
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Table III – IV: Process Design Theory
Model Theory
Recruit diverse interests.
Put the focus on the
interests.

Involve interests in
deliberative dialogue.
Build loop-backs to
negotiation
Provide opportunities to
compare options.
Arrange in a low-to-high cost
sequence
Consultation before...

Effect change by applying
citizen input to decision
making and implementation.

Representative Quote(s)
BLM does an excellent job in selecting the RAC members; people
who are willing to work together.

...feedback after

Representation and
Inclusiveness; Procedural
Fairness

A RAC is only as good as the representation that’s on it...
To me the biggest value is that we have a broad range of interests
and opinions and backgrounds, [and] when you bring all those
people together you get a diverse set of viewpoints on what the
BLM is doing...
[The RAC is] such a cross section of people. You don’t agree with
everybody’s philosophies...but you just have to work together and
try to find some common ground.

To come up with position statements and recommendation letters
to our state BLM agency that they could put in an EIS, I think that
speaks volumes for a group of citizens that have varied interests
...everybody gets to look at what the proposals are prior to the
meeting. We’ll have...representation of each category on the subgroups, and getting information out prior to our meetings so you
have an opportunity to take a look at it...if it’s a point that we can’t
reach unanimous decision then we’ll send it back to the sub-group
until the next meeting
People know each other, work together, respect each other, they’re
willing to make compromises.
You come to respect the other side...

Provide necessary
motivation, skills, and
resources.

Correlation with
evaluation criteria

It’s a trust building experience...
Overall, I think they’ve been pretty successful at talking through
issues and reaching consensus.
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Deliberativeness, Shared
Purpose, Self-organization,
Builds Social and Political
Capital.
Deliberativeness; Ends
Stalemate; Builds
Consensus;

Engagement and
Empowerment;
Produces Agreements,
Shared Information
Resources, Increases
Creativity, and Ends
Stalemate

Appendix IV: RAC Recommendations and Advice Table
RAC

Arizona

Utah

Wyoming

Colorado FR

Recommendations
or Advice

Secretary’s Themes
and Priorities – BLM
asking for advice. (Jan
2014)

FEB '14 RAC MEETING
- DEVOTED to
developing advice to
BLM on Sage Grouse
DEIS - RAC advice: Not
picking an alternative
but saying, BLM
should continue to
work for ways to bring
the two (State and
FWS plans)
alternatives closer
together...
(Feb 2014)
NLCS strategy rewrite document w/
general public as
intended audience.
MOTION - RAC
recommends the BLM
review summary and
comments from the
RAC as guide to
rewrite of the
document to bring
back to the RAC by
June 21st
Recreation and Fees –
all three approved
(Feb 2013)

Analyzed WH&B
subcommittee
position paper - no
recommended
changes (Nov'13)
Suggested WH&B
position paper may
need to be reissued to
reinforce
recommendations

Letter of Support for
Pikes Peak National
Historic Trail

Sonoran Landscape
Pilot Project –
recreation, education
and outreach strategy
– BLM asked RAC for
advise – no
recommendations yet
(Jan 2014)

Advice on EA for AMP
– suite of
recommendations re:
fence removal, weed
control, watering
sites, adjusted grazing
limits. (May 2014)

Suggesting re-writing
a protocol to adjust
how the RAC and
RecRAC work together
- motion passed (May
2014)

Grand StaircaseEscalante NM Fee
proposal - Approved
unanimously (Jan'14)

Climate Change and
Healthy Landscapes
(Sept. 2014)

Moab FO Rec Fee
proposal - Approved
unanimously (Jan'14)

Forest Service - three
fee proposals approved
unanimously (Jan'14)
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Recommendation:
Assemble a bentonite
and uranium working
group to consider:
streamlining approval
process, (3809
working group)(Mar'14)

BLM should
implement regulatory
mechanisms (9-plan);
control cheatgrass;
control juniper;
reclamation and
restoration of
disturbances; engage
SGIT and local working
groups (June'14)
Transparency Position
paper provided
recommendations on
enhancing roles in the
planning process; BLM
WY will incorporate
recommendations
into next revision of
Instruction
Memorandum (IM)
that guides staff
(Sept'14)
Recommendation BLM should
collaborate w/ local
certified governments
during cultural
consultation process
on Cultural issues

Sub-RACs

Arizona
Sub-RACs
Grazing - see
recommendation #1
above

Special Recreation
Permit Fee proposal
and roles/
responsibilities of the
RAC/FS/BLM under
REA (Aug'14)
MOTION - RAC to
write a letter to
Secretary expressing
frustration and
discontent change
affecting BLM Utah's
ability to provide
quality recreation
experiences - CC'd to
congressional
delegation.
Utah
Sub-RACs

Wyoming Sub-RACs
3809 work group - id
6 areas for potential
streamlining: prescoping; improve
communication
between BLM+DEQ;
improve Fed Register
notice process; clarify
section 106; Refine
NEPA documents;
Training on 3809
procedures (June'14)
Transparency and
openness in NEPA
RAC subgroup

Section 106

Colorado FR SubRACs
Royal Gorge RMP –
formed Aug 2014

Wild Horse and Burro
Friends Groups and
Partnerships (Sept.
2014)

RAC

Colorado
NW

Colorado
SW

Idaho –
Boise

Idaho –
CDA

Recommendations
and Advice

Wild horse roundtable
with public to discuss
management options
– keep it on the
agenda (May 2014)

BLM asked RAC to
help with concepts to
keep wild and
domestic sheep
separated
(Aug 2013)
Seeking RAC input on
land acquisition in Tres
Rios - Contiguous
parcels; Riparian
habitat areas (May
2014)

Member asks for BLM
to focus on presenting
to the RAC challenges
and opportunities
rather than status
updates (Nov 2012)
DRAFT letter to O.C.
Commissioners
presented - RAC
decided to talk to
other ID RACs before
sending the letter.
(April 2013)

Increase in
Recreation Fees at
four sites (Feb 2012)

Wild Horse Resolution
- Supporting sand
wash pilot area
project - motion
seconded, vote will be
via email. (May 2014)

RAC proposes: Writing
a letter to National
Wild Horse Advisory
Board with
suggestions of ideas,
writing to other RACs.
(May 2014)

Motion: RAC provide a
resolution in favor of
the Paradigm Project motion passed
(Jan 2014)
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Discussion on:
Natural Resource
Damage Assessment
& Restoration
Program – Role of the
RAC? Involved in
work on BLM lands;
letters of support for
projects. (Feb 2012)
Sheep Fire Salvage
Timber Sale RAC to
support timber sale –
unanimous; RAC to
draft letter of
support
(March 2013)

Sutey Ranch Land
Exchange – Acquisition
presents opportunity
for RAC to be involved
in management
(Aug 2014)

RAC to draft letter to
send to State
Director requesting
more Emergency
Stabilization and
Rehabilitation (ES&R)
funds (March 2013)

NW RAC passed
resolution supporting
chemical vasectomy in
Sand Wash (Aug 2014)
BLM looking for
support from RAC to
move forward with
proposal for North
Sand Hills – vote
forthcoming (Aug
2014)
HORSE RESOLUTION draft a letter to other
RACs to collectively
solve problems,
encourage better
volunteer
participation. (Dec
2014)

Sub-RAC

Colorado NW SubRACs
Fencing –
recommended BLM do
more fencing for
permittees –
committee dissolved
(March 2014)

Colorado SW SubRACs
Uncompahgre FO RMP
– RAC approved using
sub-group for
RMP/public outreach

Idaho Boise
Sub-RACs
BLM Requested that
RAC form a subcommittee to work on
the project: to review
resources and make
recommendations
(Nov 2013)

Colorado River Valley
FO RMP -

Oil and Gas – intent of
the group was public
education (Aug 2013)
Important for group to
hear concerns outside
of public comment
periods (Nov 2014).

Will designate a subcommittee to work w/
local WH&B program
(Jan 2014).

Idaho –
Twin Falls
Motion: Draft a
response, not going to
take on the issue (ID
Standards and
Guideline Review) at
this time - passed
(June 2013)

Montana
East
Pumpkin Creek Area
recreation
development and
Restoration - What
RAC involvement? hope for help in
seeking public
comments for use;
increase public
awareness
(March 2013)

Idaho CDA SubRACs

White River FO TMP –
BLM asked RAC to
form sub-group – Subgroup formed w/ vote
(December 2014)

RAC
Recommendations
or Advice

Idaho –
ID Falls
RAC members
encouraged to
network/solicit for
new RAC members
(Jan 2013)
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Montana
Central
Campground Fees –
support fee increases
– passed
unanimously
(May 2013)

Caribou-Targhee NF
proposed cabin rental
fee - Motion to
approve fee passed
unanimously
(April 2013)

Salmon/Challis NF Rec
Fee proposal –
Unanimous approval
of new and increased
fees (Jan 2014)

Sage Grouse DEIS
discussion/recommen
dation - RAC to
support ALT E w/
adjusted mapping to
include more leks (use
maps from ALT D).
Motion Passes: 12:1; 3
abstain
(Jan 2014)
Planning 2.0 - RAC
expressed concerned
about this weakening
the voice of the RAC
(June 2014)

BLM asked RAC to be
ready to approve or
propose Pompey's
Pillar plan at next
meeting
(March 2013)

Pompey's Pillar
motion to approve the
new fee schedule –
approved
(Sept 2013)

NLCS Letter: overall
supportive of NLCS
strategy – approved
unanimously
(sept 2013)
Motion made and
passed - letter of
support for WMT RAC
proposal to extend
RAC members terms
beyond 3 years until
Secretary appoints
new member
(May 2014)

Lewistown RMP BLM Asked RAC to be
involved in the
process - taken
under consideration
no commitment for a
sub-group but
commitment from
entire RAC to look at
RMP (Sept 2013)
RAC was asked to
change the way
public comment
period was run.
Public comment is
not to carry on
dialogue... We don't
interact with the
public so we can
have a productive
meeting and not
debates. (May 2014)
Request: add land
swap/monument to
agenda
(May 2014)
Missouri Breaks
Interpretive Center
Fee increase –
passage unclear
(May 2014)

The Central Montana
RAC endorses
Director Kornze’s
proposal to revamp
the BLM’s Planning
Process. (May 2014)
The term of a RAC
member will end
after 3 years;
however if upon
expiration of the
member’s term, a
replacement has not
been appointed, the
outgoing term will be
extended until the
Secretary has
appointed a person
to fill that position
(May 2014)

Sub-RACs

Idaho Falls SubRACs
Sub-committee
formed for
Curlew/Deep Creek
TMP (Aug 2013)

Idaho Twin Falls
Sub-RACs
Sage Grouse Subcommittee will meet
in Nov. (Sep 2013)
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MT East
Sub-RACs
Pumpkin Creek
Committee Suggestion that RAC
form a citizens
committee to solicit
public input

MT Central
Sub-RACs

RAC formed subcommittee to work on
Pocatello TMP
(Jan 2014)

Jarbidge RMP
(Jan 2014)

Considering subcommittee to review
Thompson Creek Mine
Draft EIS
(Jan 2014)

Wild Horse and Burro
(Jan 2014)

(Sept 2013)
Pumpkin Creek
Committee officially
formed - develop a
proposal/
recommendation to
BLM to finalize a
multiple use plan for
area
(May 2014)

Gateway West
(Jan 2014)
Cedar Fields and
Castle Rocks Closures
(Jan 2014)
Sage Grouse
(Jan 2014)

RAC
Recommendations
and Advice

Montana
Western
Approve
recommendations on
Rec Fees (March 2012)

NM –
Albuquerque
Rio Puerco RMP –
recommendations
highlighted preferred
options
(July 2014)

Forest Service Earthquake Lake
Visitor Center fee
elimination approved
(March 2012)

Tent Rocks Monument
is underfunded Proposing to increase
fees. Proposal will be
brought to RAC at a
later date.
(July 2014)

MOTION - reiterate
and support 2007
shooting restriction
recommendations passed unanimously
(March 2012)

Discussion: What
should RAC be?
Concerned that
meetings are mostly
informational; limited
time to develop
recommendations.
BLM to provide
information. Agenda
and priorities need to
be set by RAC. RAC
should help with
issues people are
interested in before
they get angry. (July
2014)

Missouri River
Recreation Fees –
unanimously approved
(June 2012)

NM –
Farmington
Glade Run Recreation
Area - Draft
management plan –
Deliverables for the
RAC = Letter of
support.
(Feb 2013)
RAC MOTION- support
alt. A - passed
unanimously (Feb'14)
Public Comment
Periods - MOTION follow sign-in
protocol, limit
speakers to five
minutes, and disallow
questions and answers
- passed unanimously
(Feb 2014)
Tri-State Corridor RAC to help on
Management Plan
(NOV 2013)

Cebolla O&G EA - BLM
asking for help to id
information on a
variety of issues for
NEPA. (NOV 2013)
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NM –
Las Cruces
BLM asked for
assistance from the
RAC with recreation
access issues (April
2013)

TriCounty RMP –
BLM wants the use of
firearms to be safe
and in a proper area
– Requests RAC
assistance
(Aug 2013)

BLM Asked RAC to
keep own route
inventory; attend
training for travel
management.
(April 2014)

Discussion re:
prioritizing timber
salvage -beetle killed
trees. RAC would like
feedback from BLM on
how areas are
prioritized
(June 2012)
USFS Fee proposal Passed unanimously
(Aug 2013)

Mancos/Gallup Shale
RMP amendment BLM request RAC
assistance in
addressing all issues
that need to be
addressed (NOV 2013)

Motion for BLM to add
Henneberry House to
the cabin rental
program. Unanimous.
(Aug 2013)

Sub-RAC

MT West
Sub-RACs

NM Albuquerque SubRACs

Subgroup - REC fees

RMPs
(Dec 2013)
El Malpais NCA
(Dec 2013)

Subgroup developed
to review EIS for Mid
States Transmission
Intertie (MSTI).
Timber Subgroup Asking BLM to
prioritize resources to
address dying timber

Forestry Work
(Dec 2013)
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Chaco Canyon - BLM
request RAC
assistance in
developing plan for
leasing around
National Historic Park;
BLM feels EIS and
NEPA proper place for
public involvement
(NOV 2013)
Monument designated
in March '13; BLM
developing
management plan focus on public
involvement - RAC to
help developing
alternatives
(Nov 2013)
Planning 2.0 - BLM
wants input from RAC
on how to improve the
process (May 2014)
NM Farmington
Sub-RACs

NM
Las Cruces
Sub-RACs

